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ABSTRACT
THE SPECULUM AND THE SCALPEL:
THE POLITICS OF IMPOTENT REPRESENTATION
AND NON-REPRESENTATIONAL TERRORISM
SEPTEMBER 1999
DAVID MERTZ, B.A. UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ann Ferguson
Social philosophy at the end of the twentieth century must be prefixed
by what it follows. It has become commonplace to describe our moment as
postmodern and post-structuralist, perhaps also post-Marxian. While true
enough, our situation more specifically must be post-Lacan, post-Althusser,
post-Foucault, and post-Critical Theory. A number of theorists highlight the
context this dissertation places itself in, but Slavoj Zizek and Judith Butler
should be emphasized in this regard.
The positive project of this dissertation begins with radical doubts about
the operation of epistemic truth in subjectivity and in language (of a sort first
raised by Nietzsche). The dissertation is a series of case studies in the modes of
failure of truth, and of the manner in which ideology functions within the void
left by the necessary absence of truth. It has a political project of determining
what forms counter-hegemony can take absent a traditional assumption of a
solid ground for veracity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Terrorism is politics without metaphysics; and metaphysics, the
textual form taken by [political] reaction.
The Words of the Document
The title of this document will have been "The Speculum and the
Scalpel: The Politics of Impotent Representation and Non-Representational
Terrorism." And its first sentence will be, "Terrorism is politics without
metaphysics; and metaphysics, the textual form taken by [political] reaction." I
have gotten a little way in the analysis of these words: My project will, in the
first instance, be an outgrowth of much "anti-theoretical" philosophy which
runs from Nietzsche through such living, or recently living, figures as Althusser,
Deleuze, and Zizek (and hence Lacan).
My first observation will be that words do not mirror the world. Words
also do not resemble things (besides other words); words do not "picture the
world;" words do not describe the world; words do not "refer to" the world.
Words have none of the mystical properties philosophically (and commonly)
ascribed to them, of standing in some special, but always murky, relationship to
other things. Words simply are events in the world. Whatever regularity governs
them is the regularity of a fully material world.
The problems with the above paragraph are evident. For one, my
proclamation of materialism in the last paragraph can have no meaning. My
sentence "the world and its words are only material" can refer to no world,
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because it denies its own referentiality. So there is simply something out there
(where?) to which words do not refer. Any effort to name, and hence hypost-
asize this something (even my own with my current word 'something') is
symptomatic of what Nietzsche would call a "resentful consciousness;" i.e. a
consciousness which denies the unfixedness and, hence, indescribability of the
world.
However, self-refutation is the lesser of two problems facing my
irreferentialism. The arguments of self-refutation have already been dealt with,
in a somewhat different context— though I think adequately— in a book by our
colleague, Andrew Blais. More serious is naive irreferentialism's blindness to the
subjective necessity of the referentiality of language. It is here that a reading of
Lacan becomes necessary. Through the use of Lacan, and of the Lacanianism of
Zizek, I hope to be able to articulate the contradictory necessities embedded in
the referential pretense of all use of language. As Zizek writes in a slightly
different context, "One cannot attain it, but one also cannot escape it." A major
focus of this document will be to articulate, in several different concrete
contexts, what it means for linguistic phenomena to present themselves
subjectively as simultaneously necessary and impossible. Such necessary and
impossible linguistic phenomena will go by the very general name 'metaphysics
in this document; though 'metaphysics' will be discussed mostly in its concrete
instances, such as its manifestation as nationalism, or as the semi-perpetual
U.S. "War on drugs."
Associated with my irreferentialist and anti-realist program will be an
anti-semantic, pragmaticist program for philosophy of language. I wish to make
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a pragmaticist 1 move because I thoroughly believe in the "linguistic turn."
Words are very important; they do things'. What I wish to do in this document is
to move the paradigm of what words do from the dialectic and referential
paradigm to a politicized pragmatic paradigm. It is for this purpose that I find the
following prototypes very important: it used to be that the "best case" of what
language does was dialogue— Socratic, communicative, descriptive conversation
which showed the essential, intersubjectively available, nature of things. I prefer
this: the "best case" example of what language does is a yell of "Fire!" in a
crowded theater. All language does not more or less resemble dialogue, subject
only to various distortions; all language more resembles a cry of
"Fire!" — subject, equally, to various ideological distortions, various denials of
the power struggles contained in every utterance.
Several flows feed and divert from the stream of this document. I am
certainly not the first to pay attention to what words do. There is a certain
stream of radicalism in European artistic communities which I find very valuable
and interesting, going from Dada and Surrealism, to Situationism, and sprouting
also in certain "Immediatist" strategies of post-punk America. The Oxford
"ordinary-language" philosophers are of undeniable import in many regards. A
structuralist trend of Marxism, encompassing— although in different ways— both
Althusser and Negri, as well as, for example, Lefort, is central to understanding
ideology in the concrete. But from inflows also come outflows, congealings, of
some particular ideological analyses which I provide herein.
1
Linguistic pragmaticism is quite a different matter, of course, from
philosophical
pragmatism. Let us postpone any real talk of the latter.
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Reading Words
Let me return briefly to the posturing I made above with a title and first
sentence. Let us just read it a bit more carefully, first : 2
X X X X X
"The Speculum and the Scalpel:"
X X X X X
Obviously, this is a metaphor whose terms are explicitly given in the
subtitle. . . which I will get to. I should interject here, in a Cagean disruption of
this text, that what you hold is not my actual document, but a mutilation
produced largely by the Office of Degree Requirements. A speculum is either of
two things, and I wish to play off of both meanings. In the one case, from the
Latin, it is a mirror; i.e. it stands for the whole Western metaphor of philosophy-
/science/theory/whatever as "the mirror of nature," or the mirror of something
else. I wish, as I have written, to get rid of this metaphor. Secondly, a speculum
is a medical, primarily gynecological, instrument which opens, and hence
reveals the contents of, a bodily orifice, usually a vagina. Contrasted to a
speculum is a scalpel. A scalpel simply changes the state of a body, in a violent
intervention, without making any pretense of either reflecting or revealing
anything. I know this is not entirely true, since there is such a thing as
exploratory surgery (in fact, such will be my dissertation, I hope), but I think the
2
ln the following, as at other places, misguided manuscript submission
requirements
force an incorrect typographic rendering of the text. A better version of
this document
may be found at <http://gnosis.cx/publish/mertz/>. The correct
presentation of the
below is two columns of text, the right column providing running
commentary upon the
left. As a substitute, each target of comment is set off vertically by
bounding rows of the
iconic symbol X.
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contrast is OK. Sometimes the use of a scalpel does something "good" to a
body. I am not unaware, however, of clitoridectomy, etc.!
X X X X X
"The Politics of Impotent Representation and Non-Representational
Terrorism."
X X X X X
"The body" is, in some sense, the body politic. I do not wish to say
much about what organs, or what limbs this body has— for it is a great part of
my purpose to problematize this very possibility. Only by staying at a
metaphorical level can I avoid — or partially avoid— the error of claiming to
represent the composition of this "body politic," which is epistemically some-
thing like Kant’s noumena. If I were to state here that the body is composed of
classes, or of genders, or of races, or of individuals in contradictory institutional
roles, or something else like this, I would exemplify the first sort of politics:
impotent representation, metaphysics, and reaction. Of course, this does not
preclude using the same words, for example "the political world is divided into
two contradictory classes whose conflict shapes history, in other places, with
other effects.
The phrase "impotent" suggests, of course, that "the body" is a sexual
body in some sense. I hope, though, that the sexuality of words is not
understood in a narrow teleological directedness toward biological reproduction.
Sexuality is neither the phallocentric directedness of an organism toward
reproduction, nor a mere libidinal release-a simply entropic effect.
Sexuality
should instead be understood as Bataille does and/or as a simply
transformative
force with neither aim, origin, nor object.
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Words can do many things. However, let me paradoxically exemplify two
of the things words almost always do: words create representations and words
intervene in existing representations. Let us say, neither arbitrarily nor truthfully,
that these two functions are always simultaneously present in any utterance;
and that these two functions exhaust the taxonomy of utterance.
X X X X X
Terrorism is politics without metaphysics; and metaphysics, the textual
form taken by [political] reaction!
X X X X X
The first function of words, exemplified in my taxonomy— perhaps
epitomized by taxonomy in general — is metaphysics; it is what Nietzsche,
according to my reading of Deleuze on Nietzsche and to my reading of
Nietzsche himself, called ressentiment.
Here my deliberately careless reading, or perhaps outright misreading,
will be recognized. Would not a more defensible reading of Nietzsche consider
the creation of representations active ; and the mere acting within these given
representations reactive, and hence resentful. What would be missed by the
"defensible" reading would be that the acting ("intervening") within existing
representations which I mention is specifically an acting against those represen
tations. To put it in a Spinozistic metaphysical figure (again, a Deleuzian
Spinozism is indicated), the metaphysical use of words acts in a manner which
pertains to the composition of existing representations, while the terroristic
use
of words is that which pertains to the decomposition of these representations.
In either case a semiotic closure is assumed: words act upon words
within lan-
6
guage, but upon extra-linguistic things only as noumena act upon noumena— \.e.
in a manner about which we can say nothing.
The second function of words should not be named. Naming this
function, even, for example, calling it a function only exemplifies the
metaphysical function of words. Since one must write in the metaphysical
mode— at least in so far as one writes about something — I will call this function
"terrorism." Why not? Baudrillard writes about "the event" with the same
purpose. It is in the terrorist mode that Bataille, echoing Sade, likes sex, as that
which exceeds all description and direction (it never was that way for
me— perhaps me readers have other experiences). I cannot both exemplify and
name the "terrorist" function of language. I can point to the yell of "Fire!"
mentioned above, and say "that's what I mean." I can mention that I think
some of my memos have attempted to be terrorist. But one cannot say what it
is I am pointing at. The best I can do, perhaps, is choose the particular word
"terrorist" to name the function which opposes metaphysics. Hearing the
word — especially hearing it fondly, passionately, sexually embraced and
positively evaluated-makes people react. It heats tempers. It prompts disbelief.
It spreads confusion. It has many effects more difficult to name. Good.
Problems with Words
Objections. First it may be objected that the creation of representations
acts toward the decomposition of old representations; that, in fact, my
opposition itself denies the reality of flux/"the being of
becoming"/will-to-power,
etc., since it pretends that there is an entire mode of language (the
metaphysical one) which leaves in place representations. Insofar as
the
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opposition I make is a metaphysical one, I am guilty, resentfully, of denying
flux. But the level at which the objection operates is slightly different from that.
The advocate of the "being of becoming" of representations claims that change
is simply change tout court. I disagree with this.
To understand my disagreement it is necessary to backtrack. I should
mention, here while I backtrack, that I owe the problem of my dissertation to
Alison Brown; whose dissertation (by now so long ago) addressed precisely the
problem I have been discussing (though perhaps not in a manner easily
recognized). I raised a question, way back at Brown's dissertation defense. I
asked, approximately, whether her notions of a demogenic self and
heterodemotic action— her notations for her attempt to understand a ground for
radical political action— attempted to find a position outside of Ideology, or
merely one opposed to particular ideologies— as Althusser has distinguished the
capital T from the lower case T. In brief, Althusser distinguishes, with the
marker of capitalization, between the very Symbolic process of subjectivation
and the particular contents which are interpellated into us. Particular Ideological
State Apparati (ISA’s) fill, transiently, subjectivity with content; and, in this
sense, become temporarily determinate. However, the material base of
subjectivation is referred to with the capitalized Ideology . Inasmuch as it is
always subjects into whom ISA contents are interpellated, there must exist an
outsideless Ideology which assure this interpellation "in the last instance." This
is the meaning of Althusser.
I was not satisfied that Dr. Brown gave an answer at that time
(though
that was understandable given the circumstance). These interjections
form,
perhaps, a sort of Burroughs cut-up of the text; a text already
subjected to
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capricious interventions by the Office of Degree Requirements. However, let us
suppose that since she is both ambitious and optimistic she would wish to find
a position outside Ideology. I am not nearly so optimistic. The only notion I have
of the political possibility of subjective actions, including and especially speech
acts, is of acting against the particular ideologies in which we find ourselves,
not of acting against Ideology. However, I now believe that there exists a sense
in which anti-ideology can immanently constitute anti-ideology— but this sense
can be neither subjective nor objective, and hence cannot be a position (but
rather a "utopian moment"). This is the meaning of Adorno.
Althusser supposes subjectivation works. Suppose it doesn't. Perhaps
when the Ideological imperative of subjectivation locates a desiring subject
within the Symbolic order it locates it in a position which cannot be consistently
held. This is the meaning of Lacan. Perhaps the very material base of Ideology
already contains within it contradictions which are symptomatically expressed in
the subjects into which it interpellated itself. This is the meaning of Zizek.
Perhaps after the ground slips from under the speaking subject, she reemerges
somewhere quite different than in subjectivity. This is the meaning of Deleuze
and Guattari. These possibilities need to be explored.
I will make a geometric metaphor. If we imagine ideologies (i.e. systems
of representation, regimes of signs) as so many positioned vectors fixed at a
common origin, but not necessarily orthogonal, then we may conceive of
Ideology as a (hyper-)space defined by all these vectors. An utterance
considered under its metaphysical mode is simply a rotation from these vectors,
but within the vector space; i.e. a vector sum of multiples
of some number of
existing vectors. Our purported Alison Brown would picture a
demogemc self as
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speaking from an origin other than that common to the ideology vectors; and
exercising a force which resolves the ideology vector origin to a new point in an
absolute coordinate system. A terrorist act is one sharing the ideology vector
origin, but pointing in a direction orthogonal to all ideology vectors. Such a
vector is hence Kant's noumena, as I have said. However, since any particular
speech act is a combination of its component (hence orthogonal) metaphysical
and terrorist vectors, the total vector of a speech act lies outside the given
vector space (Ideology), but nonetheless has a projection into it (the
metaphysical vector). I imagine the effect of a speech act as expanding,
reshaping, and resolving the vector space to include the combined speech
vector— which will leave the terrorist vector outside of the vector space, but no
longer orthogonal to all vectors in the space (it will have a projection, not only
onto the combined speech vector now included in the space, but also any
metaphysical vector which has the most recent combined vector as an element
to resolve). The continual resolution and expansion of the Ideology vector space
allows me to capture the notion of co-optation. A terrorist vector is completely
free of co-optation only at the very moment of its enunciation, but nonetheless
does not, at least for a time, become merely another ideology vector.
A second objection is more serious. Namely, distinguishing terrorist and
metaphysical modes of talking-like praising "terrorism," as the word is
commonly used-gives no ground for substantive political choices. The fascists
may be terrorists, just as much as we may. But then, this is exactly the point;
insofar as we speak in the metaphysical mode we do not act in a substantive
political manner-we merely rearrange and permute dead ideologies,
dead
metaphors, dead regimes. If I act differently from fascists (and I
do not know if
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do) it is not because I can name the differences, but contrarily simply because
the acts are different. In fact, I am trying, not so subtly, to exemplify the very
terrorist action I praise, in the realm of theory, by naming my opposite in a
particular way: ’fascist'. Theory cannot make the "ethical" distinction between
fascism and radicalism; only / can (only an existing, living, radically inconsistent
actor can, not an ideological, theoretical position). The same applies to the
claims I "came on with" in these remarks. Materialism, as a metaphysical
position, is incoherent and quite indefensible; but I am a materialist as a political
conviction. Metaphysically, it is foolish and naive to think that history is the
history of class struggle (as Marx always knew), but I choose to identify myself
with the interests of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie— and to identify the
proletariat as The Agent of Revolution— as a political choice.
Words before Words
The chapters below warrant a certain prefatory explanation. Perhaps by
putting the moral of the various stories up front, a greater sense of doom and
inevitability will adhere with the meandering details of particular stories. There
is a certain literary device which Zizek points to affectionately wherein the
fateful and fatal resolution of a story is contained in its opening scenes. Quite
contrary to our common sense that anticipation of a story's conclusion is played
out through its uncertainty, Zizek argues that a foreshadowed dreadful
inevitability can paradoxically heighten our hopes of preventing a foreclosed
conclusion. The moral of this one example lies in the close relation between
contingency and predetermination, as Kant knew (but then so did Thomas
Aquinas). In any event, let me introduce what I hope to do.
In Chapters II through V, I trace a path from the general to the specific. I
follow an old eighteenth century progression through the "chain-of-being,"
which is still today sometimes echoed in divisions and hierarchies conventionally
arranged between disciplines. We all know, after all, that sociology rests on the
lower ground of psychology, abstracted; psychology, in turn, on anatomy and
brain chemistry; human anatomy (despite Marx's contrary observation) on the
biology and evolution of the diverse creatures which are older and simpler than
humans; biology on bio-chemistry; and the whole shebang, ultimately, on basic
physics. Not one to buck a trend, I'll start as close to the bottom as I can.
The path I trace goes from biology in a broad sense, to human sex and
subjectivity, to that broad but historical horizon imposed on subjectivity by race
and nationality, to more "specific" cultural events which we might well live
through both the beginning and end of. From the universal to the local, in some
broad steps. I read Hegel backwards, at least in Chapters II through V.
In Chapters VI and VII, I try to understand what the irreferentialist
arguments in the tributary chapters (l-V) mean politically. In Chapter VI, I want
to determine where we are : What is it to live within totalizing ideology, ideology
which creates its own referential necessity. In Chapter VII, I speculate about
what we can nonetheless do. A kind of ideological referentiality is certainly
necessary, but given that it is also impossible, it can be transgressed (which is
not to say 'refuted', nor even 'resisted' in a traditional way).
On Biology and Beings
If my overall point is to observe the simultaneous necessity and
impossibility of reference, I should trace this necessity and impossibility from
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the most basic to more rarified levels. So I start with some rather metaphysical
remarks about the nature of biological beings in Chapter II, which perhaps touch
upon some of those "lower" levels inasmuch as they assume a Nietzschean sort
of "play-of-forces." But I think I cannot manage a quantum analysis of my
thesis. Here is what I would like to ask: What if we pose the question of what
representation is as a biological one? My hope is to engage in the activity
promoted by a common sort of scientistic reductionist of a familiar type 3 in
order to turn on its head empirico-scientific dogma about ideas, representations
and reality.
The remarks I make in Section A, of Chapter II, are a reiteration of some
basic observations in ethology and evolutionary biology; and in Section B, I
make certain philosophical remarks about an ontological understanding of what
biology is. Interject (dear reader...): the text actually written, and that approved
by the signing committee, can only be found at the web site indicated in the
acknowledgment, not in the pages in your hands. I do not know anything
unusual — in the sense of scientific expertise— about either of these areas, which
is both a virtue and a limitation for my purposes. I do not claim to discover
some new factual content in biology, some esoteric research on particular
organisms, but rather try to put into a different light the facts which any
educated lay person knows about evolution. Or better, I try to use this new light
to understand by homology how speech acts are just as badly described as
3
lt is probably unwise to try to unpack the Sokal /Social Text affair here, since neither
original protagonist is quite as clearly emblematic of idealized positions as their proponents
claim. But there are certainly resonances there of some familiar positions. What one
encountered in some of Sokal's defenders was precisely the sentiment that it is improper
to ask my sort of "soft" questions that might cast doubt on the purity of representation.
Hold in mind just that type as my intended interlocutor.
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ontologically referential as are the representational strategies of evolution
through natural selection. Biologists, as most scientists or most laypersons,
have generally been fairly unreflective in their referential (i.e. realist)
assumptions about what they themselves do when they do science. As both a
cause and effect of this unreflectiveness an effort to actually bring the "theory
of referentiality" into the same view as studies in biology has rarely been made.
Even those researchers who have looked at animal (or plant, for that matter)
communication have started with a rigidly referential image in which the only
question to ask has been "How do organisms successfully communicate
information ?" A better question, to my mind, to start with, would be "How do
the general mechanisms of deception sometimes result in communication?" As I
will argue, a more general success for organisms comes in achieving
irreferentiality.
Section C of Chapter II, I step back from the scientific-philosophy of
Sections A and B, and try to "go meta" with a bit of philosophy-of-science.
Here I wish to look at a certain conceptual horizon which has inhered in several
sciences. This horizon— formed of a certain conception of the distinction of self
from non-self— is interesting herein for two reasons. On the one hand, I try to
understand more precisely the referentialist bias which has been brought to
biology, economics and philosophy, according to a homology among them. This
is somewhat interesting to my project in itself, but what is more interesting is
the second aspect of what I do in Section C. I argue throughout that
discourses — referential discourses— create their own totalization and close off
their outsides. In the case of the particular horizon of biology and its sisters that
I describe— and indeed I could not describe it otherwise— a certain crack
in the
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closure has been created by two alternate understandings of (roughly) the same
scientifico-ideological space. In different ways Haraway and Bataille un-center
the referential horizon of these scientific fields, and thereby help us move within
the irreferentialist space I stake out.
On Sex and Subjects
Ascending our chain-of-being a bit, we arrive at human specificity, which
I argue consists of two things that are rather close together: sex and
subjectivity. Subjectivity, in ratio-empiricist philosophy, lies in a mind full of
representations of objects, and of itself as object. I have generally addressed
myself to the schema in Chapter II, Section C, and it is generally well-known to
any philosophical readers. This is what I want to unravel in Chapter III, through
a use of Lacan and some ancillaries.
Naturally, for Lacan, Lacanians, crypto-Lacanians, and anti-Lacanians,
subjectivity, in one manner or another, rests on sexuation. So within this part of
my analysis, I must move from subjects to their sexual "ground"— and from
there to their dismantling. By way of introduction, in Section A, I provide some
preliminary and general remarks on Lacan. It is an introduction among any
number of introductions. But I also hope to remind readers of some of general
Lacanian ideas which I will utilize to further ends in Sections B and C, as well as
throughout this document.
In Section B, of Chapter III, I address a peculiar and fruitful dispute
among some Lacanians about precisely how to understand the failure of
subjectivity which is sex. For all the Lacanians, the modernist representational
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subjectivity is a mode of failure. Understanding that mode is a key to
understanding a post-modernist irreferentiality.
Section C, of Chapter III, might be called a set of strategic premonitions.
I return, to a certain degree, to positioning myself vis-a-vis the positive and
negative Lacanians. But more than that, I hope, in Section C, to provide myself
a few more Lacanian tools to use in the final chapters on politics. They are
Lacan tools, though, so I think it best to build them in Chapter III.
On Race and Nation
Yet another ring along our chain-of-being, the broadest feature one can
distinguish about human subjects is that we are raced and nationed. The paired
ideology of race and nation is arguably the founding referential necessity of
modern subjectivity. To be— since Capitalism came to the world— is to be what
one is (national identity), and not what one is not [other racial identity). Identity
and non-identity are demands structuring subjects, and play out here a partial
homology with Lacanian analyses of sexuation and subjectivity. What I hope to
have done in Chapter IV is to both understand and give the lie to this
identificatory logic of Capitalist identity. To have a nation and be a race is both
a necessary and impossible condition of being a (modern) subject.
On Facticity and Fancy
Still higher up the chain-of-being-at the terminus, for my purposes-lay
a number of transient, but totalizing ideological moments. Systems of belief
can, in a variety of ways, form their own closure, their own cohesive
strategy
for disallowing refutation or resistance. And yet, such systems go away, never
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refuted but nonetheless rendered absurd, or merely forgotten. I will address this
diachronic structure of ideology at a theoretical level in Chapters VI and VIII. But
antecedent to doing so, I will explore, in Chapter V, a few examples of some
ideologies of recent memory, or still somewhat lived, but fading. As with all the
chapters in my chain-of-being sequence, my anecdotal stories hope to illustrate,
primarily, the quality of necessity attached to ideologies. The impossibility
aspect is largely retrospective: The beliefs I discuss have largely gone from
"How dare you deny..." to "Surely no one every really believed...". All in a few
years, and all without having allowed refutation.
The examples I have are all of bad ideologies, which have left bad
legacies, even after their disappearance from memory. I am frankly not certain
whether good ideologies— if there are such— can also be totalizing, and whether
they can leave correspondingly good after-effects . 4 It may be that I simply have
too dour an outlook to analyze liberatory hegemonies; or that I have lived in bad
times. Or it may be that it is just of the nature of totalization that no good
comes of it. Obviously, ideas, and even ideologies, can be good; but can the
good ones be totalizing?
4The two conceptual schemata that come closest, at least that come to my mind, are
"October" and "1968." I am not really sure whether either can be considered totalizing in
the sense I analyze, nor am I sure why both are most literally names of finite past time-
durations. "October" comes close-or at least came close for a good while, mostly prior to
my own life-to a totalizing effect, at least for some people. The concept around
"October" is not simply that a certain group of people took some specific actions in a
few
weeks of 1917. It is also not an endorsement of particular Soviet policies or actions, nor
maybe even of the Soviet Union itself. Indeed, if Stalin was brutal, or the Soviet Union of
the 1970s wasteful and inefficient, that simply shows that neither is contained
within the
concept "October." Rather, "October" is an ideology (a good one) according to
which the
victory of the proletariat is possible, right, and actual. This idea indeed
forms a certain
closure, although it is not clear how to weigh, nor even clearly discern, its effects.
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The first particular system of belief I discuss, in Section A, Chapter V, is
that around the "AIDS plague." The general evocation— well meaningly uttered,
no doubt of the phrase "How dare you... when people are dying!" served as a
kind of closure of thought and dispute, and wound up encompassing and
engulfing all sorts of beliefs which leftists would otherwise hold dear. Because
doomful prognostications allowed no refute (indeed, "How dare we..." try), non-
totalizing ideals of liberation, discussion, autonomy, and so on, merely vanished.
This was not because the AIDS ideas were better than the other ideas, but
rather because of the difference in function and structure between totalizing
and non-totalizing ideas. In retrospect— and this is a short retrospect, less than
five years— with the essential disappearance of AIDS as both discourse and
disease, the inside of that recent ideology seems as foreign and fantastic as
Egyptian or Arthurian legend.
Another recent corruption idea-cluster is discussed in Section B, Chapter
V. For a few years, and still clinging to remnants, the ideas of Satanic Ritual
Abuse, child-pornography rings, repressed memories, and a few more elements,
lived their 1 5 minutes of fame. Hundreds of innocent defendants remain in
prison, and probably will for the rest of their lives. But even at its height, the
totalization mechanism of these ideas remained more local to a few places,
around a few prosecutions, than have the other beliefs I discuss. There has
been a spread of these ideas from place to place, certainly, but totalization has
functioned only in local outbreaks (almost like a Burroughs virus). I should
interject here, although Derrida might accuse me of logocentrism, that what you
hold is not my actual document, but a mutilation produced largely by the Office
of Degree Requirements. What is most interesting to look at for my purposes is
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the manner in which denial functioned as proof (chiefly, but not only, in the
testimony of the child "victims"), performing an obvious closure of refutation
thereby.
Finally in Chapter V, in Section C, I take a look at the perennial "war-on-
drugs". The effects are obvious enough: prison populations have tripled in less
than two decades in the U.S. The particular closure the ideas effect is the
required admonition that "Drugs are bad" as a ticket for entry into the
conversation. Naturally, the price of entry forecloses any real refutational
position . 5
5There is— or rather is not— another missing section for this chapter. I have dropped a
discussion of "glimpsed terrorists" — the ideological imago of terrorism. But for reasons of
time, of length, of personal conceptual limitations, I have allowed the war-on-drugs
discussion to stand in the place of the terrorists one. In both, ideology operates by a
peculiar interplay of appearance and disappearance. The media-self of a terrorist obtains a
hyper-visibility only on condition the terrorist "himself" remaining hidden. Much the same
logic works in my discussion of "drug-criminals," so I will let that stand as proxy. Still,
there is a certain fittingness and symmetry to my ommission: terrorism is in the title of this
dissertation, and its defense, of a certain sort, is the point of the document. By ommitting
the discussion of "actual" terrorists, this document exemplifies the conceptual logic of the
ideology of terrorism by hiding the thing in order to realize the image. Perhaps the absence
of the section will serve in itself as a sort of ideology critique.
What I would have done, had I kept the section, would be to look at the still
peripheral image of taint and danger of the terrorist. The image was, or is, totalizing
without quite arriving at a level of specific beliefs. There is something of a xenophobic
tinge to the image, particularly anti-lslamic or anti-Arab. But an image cannot be refuted.
Surely, yes! Most Arabs, or most Muslims, or even most of those in liberation movements
(so-called, or otherwise) do not commit the nefarious acts identified as terrorist. Ah... but
they are not the terrorists, then! The terrorists are those who potentially commit nefarious
pollutions of the purity of our American order. How can you deny the potential...?
There are two particular interesting things about the terrorist image. Or maybe
they are both merely horrible, rather than interesting: The image has led to quite a few
really awful laws from a civil-liberties perspective; and the image has been defused (though
not refuted) by its reality. The unfortunate fact for the terrorist image is that its overt
content has—through some historical accidents— undermined it covert content. Kaczinski
and McVeigh are, unfortunately for the image, native born Americans. Kaczinski maybe
can be bracketed since he had long hair, and wrote some vaguely left-wing sounding
remarks. But McVeigh is a clean-cut Christian American soldier. It hasn't helped the image
at all.
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On Understanding and Forgetting
It is by arriving at an explicit discussion of ideology, at a theoretical
level, that I can discuss materialism concretely. Throughout the remarks I make
in this document, I share in the general lay-materialism of most intellectuals. But
in a way nothing is at stake in a materialist politics when making some remarks
on biology, or about race and nation, or about the various little political histories
I address in Chapter V. And even though a good understanding of Lacan will
certainly turn on such onto-political issues, those are not really the issues I
address in my own chapter. When one talks about ideology, a materialist
commitment makes a difference.
I would like to answer a basic question: "How do conflicts in the realm
of ideas play themselves out?" In one obvious way, no meaningful answer can
be given; different conflicts come out differently, and history— including
histories of ideas and ideologies — is almost infinite in diversity. That is not the
question I hope to answer. Rather, there is a certain way of "going meta" here,
and of discussing what it means for conflicts of ideas to be resolved, and what
social mechanisms— both those of base and superstructure in the Marxian
complements— are effective 6 in these mechanisms. One theory, if you will, of
the resolution between conflicting ideas is that the epistemic force of the better
6The word 'effective' here is intended in an ontological, rather than a practical sense. I
am not interested in this description in the success or consequentiality of the mechanisms
addressed, but rather their modality in the realm of effects, as opposed to a realm of ideas,
of forces, of essences, or even of causes.
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argument, at least at times, wins. This is an idealist theory
,
7 and therefore not
one I care for as a materialist
.
8
For a materialist, ideology is material activity. I do believe in a
base/superstructure distinction, but I cannot conceive this distinction as a
difference between forces and their representations. Rather, effects are of
primary and secondary sorts (causes do not enter here), and those effects
which are primary we could call the "base." Ideology-the lived concretion of
ideas-is precisely what we should call "base." These are Althusser's ISA's.
In Section A, Chapter VI, I try to address at a higher level of generality
the pattern I have several times observed in the empirical histories of Chapter V.
With a particular attention to Nietzsche's notions of forgetfulness (and perhaps
a nod to Wing Fu Fing), I discuss the pattern in which dominant ideas, for all
their totalizing effect, nonetheless pass. This chapter largely emphasizes
exoteric effects upon ideological forms. The Real, if you like.
In Section B, Chapter VI, I spelunk inside ideology, bringing a materialist
spray-paint can. There are some messages I want to mark there. Underground
vandalism. From the inside, ideology looks as materialist as are the exoteric
7Of course, the idealism of the "theory of the force of argument" is not quite the
idealism of Transcendental Idealism. This idealism is a sort of lay-idealism which falls in no
particular conflict — at least in a practical way-with the lay-materialism of most common-
sensical academics.
8A problem presents itself in the contrast I attempt. In a sense, I can hardly argue that
the "force of the better argument" wins. In a way this statement is a tautology. The
distinction within the distinction is between different conceptions of what this force is that
the better argument has. One could make a naive materialist distinction between an
intrinsic and extrinsic force of arguments. The lay-idealist believes in an intrinsic force to
arguments, while a naive materialist sees this force as extrinsic (such as in the force of
arms possessed by the party with the winning argument). But that s not quite the kind of
materialist I am either. A better way to put it is to say that certain arguments have, as an
intrinsic quality, the potentiality and the actuality to go extrinsic. In the final analysis, it is
extrinsic forces which decide conflicts of ideas, but winning ideas themselves are already
(intrinsically) extrinsic.
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effects it undergoes. Ideology is social stuff. The effort I make is to comprehend
ideology not in terms of knowledge, but rather in terms of belief-, not as
epistemic, but as deontological. Ideas take a material form, but this material
form itself contains an imperative. You cannot know, but you must believe !
Through a use of Sloterdijk, Mocnik and Zizek I believe I make some sense of
this material imperative structure.
In Section C, Chapter VI, I briefly address the concept of philosophical
critique. A certain longstanding framework in philosophical radicalism has
maintained the notion of a position of autonomy from which ideas of resistance
can undermine dominant ideas. In its most sophisticated form, with Benjamin,
and Adorno and Horkheimer, it has acknowledged the threat of totalization, and
attempted to sustain a purely self-grounded position for critique, or a type of
critique which can function as a pure ungrounded concept. For Critical Theory,
though, counter-hegemonic ideas still overcome dominant ideas, at the level of
ideation. For me, this is a wrong analysis. Nietzschean that I am, I certainly
have no doubt that weakness can overcome strength; but materialist that I am,
I still think it does so through a (reactive) force other than the "force of the
better idea."
In Section D, Chapter VI, I provide some promised attempts at
definitions. As best I can, I try to set out my Althusser-inspired notions of
ideologies, Ideology, hegemony, ISA's, base and superstructure. After the
context of its preceding discussion, throughout the earlier chapters, I hope my
definitions will make a bit of sense.
Guy Debord's slender and influential volume anticipates a lot of what I
am attempting in this document— as well as a lot of other work since then, such
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as Baudrillard, Lyotard, much of the Lacanian thought of the 1990s, odd bits of
cultural studies and queer theory, and a variety of other social analyses. The
difficult task of presenting a first reading of Society of the Spectacle is
attempted in Section E, Chapter VI. Debord's writes of "the Spectacle," and
means by it much what I do by "totalizing ideology." For Debord, Capitalism, in
a certain period, has taken a form which coopts every representation, and in
which the lived reality of its subjects is within representation. But as I do,
Debord conceives representation in its full materiality, not in any idealist "mirror
of production." 9 To flash forward a few sections, I see Hakim Bey as standing
as the heir apparent to Debord in tracing the evolutions of Capitalist world post-
1968 (in, unfortunately, all to literal a sense after Debord's suicide in 1997).
On Transgression and Cause
Chapter VII is about transgression. Mostly, it is about transgressing sex.
Other things might be transgressed, both those more general and those more
specific in my chain-of-being, but sex is about the right size for my purposes;
and moreover, it is quite big enough by itself for this moderate sized document.
Sex— in the related senses of sexuality and gender — is certainly far too totalizing
in its operation to be refuted, or even resisted straightforwardly. The outsides of
sex are closed in on us, and all the world to see is within the ideology (for us,
9These few words, of course, are a title of one of Baudrillard's early books, one which
follows Debord's by only a couple years. Without here trying to unpack Baudrillard, either
in that particular book or in his later turns, it is obvious that Debord and Baudrillard work in
a close connection. The "mirror" shows two things — although perhaps the two are
one— both representation and consumption, twin reflections of a reductionist Marxist
"base." Despite certain commonalities, Baudrillard seems to want to analyze an internal
logic of consumption/representation paralleling that of production, while Debord contrarily
finds the logic of representation to already lie at the core of the logic of production.
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whoever we are). And yet, there is something precarious in the ideology of (that
there is) sex. It wobbles, and perhaps it will fall, like Humpty Dumpty.
Transgression works in several manners. One threat to hegemony is a
mechanism I analyze in which constellations of ideologies become connected.
Even totalizing ideologies can wind up assuming all the frailties of non-totalizing,
even transient, ones. I try to illustrate ideologies forming constellations. On the
other hand, there can be something transgressive about ignoring hegemony. The
various French Lacanian feminists (Irigaray, Wittig, Kristeva, also Butler) have
provided variations on a theme of radical alterity, feminine jouissance, and so
on. To me it always seemed to amount to almost the same thing as Adorno's
"critique from nowhere;" and to prove— although certainly equally
appealing — similarly less than satisfactory. Again, to interject, please find the
dissertation as actually written via the web site indicated in the
acknowledgments. My own outside is simply that from which dominant
ideology is ignored\
Section A, of Chapter VII, I attempt a phenomenology (and thereby an
ontology) of transgression and totalization. Some notions from Benjamin lend
themselves to this effort, specifically his distinction between homogeneous
linear and messianic time. Homogenous linear time is the time of totalizing
ideologies, and yet within ideology there is already a cooptation of messianic
time. This cooptation is not complete, however. A Phenomenological analysis of
messianic time points to a limit in ideology, even of ideologies which are
otherwise totalizing.
In Section B, of Chapter VII, I discuss some literary transgressive
gestures towards sex. A few films I analyze provide a useful framework to
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understanding exactly how acts, or representations even (which are, after all,
acts), can escape totalization. Some films, or other literary forms, have utopian
moments. For this concept, I owe a lot to Adorno. But then, there's utopian,
and there's utopian; and I think the nowhere I want to locate is not the same
place he found.
In Section C, of Chapter VII, I address an old Romantic "transgression."
Romantic love has been posed at times as an antithesis to instrumental reason,
even as the latter's transgression. Such an analysis is generally wrong, and is in
many ways precisely a cooptive move by totalizations of sexuality. It is worth
looking at this case especially from the point of view of understanding the sort
of transgression which appears as an image within totalization, but which is
not, thereby, the "real" transgression.
In Section D, of Chapter VII, the work of Hakim Bey is discussed. Bey
presents a number of very rich and interesting concepts, most of which I
endorse. His problem is much the same as mine, and he thinks he has a solution
of sorts. In a generally locational metaphor, which might serve as a complement
to my Benjaminian focus on temporalities, Bey, in TAZ, imagines the spaces
from which dominant ideology can be ignored. He is specific here, the question
of the temporary autonomous zones is not resisting hegemony, but doing
without it. In his later books, Bey also performs a number of parallels with my
concerns with transgression, terrorist language, and totalization; these are
discussed also.
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CHAPTER II
BIOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
With all the value that may adhere to the true, the genuine, the
selfless, it could be possible that a higher and more
fundamental value for all life might have to be ascribed to
appearance, to the will to deception, to selfishness and to
appetite. It might even be possible that what constitutes the
value of those good and honoured things resides precisely in
their being artfully related, knotted and crocheted to these
wicked, apparently antithetical things, perhaps even in their
being essentially identical to them. Perhaps! — But who is
willing to concern himself with such dangerous perhapses!
[Nietzsche, 1973, p.34]
A Biological Critique of Epistemology
The Artifice of Truth
It is often imagined that the assertion of truths is the general function of
language— and that error and deceit are no more than derivative possibilities
arising from the general function of truthfulness. One often hears indignant
exclamations to the effect that the notions of falsity and deception only make
sense in relation to possible knowledge of what is really true. Let us imagine ,
10
^Imagining is, really, just what I would like to do in this (or any) chapter. Metaphysics
cannot be fully accomplished, let alone proven. What a good metaphysics can do is
provide an ontological framework allowing a satisfying or useful clarity of thought. The
stodgy Quinean that I am, my greatest hope is for parsimony; in this I believe the
Spinozistic understanding of natural ecology is far superior to more traditional
Smithian/Darwinian undertakings. Beyond parsimony, however, I would suggest that my
manner of description has two additional rather decided advantages: On the one hand, it is
rather simpler to describe the observations of natural history within the terms I use than
with the more mystical systems which take a long detour through a Catholic and Baconian
hermeneutics of forcibly revealed truth which are so dominant in scientific thought.
There's the rather old matter of Ockham's Razor. A Spinozistic metaphysics accomplishes
rather more with rather fewer terms than do those whose heritage passes from Plato
through Descartes to Kant. On the other hand, those metaphysics of truth-conditional
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with a greater sensitivity to basic facts of biology, that it is instead deception
which is the general form of representation-and that truth is only one highly
rarified instance of this perfectly general deception.
What may we say about representation? Glancing at the composition of
the word 'representation' we cannot help but notice that a representation is
something which is 're'-presented, i.e. something which is made present for a
"second" time. But why should such a re-presentation ever occur? What
conceivable purpose might it support for living beings that they make such a
second presentation. Without slipping from a "minimal" understanding of
biological evolution to the "maximal" understanding I have elsewhere criticized
[Mertz, 1989a] 11 we may nonetheless suppose that for life so ubiquitously to
representation (which imagine substance behind the vacuity of Tarski's law) of which I'm
not too fond must either cast a rather thick shell between semiotic/linguistic representation
and natural phenomena to all appearances similar, or engage in rather painful contortions
to maintain the truth-preserving tendencies of "representation" in biological organisms. A
more natural, and — why not— a more truthful picture finds a common ground in biological
and semiotic representation in an identical formal falseness.
More than a commitment to nominalism, however, what the metaphysics I try to
present strives for is shallowness. There is a certain grain of nominalism even here, but the
emphasis is somewhat different. I wish to avoid stratification of levels in ontology,
reserving stratification and differentiation rather for the objects occupying the ontology.
There is a sympathy here with reductionist or monadic materialism insofar as I wish to
deny any division at the level of ontology. Things do not differ ontologically (where all
essences are formally homogeneous), but rather merely as things. Of course, even a
traditional reductionist materialism — for example Hellenic atomism — smuggles in a
stratification of ontology I wish to avoid. After all, the reductionists still believe the various
things not explained directly material to be epiphenomena ; and this is still surely an
ontological category. I propose a shallow metaphysics, not because I believe in
metaphysics at the level of external truth and falsity, but because it is precisely the
structure of ontological levels "representing" things at other levels (e.g. "Words stand for
things") which I wish to critique. Inasmuch as possible I wish not to be hoisted by my own
petard, but also inasmuch as I wish my critique not to rely solely on the sins I identify.
1
1
1n brief, I criticize the common tendency of understanding evolution as a process of
organisms obtaining optimal "fit" with their environment, as opposed to simply not dying
out. For more on this critique see also Levins and Lewontin [1985], Rose, Kamin, and
Lewontin, [1985]; or for a typical and influential example of the error, Dawkins [1990].
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utilize representation there must be some general "survival value " 12 in it. I might
Survival value, is of course, a notion whose misuse is closely tied with the
maximalist conceptions of evolution which I mention in footnote 1 1 . The problem with
approaches toward conceptualizing evolution which make casual use of the term survival
value are of two general sorts. In the first instance, these approaches tend to view
environments in a mechanistic and hypostatized fashion. Not only do they suppose that
environments are themselves static and independent of the individual organisms which act
within them, but also, still more seriously, that there exists a single environmentally
defined niche constraining the possible adaptations of an organism. Although the limiting
assumption of staticity has problems, it also has some plausibility in many
instances — however, such ubiquitous interactions as plants modifying the chemical
composition of the soil they grow in already complicate the assumption of staticity.
Restraining the niches within which adaptive change within a species occurs to one, or
even several, is an even more glaring inadequacy in the approaches we criticize. Within the
space of any environmental ecosphere or bioregion there exist huge variations in all
microenvironmental factors. To chose just one arbitrary example, the temperature in many
regions may differ by as much as 20 degrees Fahrenheit over the space of just a few
inches, where boundaries of light/shade and proximity to plants exist in the region. An
insect's "niche" may include the fact it travels exclusively in shaded areas; and indeed the
insect may evolve towards maximum utilization of this shaded region. On the other hand, a
different path towards maximalization of environmental utilization could involve migrating
just those few inches towards sunlit regions. These two adaptations suggested present
paths to utilization of two different niches; but these niches are already possibilities for the
ancestor insect in the simple sense that the move from one to the other is well within the
locomotive capacity of the insect. Similar niche distinctions occur across all of the
thousands or millions of microenvironmental gradients and transitions within any creature's
"bioregion" and "niche"
Still more serious than the criticisms mentioned in the above paragraph, is many
biologists' (and biological popularizers'j wanton disregard for the presence or absence of
haplotypic variation within a population of a trait they suppose to have survival
value — and, in general, for the genetically open paths for possible evolution. It is here
important that one notice that phenotypic variation in a trait is simply not, in itself, suffi-
cient. Many traits which vary phenotypically vary either due to environmental noise or
systematic environmental difference, or due to a complex array of unrelated alleles (many
of which will also control for non-selected, but potentially important, traits). Supposing a
particular phenotypic trait to increase fecundity, but to be determined by an array of non-
proximate alleles, the only way that this trait could become dominant or universal in a
population is through elimination of alternate alleles at each of these gene sites. However,
such an elimination will, in most cases, have other phenotypic effects on organisms — and
will additionally affect the survivability of the population as a whole in a manner not
necessarily correlate with the fecundity of individual organisms (in the simplest example, a
population's survival may depend upon alternate alleles existing in rough proportion across
the population as a whole — as for example with sickle-cell hemoglobin which when
recessively paired increases malaria survivability, but when monogenetic has mortal results
for the individual organism). Even beyond this concern, those we criticize tend to imagine
every phenotypically manifested haplotypic variation which they might posit to automati-
cally exist in a given population. So, for example, human sociobiologists imagine that just
because they can operationalize a phenotypically varying trait such as selfishness or
xenophobia, it must willy nilly exist in a haplotypically selectable form within a population.
Over and above the error made by assuming every experimentally operationalized
phenotypic trait to be haplotypically variant is that made in facile judgements of what is
actually selected for. Many — probably in some sense the overwhelming majority— of the
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interject here, in a pattern of almost extra-textual terrorism, that what you hold
is not my actual dissertation, but a mutilation produced largely by the Office of
Degree Requirements. Furthermore, this survival value is actually quite clear in
its general features, though naturally it differs in every particular from organism
to organism (or gene to gene, species to species, population to population— as
you prefer). The survival value of representation is in the possibility of
successful deception.
Before attempting to understand why representation as a survival trait
has as its universal first nature deception we should first make a distinction
which has been made many times before. Volosinov [1986] distinguishes
between 'sign' and 'signal'; Pierce [Ducrot and Todorov, 1979] in his trinitarian
fashion between 'symbol', 'sign' and 'icon'; Harry Redner [1994], following a
tradition in which Erich Auerbach [Auerbach and Trask, 1953] is a notable
name, between 'mimesis' and '(modern) representation'. No doubt many others
of whom I am unaware and aware make distinctions which amount to the same
thing. For the purposes of this section, let us phrase the distinction as between
'expression' and 'representation'.
traits which evolve in species, whether finally advantageous or disadvantageous, arise as
"accidental" byproducts of traits directly selected for or against. So even, for example, if
there could somehow be shown to be a haplotypic center for human xenophobia, this
would not prove that it was xenophobia itself which was the subject of selective pressure
(as opposed to some more general — or more specific — human [neurological] trait).
Besides Dawkins [1990], Wilson [Wilson and Landry, 1980; Wilson, 1988] is a
clear recent culprit in this misuse. For a more sophisticated picture see Levins and
Lewontin [7555], and Gould [ 1977 ]. It is somewhat dangerous to allow the use of the
phrase under discussion in this document; and we are not unaware of its dangers.
However, for the rhetorical purposes of this section of the dissertation we will continue to
use the phrase, but put it in italics properly to indicate its status as a foreign phrase for
which a proper translation does not exist.
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Expression, Attribute and Representation 13
What is the distinction between 'expression' and 'representation'? In the
first place, it can be noted that every representation is necessarily an
expression. Later on we will notice that certain expressions may depend upon
the possibility of representation as well (though without exactly thereby being
representations). But before even this first place, we should try, tentatively,
directly to define our terms. Roughly, an expression is an "alienable" indication
that a thing is what it is. We could say that an expression expresses or
indicates the essence a thing has, since it is only by being the thing it is that a
thing can firstly produce the expression indicative of that essence. 14
13
l frequently call the metaphysics I employ here Spinozistic. It is not, in point of fact,
however, Spinozian. The terms I use are different, and I use them for different reasons. As
much as my inspiration and thanks goes to Spinoza, particularly as "expressed" in the
works of Deleuze (especially, oddly, his book on Nietzsche [Deleuze, 1983]) and Negri
[1991], my arguments are different. At a first brush, one might transpose several terms
between my dissertation and the essays of Spinoza: my 'Essence' becomes 'Substance';
'Attribute' becomes 'Expression'; 'Expression' becomes 'Mode'; while 'Representation' is
orphaned in this transposition. There is a certain sense to these transpositions, but it is a
limited one. None of my terms function identically to the transposed ones in Spinoza, nor
still less do they function identically to the same terms in Spinoza. Overall, the reader
should be best served by bracketing any effort to find a direct relation between my terms
and those of Spinoza, while nonetheless acknowledging that there is a prevalent
commonness in the desire for a direct and shallow ontology.
14We do not here depart from the Spinozistic cast in which we attempt to understand
essence and expression. To wit: we do not suppose that the essence of a thing is ever
anything apart from the immediate unity of its expressions, or, at least, of its attributes.
Expression here is taken to be identical with the Spinozistic a ttribu te— merely considered
from a different perspective. Expression and attribute are, for us, simply two sides of a
coin, separated only by the special relations of alienability marked by the term
'expression'.
Considered from the point of view of a thing itself, an attribute as expressive is an
alienated aspect of its essence. But considered from the point of a second thing, a first
thing's expressed attribute is, contrarily and precisely, a feature of a first thing’s
immanence. This distinction is given in example within the main text, infra, but we will
here detail it in its most abstract and precise form. Since a thing, from its own perspective,
enters into relation with a second thing only insofar as an expression of its essence [see
note 16, also] becomes simultaneously an attribute of such a second thing, an attribute is
an expression only insofar as it is immanently alienated. From the perspective of a second,
external thing, however, a first thing's expression is precisely the aspect under which it
becomes a thing for the second thing. In this regard, therefore, every expression
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This all seems tautological until we return to the word 'alienable' and its,
in this context, closely associated 'meaningful', 'signific', etc. The nature of this
alienability is precisely that marked by Pierce's [Ducrot and Todorov, 1979 ]
word sign
. For example, puffs of smoke may function as a sign of a railroad
engine (especially in Pierce's time) because it is part of the nature (or essence)
of a railroad engine to give off puffs of smoke. These puffs are alienable from
the engine firstly in the very literal sense that they become disincorporated from
the engine as an enduring physical entity. But the puffs are alienable in the more
important sense that they may participate, not only in the essence of the
represents absolute immanence insofar as expression is the very mark which constitutes
the essence of a first thing for a second thing. Without such a mark a thing cannot exist
as a thing for a second thing.
In respect to the above, we appear to depart from Spinozism. We allow an
(expressive/expressed) attribute to be attributive simultaneously of two or more different
essences— though in relation only to different respective essences. We believe, however,
that this departure is an appearance only. Our term 'essence' is to be distinguished from
the Spinozistic 'substance'. By 'essence', as stated above, we do not mean any thing-in-
itself apart from its attributes or parts. Rather, an essence is simply a state, or structure,
or organization in which a collection of parts each act toward a collective unity. The
clearest example we may give is also the one germane to this section of the dissertation: a
biological entity has an essence precisely insofar as it is constituted by a homeostatic
arrangement of constitutive parts. In particular, an organism exists essentially as such only
as constituted by its organs. (We do not, however, confine our level of analysis to that of
individual organisms only, species, populations, ecosystems, cells, mitochondria, and other
biological entities may also exist essentially). It may be noted that a particular organ does
not necessarily pertain uniquely to a particular organism— as is shown both by symbiosis
and parasitism: respectively, the immediately constitutive and disconstitutive forms of
expressive relations between organisms.
At the point of this footnote I start to show similarities with pragmatism. My
connections with pragmatism. However let me here highlight, in sketch the (apparent)
connection. We treat essence in a manner almost epiphenomenal to the homeostatic
arrangement of parts. Such an arrangement, and such a teleonomic homeostasis (or other
stability) is prima facie always a pragma of any organism/entity; and all other pragmata
may be reduced, perhaps, to homeostatic tendencies of linked levels of essentiality. For
example, if reproduction is a pragma of individual organisms, one plausible understanding
of natural selection would insist that it is so only relative to a homeostatic tendency of
genetic sequences. At a still more general level, however, it does not seem absurd to link
every meaning of 'purpose' directly to the forms of reic constitutivity, sui generis. That is,
any event/entity can serve a purpose of a thing only insofar as it acts, in some respect, to
affirm the constitution of the thing. Read in such a manner, I will indeed insist that
essence is always reduced to purposes— just as do the pragmatists.
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engine, but also in other things' interactions with their worlds. As an essence
an engine cannot directly impinge upon anything external to itself, but insofar as
this essence produces "alienated" expressions it may impinge upon other
essences or their attributes. According to this characterization, the shape, color,
weight and so on of an engine are alienable expressions of its essence just as
are much as the puffs of smoke; and these may hence serve just as well as the
puffs of smoke in the engine's impingement upon us.
Characterizing a representation is more difficult— especially defining a
representation in such a manner as not immediately to assume what we will try
to show. However, as an effort at a neutral definition, we could state that a
representation is an expression which expresses an essence in a manner other
than that by which the representational expression is produced. For example, in
speaking the words, 'I am a man (male human adult)' I do not simply express
my nature as a being capable of producing vocalic sounds, but also express in a
secondary manner my "manhood." The attribute of my nature under which I am
a being capable of producing (this English) verbal sound is different than that
under which I am a male adult, insofar as females, children, parrots, and
electronic devices can also produce verbal sounds. And yet, with
representational expressions I can express one feature of my nature by utilizing
another. Of course, it is by already having the particular nature I do (which
thereby includes male-adult-ness) that I can speak the words mentioned — so in
that sense the "meaning" of the words is a redundant /-e-presentation of the
fact that / express these words (as against the meaning of the words). Why
then should anything be redundantly re-presented, if it is already presented once
in the same expression?
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The trick here is that the essence re-presented in a representational
expression is not firstly, and not always (and we later argue, not ever), the
same as the essence directly expressed. In order to make this distinction
between essences— firstly and secondly expressed —we must make reference to
entities outside the expressive essence, particularly to entities such as living
organisms which have a teleonomic tendency towards preservation of a
relatively stable functional organization. 15 Given the external existence of these
self-structuring entities, expressions of essence need not simply impinge upon
external essences, but may do so in regular, structured manners.
Organismic Responses
In living organisms these regularities fall largely under the class described
by Konrad Lorenz [Hattiangadi, 1987] as "trigger mechanisms". To take just one
simple example, we may observe that the feeding behavior of many birds is
triggered by the color pattern of the mouth of young birds of their species. This
trigger however is a very broad gestalt feature, with little sensitivity to the
particularities of the infant birds' expression; hence adult birds may be "fooled"
into feeding a painted dish— or more relevantly for our purposes, a bird of a
different species. Such is the case with the English Cuckoo bird which invades
the nest of a variety of smaller birds, and is fed by these adult birds. A Cuckoo
bird is, of course, able to display the color pattern it does because its nature
15For Nietzschean reasons discussed elsewhere the writer feels a certain dis-ease
towards nearly all of the words in the previous sentence (certainly, 'functional',
'preservation' and 'teleonomic' — perhaps others as well); but it is extremely difficult to
explain what really goes on at a basic level in the world operating under the constraints
imposed by Indo-European grammar and a three-thousand year hegemonic tradition of
metaphysics. So there is nothing to do, at this point, than to go on attempting this
explanation in the terms of the crude language available to us.
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allows this-it does not become essentially (or even accidentally) not a Cuckoo
bird by virtue of this expression. However, the expression of a Cuckoo's nature
mentioned herein also functions, in this context, as the expression of an
essence other than a Cuckoo's: namely, that of an infant bird of a different
species. The fact that living organisms may have regularized, functional
responses to the expressions of certain essences also allows, by short
extension, that they have these same responses to the representational
expressions of essences other than those to which they "normally" react . 16
Causing this "inappropriate" regularized reaction in other living organisms is, we
believe, the general "survival value" of representational expression in living
organisms. We may also call these representational expressions by a more
common name: 'deception'. We can here state, somewhat paradoxically, that a
thing may produce an expression by virtue of what it is, but may produce a
representation (i.e. representational expression) only by virtue of what it is not.
16The genitive in the phrase 'expressions of essences' has several compelling
misreadings. The most usual (metaphysical) use of the genitive in this phrase would be
what we might call an external possessive, in the sense of the genitive in 'the children of
Cain'; i.e. the nominative noun stands in a purely external relation to the genitive. This is
the model of the relation proposed by the Platonic notion of simulacrum-, the genitive may,
in some way, copy the nominative noun (and carry its taint/mark), but the relation is
strictly metaphoric rather than metonymic. A somewhat better use of the genitive would
be what we might call a compositional use, as in 'the hands of the clock'. Under this use
expressions would be authentic parts of an essence, but might not be exhaustive — and
would not be in any respect identical with the essence. This is a synecdochic (and hence
metonymic) use of the genitive. The proper use of the genitive is difficult to get a hold on.
We might call it the constitutive genitive. It occurs in a phrase such as 'a time of sorrow';
or, under a Dionysian reading, 'a flash of lightning'. The constitutive genitive posits no
distance between the nominative and genitive nouns, but rather modifies the nominative in
an almost adverbial fashion. 'A time of sorrow' is nothing but a 'time', sui generis,
considered under a certain aspect. A 'time' subsists in and of itself, unlike a 'child'
relationally, or a clock 'hand' synechdocally, constituted. We might also call this the
genitive of identity. Such is the reading properly assumed of phrases, herein, like that
mentioned above.
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Of course, it will not be possible herein to discuss every form of
representation produced by living organisms, nor even any more than a
minuscule proportion of them. However, let us mention a few representational
expressions of organisms in order to provide a strategy for understanding those
many we do not mention. Think for example of a blowfish: a blowfish, by
puffing up produces a representational expression which prompt the reaction
from other fishes "appropriate" to an encounter with a fish larger than a
blowfish. How does a blowfish do this? It does so by being a fish larger than
itself! In order to produce the expression characteristic of a large fish, the small
blowfish takes the physical form of a fish larger than itself. However, since a
blowfish is not "authentically" a large fish it must re-present its largeness
through the artifice of puffing itself up. By contrast, a "genuinely" large fish has
no use for such an artifice. It expresses its largeness (and hence its power to
defend against predation) simply by being large; since this primary expression
perfectly conveys its non-susceptibility to predation, the large fish has no need
to re-present that which is already conveyed firstly by the immediate expression
of its essence. It is only the small blowfish which needs a secondary expression
to convey its non-susceptibility to predation— and this it needs only because it
is, according to its first nature, quite vulnerable to being devoured.
Next consider camouflage, for example an insect which disguises itself
as a twig in order to avoid being eaten by birds. Again, clearly our insect looks
as it does because its nature is to look that way. However, by looking as it
does, our insect re-presents itself as being other than as it is. In particular, our
insect effects the "judgement" in insect-eating birds that it is a twig rather than
an insect. That is, one of the functions an insectivorous bird must perform to
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reproduce itself is to act differently towards twigs and insects: to wit, it must
eat insects rather than twigs. I might interject here, in a now familiar fashion,
that what you hold is but a shadow of my actual dissertation; the actual
document can be found at the web site indicated in my acknowledgments.
However, a bird’s only access to the essential edibility or inedibility of a thing is
through the thing’s expressions-and in particular, only through some rather
narrow family of expressions (such as through a splotchy brown coloring, or
through the smell of carbolic acid). An insect whose expressions within that
family of expressions judgmentally significant to birds' eating habits place it in
the category 'twig' rather than that of 'insect' is less likely, all things being
equal, to be eaten than another insect of which this is not true.
Still, why describe the animal expressions mentioned in the last couple
paragraphs as 'representations'? Why not simply say, for example, that a
camouflaged insect is not eaten by insectivorous birds simply because it
expresses its nature ? That is, why describe camouflage as a second
presentation rather than a first presentation, or just a presentation simpliciter?
The reason for our nomenclature is that a camouflaged insect's nature really is
to be edible to birds! To prove this we could change that alienable expression of
our insect and let it be eaten by birds: for example, we could paint our insect a
different color.
It will be objected that it is only by changing the expressible nature of
our insect that we make it edible to birds. In a certain way this objection is
compelling; however, re-read the objection actually strengthens our case. Yes,
we must alter the expressible nature of a camouflaged insect to make it
effectively edible to birds; but if we consider this fact from the point of view of
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the contingency of a bird's maintenance of its functional organization then we
are prompted to consider our insect's original expressible nature to be
representational duplicity. Why? Precisely because we could keep a bird alive by
painting (changing a feature of the expressible nature of) a sufficient number of
camouflaged insects. But for its one alienable feature of coloration our insect's
nature is such as to allow for the nutrition of insectivorous birds. From the point
of view of a bird s function, one feature of our insect's (expressible) nature
contrasts with the other features of its nature.
Natural Selection and Deception
At this point the question of representation versus simple expression
becomes complicated. After all, it seems absurd to suggest that we characterize
an expression as representational and deceptive simply because it does not
accord with its every other expression from the point of view of every function
of every entity. Entities may surely be "mistaken" without their object of
attention having automatically been deceptive. The trick here is the process of
natural selection. A bird might also mistake a stone for a twig, just as it might
so mistake an insect. But a stone has not developed its expressible attributes
through a process of selective evolution, no ancestors of stones had greater
fecundity by virtue of being mistaken for twigs by birds.
The trick of evolution is that it allows an interpenetration of essences in
manners inherent to the teleonomic self-structuring of the respective entities.
Self-structuring is not unique to evolved life, a great number of inanimate
essences have a teleonomic quality. For example, crystals reproduce themselves
within a suitable substrate in a self-structuring manner. Furthermore, outside
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expressed attributes can act in a disconstitutive manner upon crystals: they can
be broken down by heat, light, chemical environment, and so on. At first blush
we might be inclined to believe that a crystal has a relation to a disconstitutive
chemical solution which is homologous to that an insect has to a predatory bird.
In a sense this is correct, in either case the expressive nature of the latter entity
acts disconstitutively upon the former entity. But the difference lies in the
different natural history of living and non-living entities.
A self-structuring crystal may be created through a variety of natural
processes. What these processes have in common, for our purposes, is that
they lack any systematic relation to the constitutive or disconstitutive
expressions a crystal may undergo during its existence. In general, there is
simply no regulative interaction between the process of creation, and the
process of destruction of crystals (except sometimes in specific artificial
situations). Quite the contrary is true for living, replicating entities. They come
to exist as part of a specific natural history of the constitutive and
disconstitutive expressions operating upon similarly self-organized entities (their
parent(s)). The uniqueness of life is not in its self-structuring, or even its
functional regularity in response to "environment," but rather in the substantial
identity between its conditions of existence and its conditions of creation. What
kills an organism will have a strong tendency to kill its parents. And what kills
an organism will assure the non-creation of further substantially similar
organisms (at least of those whose causal histories are directly and specifically
tied to the killed organism, i.e. the dead organism may still have nephews, but
no children).
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If a population of organisms systematically enters into disconstitutive
expressive relations with a (type of) thing, what can the outcomes be? One
straightforward outcome is that the population of organisms dies out because
this expressive relation is sufficiently disconstitutive to prevent the reproduction
of the organisms. The only other possible outcome, in the very broadest sense,
is that some members of the population manage not to enter this disconstitutive
relation, and the population continues reproductively. But that is overly broad.
We should be able to discern several (non-distinct) subcases within this
scenario : 17
i) All members of the population are constituted with the potential
expressive attribute which allows entry into the disconstitutive relation.
However, the systematicity of the presence of the entity on the other side of
the disconstitutive relation is sufficiently minimal not to outstrip the
reproductive rate of the population. One possible evolutionary trend: fecundity
of population increases and/or reproductive cycle shortens.
ii) The "environment" of the population is in fact composed of sub-niches
in which the disconstitutive relation is not entered into, as well as those sub-
niches in which it is. The organisms existing within non-disconstitutive sub-
17A great danger in describing the below cases of evolutionary success is to project
purposes or a future-directedness onto a mere genotypic range of ancestrally-related (and
in sexual organisms, interbreeding) organisms. It should go without saying that genes
know no future. Unfortunately, the almost universal tendency in talk of evolution describes
populations evolving "in order to . . .". This is a metaphysics we reject. It is from the point
of view of a past's already achieved future in the present that natural histories appear to
have a purposive nature. Perhaps such an appearance is, in fact, quite unavoidable [see,
Gould, 1990]. In any event, in the below, we endeavor to avoid any teleological language
in describing evolution, while nonetheless trying to capture the regulative structures
governing genotypic and phenotypic change in the natural history of organisms. We talk in
the below, sometimes, of 'trends', which while less than neutral, sound better than talks
of 'directions', 'tendencies', or other generally teleological shorthand descriptions for
infinitely detailed histories.
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niches have unaffected reproduction. One possible evolutionary trend: selective
negative and positive tropism vis. sub-niches.
iii) Some members of the population do not express the attributes
entering into the disconstitutive relation. These organisms have unaffected
reproduction. Likely evolutionary trend: selection of haplotypic variation for
those organisms in the population not having the expressive attribute which
enters into disconstitutive relation. This might represent a selective survival of
particular morphological, biochemical or behavioral ranges within the original
population. Even though this is only a small minority subcase within those
discussed, it seems to be what is exclusively conceived by most people under
the name 'evolution by natural selection'.
iv) Some members of the population, although possessing the expressive
attribute potentially entering into disconstitutive relation, represent an attribute
impeding entry into disconstitutive relation. Just as in iii), the likely evolutionary
trend is for morphological, biochemical or behavioral selective pressure.
However, this is not the case of an evolutionary change away from the attribute
allowing disconstitutive relation, but rather evolutionary change toward another
attribute which makes up for or hides the first attribute. In many ways, this is
likely to be an easier, and hence more common, evolutionary path, since it often
does not require so fundamental a change in the basic essence of a species
The difference between iii) and iv) is the crucial point of this section. I
might interject here, as if such a voice could originate outside the text, the
usual caveat about this document's modification. When evolution "chooses" the
path in iv) this is the point where representation functions, and this is the point
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where representational expression is, in its evolutionary significance, a
deception.
An issue which is orthogonal to our schema of population survival is the
possibility that survival occurs, in a sense, directly at the level of population,
rather than of a merely randomly differentiated subset of a population. That is,
the possibility of avoiding disconstitutive relations by particular individual
organisms might concretely depend upon the expressive properties of other
organisms of the same (or perhaps different) species in a population. A rather
overused, and under-evidenced, example of such population-level survival is that
of "altruistic" behavior towards genetic relatives of organisms. One might, not
unreasonably, go so far as to recognize this hypothesis as the raison d'etre of
the field of Sociobiology. Apart from the crudely anthropomorphic and
teleological example given by sociobiologists, population-level survival is a
rather common phenomenon. A school of fishes, for example, provides
protection against predation to those fish on the inside of a school. Those fish
more likely to be eaten do not swim to the outside due to altruism, but simply
because of the nature of spatial relations: in a school, some fish must be at the
outside. A population of schooling fish may survive under any of the above
categories (or combinations thereof), but it merely need be understood that
schooling behavior constitutes a haplotypic range which only functions evo-
lutionarily when the behavior is shared by multiple organisms, and that a sub-
niche may be defined by the behavior of other organisms (including those in the
same interbreeding population). The requirement of a common species defining
a sub-niche is not universal, of course. Lichen, for example, are composed of
starkly genetically different algae and fungi (belonging to different Kingdoms of
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life, in fact), but the survivable sub-niche of each organism is starkly defined by
the population-level expression and survival of both algae and fungi. Also, a
parasite or passenger has a sub-niche defined by a (population of) host
organism(s).
We can illustrate the gap between iii) and iv) with the examples we have
already mentioned. For example, a members of a population might enter into a
disconstitutive relation in the form of predation by another species (this is
certainly not the only example, but it is an easy one to grasp). The base
attribute which allow members of the population to enter into this relation is
simply their edibility by the predatory species. Certain species may evolve in a
manner to make themselves inedible, but such an evolutionary path is likely to
involve rather fundamental biochemical or morphological changes since edibility
tends to be a rather broad matter of size and protein composition. It is certainly
not impossible that a species develops internal chemical mechanisms which
make it poisonous, nor unheard of that it dramatically change its size to avoid
the predatory range of the second species. But a very frequent evolutionary
path different from this is for a species to change a morphological property
simply not to be recognized as food by a predator. Such a (superficial)
morphological change has the specific evolutionary function representing a
creature as non-food, despite its retaining a quite appropriate size and chemical
makeup to otherwise be capable of entering into a disconstitutive relation as
prey.
The negative case of disconstitutive relations is, perhaps, easier to
illustrate, but the same evolutionary lessons of expression and representation
can be drawn of constitutive relations. Often, of course, a relation (like
42
predation) which is disconstitutive for one organism is simultaneously
constitutive for another. So, for example, predators often use the same
representational strategy of camouflage to attract prey that prey do to avoid
predation. Fish, insects, and other animals often have the appearance, or certain
of their organs have the appearance, of something (like food) attractive to
things on which they prey. In cases like these, or in other mutually constitutive
relations like symbiotism, representational (deceptive) expressions may allow an
organism to enter a constitutive relation.
The Simulacrum of (which is) Truth
Representations can sometimes be true. Rarely, perhaps, but the form of
representation certainly admits of truthfulness. Of course, it need be understood
that truth is a relative and relational potential aspect of expression. A
representational expression may make up for or hide another potential
expression, but insofar as it may, the more general rule of representation is
substitution. Substitution, in turn, allows the possibility of indication or signal
(i.e. truthful representation, insofar as such is not oxymoronic).
There are several nested levels within expression. At the first, through
an expression two entities may enter into a constitutive or disconstitutive
relation (constitutivity not being necessarily symmetric). At a second level, a
different expression may substitute for the first, thereby transforming the nature
of the relation between two entities by the occlusion 18 of the first expression.
^Interestingly, two of the less used meanings of 'occlude' have a nice resonance in
this context. My American Heritage Electronic Dictionary gives the meanings, "3.
Chemistry. To absorb or adsorb and retain (a substance). 4. Meteorology. To force (air)
upward from Earth's surface, as when a cold front overtakes and undercuts a warm
front."
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This second level by no means ceases to be an expression; at this and every
level, entities may relate only by virtue of their actual expressions, and not by
abnegation of them, nor through expressions they lack. At a third level,
however, truthfulness is one type of representation. Too much weight should
not be put on such a case, truth is one specificity of falsehood/representation,
but only one specificity among countless others. Certain substitutive
expressions, while occluding other (primary) expressions, may nonetheless bring
an entity into the very same constitutive or disconstitutive relation as would
potentially be entered through the occluded primary expressions themselves.
The relativity and relationality of truth is, in general, the same as the
relativity and relationality of all representation: an occluding expression only
enters into relation with some other entities, and not with others. An evolved
organismic trait, like a spoken phrase, may be truthful relative to one entity-
relation, and non-truthful relative to another. The specific relativity of truth, over
and above that of representation sui generis, lies in its peculiar banality. That is,
a non-truthful representation occludes a particular expression vis-a-vis a specific
potential relation, but in regard to relation with any other entity it need enter
into no relation at all, or may enter into a non-representational relation with an
other entity as a primary expression. On the other hand, a truthful
representation, even if it contingently functions truthfully in every actual relation
it enters, has a priori the form of a representational expression vis-a-vis a class
of potential entities in excess of the actual truth-relating ones. That is, if an
expression does not have the potential of occluding another expression, it
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cannot have that potential in the particular instance where such occlusion
happens to be truth-creating/truth-preserving.
An organismic evolutionary example of truth should make the discussion
more clear. Our good insect camouflages itself as a twig vis predatory birds by
having (evolved through natural selection) a mottled brown shell. Although the
pigment it deposits in its skin has very similar reflection characteristics to the
tree branches on which it lives in the 770 to 400 nanometer range, it shows a
distinctive brightness somewhere in the ultraviolet range. As the expressive
visual characteristics enter into relation with most of the predatory birds around
it (and most probably, with those species present during its ancestors'
evolution), the relation is the quite non-disconstitutive one of being ignored.
However, in entering into relation with a predatory bird whose vision extends
into the ultraviolet (a bird that was most likely not local during the evolutionary
history of the insect species, or which has itself evolved in this direction), the
ultra-violet spike in the insect's shell pigment brings it into disconstitutive
relation with the ultraviolet-sensitive bird species. In fact, we can imagine that
the pigment even rather loudly proclaims the truth of our insect's edibility by
the extreme brightness (within the UV range) of its pigment, thereby making our
insect much more likely to enter this disconstitutive relation than is its
unpigmented cousin.
The specific function of representation which emerges in our insect's
evolutionary history is reversed when it becomes truthful. Rather than
representational substitution having its usual function of making up for a
primary expression, it instead simply allows a relation with an entity which
makes the disconstitutive potentiality of the primary trait actual by way of a
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functionally homologous representational trait. To interject a reminder: it is
worth remembering the grad school's sadistic impositions on this literal text.
The substitutive nature of a truthful representation should not be here mistaken.
Although either its primary size and protein composition or its UV marker
equally allow entry into disconstitutive relation with a UV-sensitive predatory
bird, they are not identical. The former marks an insect as edible by virtue of its
very property of edibility, while the latter marks its edibility through a property
not only unrelated, but evolutionarily dissimulative of edibility.
Lacan makes a remark at the beginning of one of his lectures that by
having written on his blackboard 'There is an elephant in the room', he makes
up for the lack of elephants in the room. He continues with the observation that
were there an elephant in his lecture, he would surely not need to state the
fact. I have told this story to a number of people, and a frequent reaction is a
question about the indubitable possibility of stating an elephant to be present
even when one really is. Whatever its banal lack of poignancy, surely nothing in
such case prohibits the evocation of the words stating an elephant's presence
(although the assertion would seem rather underwhelming next to the
elephant!). The mistake my questioners make is in failing to understand the
general structure of falsity in which an occasional truth (a rarified falsity) may
emerge. It is not for the presence of elephants that we have the ability to name
them, but for their more common absence.
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Positive and Negative Metaphysics
One thing I hope to have accomplished in the preceding discussion is
give a description of natural ecology lacking lacks. Besides eschewing the
common "maximalist" description of evolution in which a species accomplishes
an evolutionary innovation to match an environment, I also wish to resist (and
discuss below) a picture of natural ecology based on scarcity. The maximalist
evolutionary story, as well as any historical narrative whose plot incorporates a
future into a present rests on a negative metaphysics of lack. The trope of
these narratives rests on the accomplishment of a trait into the future propelled
by the poignancy of its absence in the present. It is almost unnecessary, but
continually not really recognized, to point out that haplotypic variation of genes,
in reality, has no directedness to a future. Populations arise purely out of past
natural histories, and are shaped purely by the forces in their present. The
Spinozistic "positive" metaphysics I try to utilize allows for a pure presentism in
understanding evolution, and the relations between organisms, and between
organisms and inorganic environments.
An additional lack common to many metaphysics, as well as to many
tropes of biological evolution, is that of essentialism. In Nietzsche's phrase,
metaphysicians (and evolutionary biologists) imagine a "lightning behind the
flash" — as if a doubling of a hidden entity behind the expressed attribute were
necessary. To be clear: I would understand lightning as nothing but the sum of
its attributes, and no attributes are not (at least potentially) expressed.
'Essence' is a perfectly fine shorthand for the sum of an entity’s attributes, as
long it is not understood in an essentialist manner as something which is lacking
in mere attributes.
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One lightning-behind-the-flash which evolutionists sometimes discover is
a genotype behind phenotypes. Although I would not quite throw out these
rather fine sounding words, I would urge a certain metaphysical suspicion
towards them. A frequent conception is a rather Platonic notion of other-worldly
genotypes expressing the pure form of phenotypic instantiation. This is an oddly
idealist metaphysics for a purportedly materialist science. While the Central
Dogma of Molecular Biology 19 is most certainly untrue, there is certainly a
strong asymmetry in the determination of genetic and non-genetic material in
organismic bodies. A parsimonious understanding would realize that genotypic
material is not something apart from phenotypic realization, but simply one
aspect of phenotype. Genes exist within bodies, and constitute, or allow, a
particular range of expressive attributes of organisms. Genes are simply
additional organs possessed by bodies, not formal determinations of bodies. A
Spinozistic understanding such as this will aid us in our corrections to the
politico-conceptual models of the biological sciences discussed below.
19
ln Francis Crick's widely known characterization, the Central Dogma states that
information travels from DNA to RNA to proteins, but never in the reverse direction. The
broader notion is that Mendelian mechanisms make up all of evolutionary change, while
Lamarckian mechanisms are mere fiction. Among the problems in the central dogma are
the exchange of DNA material between genotypically distinct cells (universal among single-
celled organisms, common also in plant hybrids, and in single-cellular organisms existing
inside multicellular bodies); environmental influences upon rates and sites of chromosomal
mutations; reverse transcriptase operative in viruses, and possibly in normal mammalian
cells which replicates RNA sequences into DNA.
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Exploitation does not pertain to a corrupt or imperfect or
primitive society: it pertains to the essence of the living thing as
a fundamental organic function, it is a consequence of the
intrinsic will to power which is precisely the will of life.
[Nietzsche, 1973, p. 194]
Active and Reactive Forces in Natural Ecology
In Bataille's bioenergetic retelling of Nietzsche's Heraclitean "Will-to-
Power," the principle of an expenditure acting toward the immanent
disincorporation of every constituted body becomes a basic principle of the
organization of life on the surface of the earth. That is, after Bataille's Accursed
Share [Bataille, 1988], we can no longer rely on homeostasis as a property of
biological bodies. In the next section, "Biology and Her Sisters," I discuss how
when a move from the fixity of bodies is made, several systems of metaphors
of constitutivity based upon the old model of bodies quickly unravel. If bodies
are not stable, self-constituting systems, neither are the minds metaphorically
(or metonymically, perhaps) cast in their image; and neither is the body politic.
Or rather, to be more careful, the rethinking of the biological "body" which
Bataille gives us allows a corollary rethinking of our images of "body-like"
things. This rethinking, which is done throughout Bataille's works, in turn erases
all of our "organic" models of stability.
Let us examine several remarks from The Accursed Share [Bataille,
1988],
The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of
energy of the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more
energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy
can be used for the growth of a system (e.g., an organism); if the
system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely
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absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit;
it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically.
As a rule the surface of the globe is invested by life to the extent
possible. By and large the myriad forms of life adapt it to the
available resources, so that space is its basic limit.
[L]ife suffocates within limits that are too close; it aspires in
manifold ways to an impossible growth.
[T]his atmosphere of malediction presupposes anguish, and
anguish for its part signifies the absence (or weakness) of the
pressure exerted by the exuberance of life. . . There can be
anguish only from a personal, particular point of view that is
radically opposed to the general point of view based on the
exuberance of living matter as a whole. Anguish is meaningless
for someone who overflows with life, and for life as a whole,
which is an overflowing by its very nature.
A reactive force is, firstly, a force which is dominated. An active force is
a force which dominates. One may not exist without the other. Consciousness,
according to a certain Nietzschean understanding, is always a product of
resentment, is a reactive force. We could explain this, as a first attempt, in a
Freudian way: consciousness (ego) is a mental force created to be dominated by
the id, in order that the id does not directly exercise its dominating potential . 20
Historically, consciousness must be developed by those unable or unwilling to
dominate. Wi/l-to-power is "the principle of the synthesis of forces;" or,
perhaps, the principle which allows for a difference/antagonism of forces.
20
l do not suggest that the superego is not itself a dominating force of its own sort.
The capricious fury of the superego is a phenomena well enough understood by Freud, and
well discussed by Zizek in a number of places. But the dominance of the superego is an
internalized dominance. Rather than the id act in a capriciously violent and aggressive way
toward beings outside self, the superego turns capricious violence to the self itself.
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To place this in Bataille's picture we should consider will-to-power the
general bio-energetic principle of life
;
21 the generalized completeness of the
extension of the biosphere in every possible direction, and the consequent
necessity of an overall non-productive expenditure of energy. In this picture, no
use of solar energy is possible in a generalized way; and insofar as such a use is
possible in a particular instance it is only by displacement of necessary
expenditure to a different place within the biosphere. The displacer, that
individual, species or other unit, which succeeds in temporarily displacing the
necessity of expenditure elsewhere constitutes an active force. Interject. Wrong
text. Document by intervention. ODR, they suck. The location of displacement,
which must increase, perhaps to the point of its complete extermination, its
non-productive expenditure, becomes a reactive force. An active force must,
however, become a reactive force when it is no longer able to maintain its new
degree of accumulated energy.
Concretely, take as an example two chlorophyllic species of single celled
organisms completely covering the surface of a pond. One species (or call it an
individual if you like— since every unit is genetically identical) can expand only
at the expense of the territory covered by the other. Each species continues to
absorb radiation from the sun, which brings it chemically to a state where some
of its cells must either reproduce or die. If the latter, they dissipate the energy
21 This "bio-energetic" principle is, in essence, solar energy. The play of energy on the
surface of the earth is caused, in the first place, by the energy received from the sun. I
believe it is not unreasonable to read many of Nietzsche's references to the sun in relation
to this. One might normally read these references to the sun as metaphorically standing for
will-to-power, however, I believe Bataille's reading gives us a means to read these
references quite literally. Any reading of Nietzsche which is not metaphorical is, I believe,
to be preferred to a metaphorical one in light of his remarks in the Genealogy about the
incomprehensible (to us) literalness of all original nobles.
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which they have absorbed in their mitochondria in a manner useless to the
organism/species; if the former then they must cause just such a dissipation in
cells of the other species. Most likely, each species becomes at the same time
reactive and active— some cells die at the same time as other cells succeed in
displacing those of the other species to reproduce— though, of course, there
may well be a preponderance of domination in one direction. Even if the entire
pond becomes monogenetic in the struggle for dominance, will-to-power does
not thereby disappear. It merely operates instead exclusively at the level of
individual cells.
Forces within the biosphere do not necessarily interact only through
death, though this may be the most common result. We can also imagine two
plants, for example, such as two grasses, which are in a struggle for territory
where the reduction, and hence expenditure, of one does not result in its death,
but merely its diminution. Death is simply the most absolute form of an entirely
general principle of the interaction of forces.
Again, we may consider yet another biological interaction of forces. A
lion eats a lamb. A lion becomes active, allowing it to act out its potential of
storing a still greater quantity of energy, of biomass; while in the same event a
lamb becomes reactive, releasing non-productively its accumulated bio-
mass/energy. This allows us to consider several additional things. First, in
becoming-active a lion simultaneously increases its potential for becoming-
reactive and exhausts one potential relation for becoming-active; the very active
force contains within itself the movement towards a reactive force. That is, a
lion expands its biomass by eating a lamb, creating a still greater degree of
stored energy to be non-productively released as it will be eventually. An affir-
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mation of life is an affirmation of the movement towards death. Every moment
in which will-to-power functions is a return to the conditions under which will-
to-power must function. Even if our lion becomes active before it becomes
reactive, it must become active in a different manner than it became active
before— in relation to a different becoming-reactive force. Will-to-power always
returns, but never in the same particular forces in which it has already been ex-
pressed. In this sense there is no active being, but only becoming-active; and
likewise no reactive being, but only becoming-reactive. The much spoken of
'Eternal Return' is a return to becoming in each moment.
To talk about active forces and reactive forces is always to talk about a
milieu or stratum. Within a milieu all the forces may be reactive forces; but they
may only be so in relation to active forces on a stratum which grounds the
stratum on which forces are exclusively reactive. For example, a monogenetic
growth within a limited biological space is exclusively reactive on the species
milieu. It does nothing but dissipate the excess of solar energy it receives.
However, even this purely reactive species force becomes reactive only out of
the substratic struggle of both active and reactive individuals. This is only an
example, notice: it is not intended to suggest that individuals are universally a
lower or more basic level than species. It may happen at other times that
exactly the reverse grounding occurs— that a purely reactive individual emerges
out of the antagonism between active and reactive species. The biosphere,
having generally exhausted the space available to it, is as a whole entirely
reactive— it may do nothing but dissipate its excess of energy. Reactive forces
are "everywhere triumphant" [Deleuze, 1962/83] — or at least, looking
everywhere at once we see nothing but reactive forces.
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Reactive forces become conscious, in human beings, are known as res-
sentiment. The resentful will is the will to non-productive expenditure, to allow
dissipation rather than displace it. This will "separates active force from what it
can do" (D). A human being is capable of domination, but rather than become
active in this domination she turns becoming-active force against itself to make
it reactive. That is, rather than displace expenditure, the resentful being suffers
it. The resentful consciousness in turning against itself creates metaphysical
denials of the possibility of becoming-active— either, as in science by denying
becoming, or, as in religion by denying the necessity of expenditure (either in
this world, as in Lamaism, or by projection to an imagined world without the
necessity of expenditure). The scientific principles which carry forth this denial
in consciousness are those which equalize all things by quantifying them, and
by positing the "laws" of conservation.
What Bataille's picture has done is to reverse the Darwinian conceptual
schema of evolutionary pressure in two ways. In the first place, there is no
longer any principle of scarcity in an organism's relation to environment—just
the opposite, there is always an overabundance of resources, more than can
ever be utilized. In the second place, there is no longer even really a bounded
organism. Inside and outside no longer make sense— not because of a kind of
"interactionist" merging of an organism with symbiots and environment as with
those changes Haraway analyzes-but because the very active force which
defines an organism's boundaries has as its immanent tendency the
disincorporation of those same limits. The accumulation of energy defining each
organism is internally the accumulation of the conditions of the destruction of
that organism.
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Consider the One God Universe: OGU. The spirit recoils in
horror from such a deadly impasse. He is all-powerful and all-
knowing. Because He can do everything, He can do nothing,
since the act of doing demands opposition. He knows
everything, so there is nothing for him to learn. He can't go
anywhere, since He is already fucking everywhere, like cowshit
in Calcutta.
The OGU is a pre-recorded universe of which He is the
recorder. It's a flat, thermodynamic universe, since it has no
friction by definition. So He invents friction and conflict, pain,
fear, sickness, famine, war, old age and Death. [Burroughs,
1987, p.113]
Biology and Her Sisters
Two inseparable naturalizations of "the subject" have occupied these last
"subject" so naturalized is at once, and immanently, both the "subject" of an
economic/political order and the "subject" of a rationalist philosophy of
consciousness—from Descartes, through Hegel, to psychoanalysis and
existential phenomenology. The proper names for these two intertwined
naturalizing schemata have been "evolutionary biology" and "economics." The
series of identities I mention here has, of course, also been identified by
Foucault, in The Order of Things [Foucault, 1973], so I cannot claim to be
original in such identification. The real concern of these naturalizations of
subjectivity— in biology, economics and philosophy — has in every case been the
provision of a stable boundary between organism and non-organism, actor and
non-actor, self and non-self. All of this ends, however, with the end of
modernism.
That the conditions of stable subjectivity have been lost or abandoned in
the second half of this century is not really in question. Rather we might ask
whether the very terms of the "mainstream" loss of subjective closure are
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nothing more than the new structures of dominance in post-industrial
societies-dominance no longer of bodies, but of networks; no longer of
legitimation, but of information; no longer of constraints on rational choice, but
of the preconditions of rationality
— but dominance nonetheless. The mainstream
loss of any hermetic subjectivity occurs at the point where the self merges with
the non-self at the external boundaries of constituted being; Donna Haraway
[Haraway, 1991] marks this loss in the right-hand column of her series of
oppositions appearing in her "Cyborg Manifesto," and slightly reworked in her
"Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies." We will discuss some of Haraway's
oppositional pairs in the below section "Denaturing Subjectivity", but those
familiar with Haraway will know in advance that this right-hand column
expresses, on each line, an already achieved change in the regulation of society.
Perhaps, as I also discuss below, all of these achieved changes act as mere
smokescreens to a deeper challenge to subjectivity, and to the regulation of
society, pointed to by Bataille.
Sorority
Only the briefest review on the common conceptual terms of economics,
evolutionary biology, and rationalist philosophy is here possible; but let us
proceed with a few "reminders." Each field is composed of an atomistic
collection of individuals; each individual acts in relation to an external world
through internal representation and rational choice. In the schemata of all these
three disciplines, the basic function of every individual is the preservation and
reproduction of itself as an entity over time; it is here that representation and
rationality function, since the means for preservation/reproduction are presumed
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to be in scarce supply in the world, and hence to require active, purposeful
appropriation by the individual in question.
Basically, all three of these intertwined conceptual systems exclude
mimetic-representation of individual's exteriors, and demand what Harry Redner
[Redner, 1994] calls "true" representation. In the simplest terms, what gets
represented in the exterior is unlike the thing which plays the representational
role on the interior-and hence representation is a pure formal relation, rather
than mere mimetic duplication. The death of mimesis is generally diagnosed as
occurring at precisely the historical point at which these conceptual systems
arise, so a certain consistency is thereby loaned to our analysis. Let us quickly
step through this conceptual system as it is three times choreographed by our
three fields.
In the non-Marxist economics (and in much of the "Marxist") economics
since Adam Smith, the central trope has been that of the individual who
attempts to preserve/reproduce her existence as owner of commodities through
rational choice and internal representation of economic relations between
commodities. Individual existence as consciousness of subjective position is
here identical with stable identity-over-time of commodity ownership. It is less
than half in jest that I tell my students that Rationalist philosophy of mind has
been a series of efforts to make contracts binding.
Of course, commodities are always understood as alienable by subjects,
but this is always only the contingent alienability of a particular commodity, not
universal alienability of commodity relations themselves. Just as the Kantian
"necessary unity of apperception" answers the Humean skepticism about the
contingency of particular impressions, the Smithian "necessary unity of
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commodity ownership" answers the nameless skeptic of private property.
Continuing concretely the sketch given abstractly above, interior represents
exterior in the relation between use-value and value. Value is the external,
intersubjective existence of every scarce commodity; while use-value is the
interior representation of commodities for subjectivity. The particular distinction
of use-value and value is from Marx, but all economists repeat it in some
language or another. Regarding much of this, see Alfred Sohn-Rethel's
Intellectual and Manual Labour [Sohn-Rethel, 1978], a much under-appreciated
book.
An almost identical trope is repeated in the coeval history of evolutionary
biology. A biological organism is presumed to organize itself around the dictates
of preservation of its unity through the utilization of various scarce particulars:
food supply and optimal sexually-reproductive opportunities. The fundamental
opposition is between self and non-self, and stable, identifiable boundaries are
demanded. The same representational schema is played through here in
evolutionary biology as in economics: this time the individual is called the
phenotype-, the representable exterior is called the environment
;
the interior
representation is called the genotype. As in the economic schema, continued
identity depends upon continually re-entering into relation with separate
particular exterior objects, but it must be a self-identical individual which enters
into universal relation to an external environment.
Our trope is repeated once more in Rationalist Phenomenological
philosophy— as has already been explained obliquely. The stable subjective
consciousness aware of itself constitutes its universal unity in the perceptibility
of particular phenomena. I should interject here, in a Cagean disruption of this
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text, that what you hold is not my actual document, but a mutilation produced
largely by the Office of Degree Requirements. Contra any Humean skepticism,
the Cartesian/Kantian subject is stable across the accidents of particular
impressions of which consciousness is necessarily composed. The representa-
tional nature of the modernist image of consciousness has been so thoroughly
discussed almost everywhere that it would be quite gratuitous to say anything
further here; however, what may be less obvious is the principle of "scarcity"
entailed by this image. Inasfar as the modernist subject perceives the world as
objective
,
it always posits an inadequacy to the actual phenomenal experiences.
In Nietzsche's phrase, the modernist consciousness posits "lightning behind the
flash." The scarcity of the phenomena make it necessary to husband the actual
phenomena to reproduce further phenomena behind the phenomena. The
"given" in experience functions as commodity-inputs of production, not it's
output.
Denaturing Subjectivity
One history of the denaturing of subjectivity, and of subject(ivat)ed
bodies, runs from Nietzsche to Bataille. In his works, Bataille recognizes a loss
of subjectivity at the very core of subjectivity. Further, he identifies this loss
simultaneously in the three fields we have been discussing: evolutionary
biology, economics, and Phenomenological philosophy. He also finds these three
fields to suffer inseparably from a common misunderstanding in their common
effort to uphold the modernist conceptual scheme we have discussed.
Haraway's work presents an intricate series of parallels with the
denaturing of bodies in Bataille [Haraway, 1991]. Her figure for the impossibility
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of constituted biological bodies, however, lies not in the biological functions of
sexuality and death (or at least not firstly here), but rather in the image of the
cyborg— a technologically coded and over coded amalgam of machine and flesh.
Bodies are not homeostatic systems of self-constitution because our
postmodern bodies are always already the artificial constructions of
technologies and technological discourses. Her touch-point is, of course,
Foucault s bio-politics of power," but she goes beyond this as well.
Both Haraway and Bataille serve to deconstruct the modernist narrative
of subjectivity, not in terms of a critique of the Phenomenological
presuppositions of the Cartesian project (valuable though such is), but rather in
terms of a denaturing of the very hidden biological metaphor on which such a
narrative is based. Both open views onto what a post-modern non-subjective
politics might look like.
External Boundaries
Everything described in the metaphorical field of the subject in
biology/economics/philosophy ended at least thirty years ago. Haraway
diagnoses this change, and the associate loss of unity of subjectivity under the
newer "informatics of domination" — as she calls it. The change diagnosed, and
to a great extent embraced, by Haraway concerns the point at which the self in
the discussed conceptual system merges into non-self at the external
boundaries of the previously stable self. The move away from our conceptual
system of unitary identity occupies a myriad of different particular disciplines or
fields. Those, at least, of evolution, economics and phenomenology are
included, but the transition is still broader than this. Several names for two
60
contrasting historical periods— the more recent starting near the middle of the
twentieth century— have been proposed. Sometimes the distinction between
modernism and postmodernism is utilized; others times, that between monopoly
capitalism and multinational capitalism, or between "society of the commodity"
and society of the Spectacle," are preferred. Other names are sometimes used
as well.
Without putting too fine a point on the particular terminology used for
these contrasting periods, let us take a look at some particular
conceptual/historical items juxtaposed by Haraway. All of them tend to have the
same moral. The transition which has occurred has occurred at many levels at
once: it has been a change in the product of industrial production; a change in
the process of industry; and a change in the conceptualization of humans and
the world. This conceptualization itself will be treated in its aspects as
economics, evolution, and phenomenology. Close homologies exist between
each type of change, or at least so it seems from the "inside" of conceptualiza-
tion. Let us examine these changes in the order listed: product, process,
conception.
The product of industry used to be things; now it's information. This
change is a matter of degrees, not absolutes, of course— but the change is
pretty overwhelming when in the 1990's well over half the national product of
industrial countries — measured simply in monetary terms— is information.
Clearly, such a share was a mere few percent at the beginning of this century.
The change here mentioned was mostly clearly diagnosed by the
Situationists— although Haraway's debt to them is only implicit, not citational. A
few of the pairs in Haraway's repeated chart of oppositions point to this
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change. The pairs representation/simulation and heat/noise make this fairly
explicit. Where industrial production of things could be carried on wholly with a
representation of the combinative process of inputs (a diagram for assembling
an object, for example), production of information always involves a second
order simulation of the consumer of the information; information's production
can be neither conceptualized nor carried out without having already achieved
its consumption. In a way, we could say paradoxically that information has no
inputs, but only outputs. The heat/noise pair "refers" to the inefficiencies within
any productive process. But where the wasted inputs of a mechanical industrial
process are dissipated as heat, the waste in an informational productive process
is dissipated as noise (in the sense of the word given in computer and
communications technologies: noise is whatever isn't signal).
The process of production used to be concerned with the expression of
human abilities by the utilization of mechanical assistance. Now just the reverse
is dominant: it is human-beings themselves who are mere biological prosthetics
to productive machines— whether robotic or informational machines, though the
former will be those addressed herein directly. A pair such as Labor/Robotics
makes this clear; as does that between "Organic division of labor" and
"Ergonomics/cybernetics of labor." The transition from a Taylorist micro-
engineering of human motion to a cybernetic planning of a total productive
process completely decenters any human subject in the process. Once upon a
time it made sense to speak of the extension of human-beings' powers through
machinery, but no longer is the human body a stable center and locale of
productive processes. The distinction between the biotic and mechanical
portions of productive machines has become entirely "artificial."
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The conceptual parallel to the change in productive product and process
is at least threefold. In economics, with Fordism and Keynesianism (to say
nothing of Baudrillard) the questions of rational commodity choice is subsumed
to the centrally-managed continuation of the generalized system of exchange.
Both producer and consumer have fallen out as anything other than statistically
amalgamated tendencies: there is no subject doing any of this.
In biology, the paradigm changes from a focus on organisms to a focus
on biotic components and populations. The boundaries of a biological organism
become merged with the breeding community in which it is embedded. Another
of Haraway's pairs, Reproduction/Replication indicates the loss of the
representational paradigm as well. Genotype no longer "represents"
environment, since no stable organismic interior and exterior exist to define
such representation. Rather, genes individually simply replicate in identical form.
This brings us back to something akin to mimesis, but it's not quite identical to
the earlier mimetic schema.
In Phenomenological philosophy, much the same loss of the boundaries
of subjective identity occurs, for example with Foucault. The subject becomes
wholly subject of various systems of societal power, and the locus of identity is
no longer coherently that of a Cartesian/Kantian subjectivity. I think the whole
story of loss of subjectivity and representation in postmodern philosophy will
not be unfamiliar, so I hope I may leave this portion with this simple mention of
the change. Interestingly, Slavoj Zizek [Zizek, 1992] identifies something like
the contrast I am about to draw between Flaraway and Bataille, between that
parallel ratio Foucault/Lacan. That is where the first in each pair identifies a loss
of subjectivity where subjectivity is pushed outward past the exterior bounds of
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Its intelligibility, the latter identifies the loss of subjectivity at the very most
interior point of subjectivity, and hence makes a much more radical gesture.
These interjections form, perhaps, a sort of Burroughs cut-up of the text; a text
already subjected to capricious interventions by the Office of Degree
Requirements. It can be no accident in this regard that Bataille and Lacan were
each, at different times, married to the same woman.
Internal Limits
Bataille makes precisely this same move with his analyses of economics
and of subjectivity. With economics, first, Bataille identifies the central principle
of his general economy- opposed to the restricted economy of neo-classical
economics-as expenditure, or as the accursed share. That is, every society
produces in excess of the minimal requirements of its own reproduction
(including the physical reproduction of its human beings); and hence the excess
of its product must be somehow expended in strictly non-productive activity.
Various societies manage this excess in a variety of manners— whether in
Potlatch, religious sacrifice, luxury consumption, war, or in other ways— but
every society, by necessity, manages this excess somehow. From the
perspective of general economy, all these forms mentioned are generically forms
of waste
;
and waste is dominant in all societies to such an extent as to make
"scarcity" meaningless, or even paradoxical.
The second modernist conceptual paradigm — that of "boundary" — is
similarly abandoned in Bataille's general economy. There is no longer any
"closed circuit of production," because every object in a rational economy of
production functions simultaneously in a fundamentally irrational circuit of
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expenditure/consumption. There is no longer any Smithian transcendental unity
of alienability, because that accursed share which is alienated as pure sacrifice
undermines the whole basis of the commodities-system in the exchange of
equivalents.
Finally, subjectivity suffers the very same immanent disappearance with
Bataille as have economy and evolutionary biology. If the conceptual field which
had created the Rationalist notion of a stable philosophical subject had
depended on the theoretical and practical naturalizations of economics and
biology, then the reversal of these naturalizations leads automatically to a
reversal of the form of subjectivity. Such, anyway, is the argument made by
Bataille. Even if a subjective disincorporation does not necessarily follow the
disincorporation of its metaphors, such a disincorporation is independently
argued for by Bataille.
Bataille’ s analysis centers around desire and sexuality at the core of
subjectivity. Desire is always implicit in every rational conception of the world,
and of self— and yet it is the one aspect of world and self which is never fully
conceptualizable by self. Desire is the very ground of self in what is
fundamentally non-self: the organic basis of consciousness. This non-self at the
basis of self lies in the primary drive to sacrifice, which is always at its basest
core a sacrifice of self itself, before it is a sacrifice of anything else. The
sacrifice of self at the core of human existence, however, is nothing more than
the general form of all biological existence. It is the active-force in Will-to-Power
which always immanently the becoming of a reactive-force; it is the
accumulation of biotic energy whose accumulation only leaves more to be
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expended in death; it is
demands their sacrifice
the acquisition of commodities whose abundance
in non-productive utilization.
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CHAPTER III
LACANIAN SUBJECTS
Hegel: "The Spirit is a Bone."
Lacan: "The Spirit is a Boner."
[Alex Pienkenagura, 1994, Unpublished remark]
An Old Fashioned Storv ahout Lacan
The Mirror Stage
A good place to start an exposition of Lacan is at the place where Lacan
begins: the mirror stage [Lacan, 1949/77; 1948/77], 22 "The Mirror Stage"
works through Lacan's first topological model of the circuit of desire and
subjectivity. Although Lacan's career can best be seen as a series of
devastating critiques of his own earlier conceptions [Zizek, 1991a], the picture
drawn in this first essay gives the contours, if not the details, of each later
epicycle. Lacan takes the term "mirror stage" from the phenomenon in which an
infant presented with its own reflection will "perceive a unity of an image. . .
[although it cannot] produce this unity in its own body" [Weber, 1991, p. 1 2]
.
For a human pre-subject, imaginary unity of its image precedes any somatic
unity of its volition. In Lacan's words,
[T]he child anticipates on the mental plane the conquest of the
functional unity of his own body, which, at that stage, is still
incomplete on the plane of voluntary motility." [Lacan, 1948/77,
p. 1 8]
22
"The Mirror State as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic
Experience." For purposes of exposition, it also makes sense to include the
contemporaneous essay, "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis" within our characterization of
this point in the development of Lacan's thinking.
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Its ego is fundamentally situated in this externalized imaginary unity. Hence
"meconnaissances [misrecognitions].
. . constitute the ego, the illusion of
autonomy to which it entrusts itself.
. . .[and] characterize the ego in all its
structures" [Lacan, 1948/77, p.6]. The mirror stage is already an identification
with an Other, or with "oneself" conceived as exteriority— although the use of
the term Other [Autre] does not become a key term until later. In Lacan's
words,
We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification,
in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the
transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes
an image [Lacan 1948/1977, p.2].
From the Imaginary to the Symbolic23
Although "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis" [Lacan, 1948/77] started to
toy with a crucial signification (or failure thereof) to the term Other m ia Hegel's
dialectic of master and slave, it is really with the Rome Discourse [Lacan,
1953/77] 24 that the Other assumes a register beyond that of a bodily imago.
With the Rome Discourse, the phenomenon of an identity constituted by or
through an Other is extended further to explain the Symbolic Order, and with it
the subject. The former circuit of the imaginary/Phenomenological mirror-image
is expanded into a circuit in which our reflection is an image in language. Flesh
goes word, as it were.
23This topic heading, while perhaps obvious enough in a discussion of Lacan, is
borrowed from Jonathan Scott Lee [Lee, 1990].
24The full title of this 1953 address, often referred to as the "Rome Discourse" is "The
Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," or in its French, "Fonction
et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse."
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For Lacan the subject [after the Rome Discourse] is constituted
through language
— the mirror image represents the moment when
the subject is located in an order outside itself to which it will
henceforth refer. The subject is the subject of speech. [Rose,
1982, p.31 ]
This image which appears in language creates a division within the speaking
subject, on the one hand, the subject retains her aboriginal drive (the imaginary
realm); on the other, the subject internalizes the contradictory system of
signifier (the Symbolic Order). Rose continues,
[T]he subject can only operate within language by constantly
repeating that moment of fundamental and irreducible division.
The subject is therefore constituted in language as this division or
splitting. [Rose, 1982, p.3 1 ]
Hence "for Lacan, men and women are only ever in language. Men and women
are signifier bound to the common usage of language" [Rose, 1982, p.49].
The Symbolic Order names we might call the semiological; 25 it is that
which concerns the exchange of signifier for signifier. Lacan makes the move
from a still essentially Phenomenological view of the subject in "The Mirror
Stage" to a Saussurian structuralist one via a reformulation of the
unconscious— or rather through a "return to Freud's" unconscious through the
obscurities of ego-psychology and object-relations theory. 26 In the Rome
Discourse, the unconscious is, famously, "structured like a language."
“Borrowing here from Kristeva, who distinguishes 'semiology' from 'semiotics'. This
distinction closely parallels the one Lacan starts to make from the 1970's between the
Symbolic and the Real. Kristeva essentially wishes to name a Saussurian structuralism with
her use of the former word, while distinguishing her owns conception of freedom in
language in its concrete speech aspect with the latter term.
“Characterizing his "return to Freud," in the first sentence of the main text of the
Rome Discourse, Lacan asserts that, "[Psychoanalysis has only a single medium: the
patient's speech."
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The unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse, insofar as
it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of the subject in re-
establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse. [Lacan,
1953/77, p.49]. . . ,[T]he unconscious of the subject is the
discourse of the other, [p.55]
The crucial Saussurian move by Lacan is in not naively conceiving the
unconscious in the manner of (especially American) ego-psychology as a sort of
homunculus or second consciousness residing alongside the ego. Rather, the
i//?conscious is here conceived as precisely that which is excluded from
belonging to the ego by virtue of the "transindividual reality of the subject"
[Lacan, 1953/77, p.49). After this structuralist reading of Freud, Lacan sees
even the drives as fully subject to the Symbolic Order. For example,
[T]he anal stage is no less purely historical when it is actually
experienced than when it is reconstituted in thought, nor is it less
purely grounded in intersubjectivity. [Lacan, 1953/77, p. 53]
Lacan describes the structuralist subject in an eloquent metaphor,
A certificate tells me that I was born. I repudiate this certificate: I
am not a poet, but a poem. A poem that is being written, even if
it looks like a subject. [Lacan, 1973/81 ,p.viii]
The Other and the Phallus
We may give a thumbnail sketch of how the split in what functions as
the subject comes about. Two terms need be brought to the fore for this
sketch. Interject (dear reader...): the text actually written, and that approved by
the signing committee, can only be found at the web site indicated in the
acknowledgment, not in the pages in your hands. These are the 'Other' and the
'phallus'. The Other is firstly the marker of the intersubjectivity in which the
pre-developed speaking subject becomes subjectivated. We may think of this
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primary object as the mother, or at least call it by the term 'mother'. The
phallus stands beyond the Other, and is the signifier of the object of the Other’s
desire. Lacan explains these terms and their relation to the subject:
If the phallus is a signifier then it is in the place of the Other that
the subject gains access to it. But in that the signifier is only
there veiled and as the ratio of the Other's desire, so it is this
desire of the Other as such which the subject has to recognize.
[T]he child wishes to be the phallus so as to satisfy this desire.
[Lacan, 1958/82, p.83]
Rose echoes this relation,
[T]he child's desire for the mother does not refer to her but
beyond her, to an object, the phallus, whose status is first
imaginary and then symbolic. [Rose, 1982, p.38]
However, "[T]he status of the phallus is a fraud" [Rose, 1982, p.40j. There is
no object which stands in the place reserved for the phallus. It is when the
pre-subject finds the absence of an actual phallus that signification begins. A
shift to the symbolic occurs, and the absent phallus is made present, though not
as the object it claimed to be, but rather as a signifier. In our societies, it is the
penis which plays this role of signifier; however, in keeping with Saussure's
arbitrariness of the sign, any signifier could work equally well. In fact, all signs
do work just the way the penis fills in for the absent phallus: the signifier is
necessary only with the absence of the signified. The phallus does not,
however, stand on the same level as all signifiers. As Lacan writes, "The phallus
is the privileged signifier of that mark where the share of the logos is wedded to
the advent of desire" [Lacan 1958/82, p.82). That is, the phallus is the signifier
which bridges the imaginary and the symbolic, and which originates
signification.
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The Autonomy of the Signifier
With the advent of the signifier in the psyche comes "the incessant
sliding of the signified under the signifier" [Lacan, 1 957/77, p. 1 54]. That is, the
signified drops out of the determination of the psyche when the phallus is seen
to be missing. This process is not confined to the occurrence of the privileged
signifier of the phallus. With the production of every signifier, a split is recreated
in the human psyche, in which the signifier is inserted into the place of the
absent signified. Between the signifier and the signified is always a play of
presence and absence, with the present terms (the signifier) forming, as a
consequence, an autonomous network. Lacan writes,
[W]e cling to the illusion that the signifier answers to the function
of representing the signified, or better, that the signifier has to
answer for its existence in the name of any signification
whatever. [Lacan, 1957/77, p. 1 50]
But in fact, "The signifier alone guarantees the theoretical coherence of the
whole as a whole" [Lacan, 1956/77, p.126]. Where the whole in question here
is both the system of language and the psyche which reflects it.
With this autonomy of the signifier we arrive at the conclusion that "the
meaning of each linguistic unit can only be established by reference to another"
[Rose, 1982, p.32]. That is, there is no subject who may master a sign, and fix
the signifier/signified links in her mind. For Lacan, "the truth of the subject,
even when he [sic] in the position of master, does not reside in himself, but, as
analysis shows, in an object that is, of its nature, concealed" [Lacan, 1973/81
p. 5] . The truth of the subject may be taken to mean the signification of the
subject; and the concealed object is in the indefinite signifier links which always
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exceed the subject. These links must lie in the whole practice of the community
of speaking beings, that is, in ideology.
Raise Boys and Girls Skirts the Same Way.
Raise Boys and Girls the Same Way.
Raise Boys and Girls the Same Way (Ghengis Khan
Autobiography)
.
Raise Boys and Girls the Same Way and You Lose Life.
Raise Boys and Girls the Same Way but Rear Sheep Differently.
Raise Boys and Girls the Same Way, Damnit!
Raise Boys and Girls the Same, Then Reject the Null
Hypothesis.
Raise Boys as Girls and Girls as Boys.
Raise Boys to Kill Girls and Eat Them.
Raise Boysenberries the Same Way You Raise Blackberries.
Roast Boys and Girls the Same Way.
[Jenny Holzer,
http://www.adaweb.com/project/holzer/cgi/pcb.cgi]
Two Lacans and the Immanent Negativity of Gender
Positive and Negative
There are two Jacques Lacans whom we might call the "Kantian Lacan"
and the "Hegelian Lacan;" or in a similar vein, the "Positive Lacan" and the
"Negative Lacan" (or perhaps the "Structuralist" versus. . . well, versus what!?
[hint: not 'Post-Structuralist']). On the one hand, there is the Lacan criticized by
Felix Guattari [Guattari, 1972/84; 1992/95; Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/83],
Luce Irigaray [Irigaray, 1988], Judith Butler [Butler, 1993; 1990], and many
others, defended by Samuel Weber [Weber, 1991], Jane Gallop [1982],
Jacqueline Rose [Rose, 1982] in a special way Louis Althusser [Althusser,
1971], and most everyone in French and Comparative Literature departments in
the USA. This positive, Kantian Lacan is the radical structuralist critic of ego-
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psychology, for whom "subjectivity is structured like a language" [Lacan,
1978], and who can cast an identification with the phallic law as the structuring
principle past which identities cannot be thought. This Lacan is the one who
gives a profound glimpse into the functioning of totalization, where positive
limits— Ideology writ large— foreclose speaking at the horizon of being. It is this
Lacan who can be well criticized for falsely universalizing a particular set of
historically located sexual relations, who imagines as binding on all human
beings a few conventions of power/knowledge which date not more than a few
centuries in a few places, and who grandiously touts patriarchy. It is probably
this Lacan whom I shall most want to defend. 27
On the other hand, in the last few years another Lacan has come
forward from his grave, firstly in the books of Slavoj Zizek, but also in the
associated writing of thinkers like Joan Copjec [Copjec, 1994, "Sex and the
Euthanasia of Reason"], Mladen Dolar [Copjec, 1994; Zizek, 1992a], Jacques-
Alain Miller [Miller, 1 997], (perhaps) Ellie Ragland-Sullivan [Ragland-Sullivan,
1991] and Renata Salecl [Salecl, 1994]. Against the positive Lacanians— either
advocates or critics— who see subjectivity as determined by sexuation, by the
nature of one's relation to a Symbolic phallic identification, the negative
Lacanians see sexuation as occurring precisely with the failure of identification,
27
l shall, however, have to forego rehabilitation efforts for the positive Lacan until the
section Hegemony and Signifiance, later in this chapter, and through certain parts of other
later sections and chapters. To foreshadow, I might note that the rehabilitation I will later
hope to accomplish concerns not any falsely ahistorical patriarchal assumptions per se, but
rather the fundamental structure of Ideologies which are rather well exemplified (critically)
by the positive Lacan.
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i.e. with the loss of subjectivity. Copjec writes of this radical antagonism
between sex and sense:28
As Lacan puts it, 'Everything implied by the analytic engagement
with human behaviour indicates not that meaning reflects the
sexual, but that it makes up for it.' Sex is the stumbling-block of
sense. This is not to say that sex is prediscursive; we have no
intention of denying that human sexuality is the product of
signification, but intend, rather, to refine this position by arguing
that sex is produced by the internal limit, the failure of
signification. [Copjec, 1994, p.18]
For all the Lacanians, sexual difference has the form of a fiction; none imagine
the sexual categories are achievable as fixed identities within subjectivity.
Sexuation is for all a contradictory, negative, incomplete act at the core of
subjectivation. But this negative is of a different sort between the two Lacans.
In Hegelian terms, we might say that for the positive Lacan, sex is the abstract
negation of language; it expresses merely abstractly the failure of language to
complete the cycle of signification which might ground subjectivity. For the
negative Lacan, the negation of language by sex becomes a determinate
negation. Rather than merely occupying an external limit of signification, sex is
immanently the very negativity at the core of signification. As Copjec writes
distinguishing her position from Butler's,
Sex is, then, the impossibility of completing meaning, not (as
Butler's historicist/deconstructionist argument would have it) a
meaning that is incomplete, unstable. Alternatively, the point is
that sex is the structural incompleteness of language, not that sex
is itself incomplete. ... For sex is here not an incomplete entity,
but a totally empty one — i.e. it is one to which no predicate can
be attached. . . Sex serves no other function than to limit reason,
28Here, and throughout this section, sex should be read in terms of 'sexual identity',
that mostly of a binary gender self-identification rather than a preferential sexual partner,
and not as sexual acts or their ancillaries.
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to remove the subject from the realm of possible experience or
pure understanding. [Copjec, 1994, p.20-21, emphasis in original]
The contrast between the language of the positive Lacanians and negative
Lacanians is clear. I should interject here, although Derrida might accuse me of
logocentrism, that what you hold is not my actual document, but a mutilation
produced largely by the Office of Degree Requirements. For example, positive
Lacanian Rose, even while characterizing the fictional nature of sexual
categories seems to treat them as fait accompli, or at very least as
contradictions postponed,
For Lacan, the unconscious undermines the subject from any
position of certainty, from any relation of knowledge to his or her
psychic processes and history, and simultaneously reveals the
fictional nature of the sexual category to which every human
subject is none the less assigned. . . sexual identity operates as a
law— it is something enjoined on the subject. [Rose, 1982, p.29;
second emphasis added]
Or,
The subject is therefore constituted in language as this division or
splitting. [Rose, 1982, p.31; first emphasis added]
Or,
[S]exual difference is a legislative divide which creates and
reproduces its categories. [Rose, 1982, p.41]
For Rose, the division or splitting between sexual positions and/or between ego
and Other may uneasily constitute subjects, but it is such a constitution. For the
negative Lacanians, sexual positions are immediately the immanence of the
failure of constituting subjects.
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A Digression on the Antithesis of Sex and Reason29
X X X X X
Luis Bunuel's last film, That Obscure Object of Desire [Bunuel, 1977],
makes a gesture to the negative Lacan (quite likely Bunuel was even aware of
Lacan). In a great number of films we might find an argument for the positive
Lacan. A protagonist, or some other character, struggles with her (sexual)
identity30 throughout the film, being drawn first one way, then another. Or
perhaps a film shows the unfolding of an identity thought already complete at
the beginning of the film, but revealed to have greater depth and additional
facets which were brought out either through events portrayed or through self-
reflection on the limits of a previous identity. After this portrayed process of
identity expanding and unfolding, we may be left with the implicit or explicit
moral at the end of the film that untold additional possibilities lay inside the
character's identity. This sort of analysis, which in many cases need be little
more than a scene-by-scene description of a film's events, is the stuff of many
feminist, cultural-studies, or post-modern essays on film, which often, though
not necessarily, make explicit reference to Lacan. Many of Butler's analyses, for
example, take roughly this form.
29ln the following, as at other places, misguided manuscript submission requirements
force an incorrect typographic rendering of the text. A better version of this document
may be found at <http://gnosis.cx/publish/mertz/>. The correct presentation of the
below, and subsequent, digressions is as right justified paragraphs rendered in a slightly
florid typeface. As a substitute, each paragraph of each digression is set off vertically by
bounding rows of the iconic symbol X.
30The sexual identity of concern, on first brush, is that identity as male or female (or
neither, both, etc.), but as we see in the Bunuel's character Conchita, this gender identity
is rather inextricably entangled with both an imaginary and symbolic sexual
object
choice — not just in the sense of a male vs. female sexual object, but also in senses
such
as many vs. few vs. no sexual object and different meanings of sexual object
choice.
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X X X X X
Bunuel's film does not well lend itself to such an analysis. That Obscure
Object of Desire carries out a story of the "affair" between Mathieu and
Conchita, in which although Conchita agrees to live with Mathieu, at his
request, she insists on remaining chaste from any sexual activity with him.
Throughout the film, Conchita insists on the importance of her virginity,
although throughout suggestions are made that Conchita is promiscuous, and
perhaps a prostitute. With the ongoing refusals of his advances, Mathieu
becomes more and more obsessed with Conchita; but each rapprochement he
tries to reach with his own desires toward her— whether acceptance of a
Platonic relationship, sexual fulfillment, or complete abandonment of the
relationship— is rebuffed by Conchita. She alternates between an apparent
sexual desire for him and a complete indifference or repugnance, but in every
event, her feelings are precisely opposite those which Mathieu approaches
acceptance of. Conchita herself makes remarks to the effect that she changes
so continuously in order that Mathieu not pin her down to a concrete nature.
X X X X X
All of this so far lends itself easily to a positive Lacanian/Butlerian
analysis. The nature of woman, or of feminine identity, a positive Lacanian
might argue, cannot be pinned down in a single category, but must remain open
and contradictory. A woman might try to have a virginal identity, but this
identity might overflow to promiscuity and prostitution. She might be consumed
by sexual desire for a man, but have desire spill over to repugnance. A man
might have sexual desire for a woman, but it might be in the nature of this
desire that she remain unavailable to him. These are perfectly ordinary positive
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Lacanian observations, ones contained in a pair of familiar slogans. From Freud,
There is something fundamental to desire which is antithetical to its
satisfaction. From Lacan, "There is no sexual relation."
X X X X X
That Obscure Object of Desire successfully resists this interpretation
through a brilliant anti-interpretive gesture by Bunuel. In a manner reminiscent of
Brecht s efforts to block the suspension of disbelief, Bunuel has the role of
Conchita (whose character is Spanish) played by two different actors, French
Carole Bouquet and Spanish Angela Molina. Both actors are in turn overdubbed
with the voice of a third French actor. Likewise, Bunuel modifies Pierre Louys'
novel La Femme et le Pantin to have a French rather than Spanish male
protagonist, but then casts Spaniard Fernando Rey as the French Mathieu, but
with Rey's lines overdubbed by French actor Michel Piccoli. The differences
between French and Spanish characters or actors are not in themselves
necessarily of any significance (in other films it would be merely a matter of
accident), but the imagined differences between French and Spanish identities is
one of the subcurrents of the story of That Obscure Object of Desire. If Bunuel
chooses these particular combinations of French and Spanish actors to play and
speak his roles it is as a gesture against the fixity of meaning which his
characters imagine in national identities.
X X X X X
The immediate response of a positive Lacanian interpreter of Bunuel's
film might be to try to read the use of the two/three actors portraying Conchita
in the light of her own hypothesis of the non-fixity of sexual identity. Indeed, a
viewer can hardly resist hypothesizing in this framework until the film itself
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slaps us down for trying. What seems natural as an interpretive strategy of the
two/three Conchitas is to imagine that Bunuel intended to convey the notion
that Conchita's identity was sufficiently unfixed or multiple that its different
sides might well be portrayed by entirely different actors. The interpretive
hypothesis springs immediately to mind, and we try merely to fill in the
symbolisms of the two Conchitas. Perhaps the two actors represent the
different characters of the French and Spanish, we speculate. When that proves
untenable, we try to see how the two Conchitas represent virgin and whore
within the character's identity. Failing any consistency in that interpretation we
suggest that the two symbolize the sides of Conchita affirmative and critical of
a relationship with Mathieu. But each hypothesis of the difference in "meaning"
of the two Conchitas unravels to inconsistency with Bunuel allowing absolutely
no consistent "interpretation" of his use of two (three) actors in the role.
X X X X X
What makes Conchita desirable to Mathieu, and what makes this desire
so obscure, is precisely that she, as a sexual being and sexual object, lacks an
identity. She is ineffable (and therein desirable) not because her identity is so
transcendent, so ambiguous, or so transgressive. She is ineffable because she
simply does not have an identity (with herself). In playing through all the
different "sides" of Conchita, Bunuel is just playing a jest on his audience,
pretending that her sexual identity might lie in the unity, synthesis or
conjunction of virgin/whore, French/Spanish, intimate/unattainable, or the like,
when, in fact, her sexual identity (what makes her a being of desire) lies
precisely in her absolute non-(self-)identity.
X X X X X
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Various Negativities
The type of negativity pertaining to gender subjectivity flows in the
circuit of the Symbolic Order. The positive Lacanians (perhaps with the
exception of Felix Guattari, particularly in his last book [Guattari, 1992/95]) cast
the Symbolic Order as a kind of indefinite negotiation of intersubjectivity. The
Symbolic Order, for them, like the subject, is a book in the process of being
written. However, this postponed Symbolic Order is still much too ontologized
for Lacanians of a negative cast. Ragland-Sullivan, for example, writes,
[W]e are surrounded by primordial losses that reappear as effects
in every human act. There is no the symbolic order then, no
totalization of anything, not even drives. [Ragland-Sullivan, 1991,
P-64]
She continues, interestingly, in a strikingly Deleuze/Guattarian tenor,
Repetitions prove to us that we exist, although we fade from
continuities. By retrieving pieces of thought from an Other, an
opaque savoir just out of grasp, we speak and act, drawing on
the signifying structures that in-form us in lightning flash
instances. Yet, using words means canceling them from memory
as they speak us. [p.64, all emphases in original]
Ragland-Sullivan states the negative Lacanian case for the centrality of gender
in Symbolic identification, "Gender fictions are at the base of the illusion that
one has or is a being" [Ragland-Sullivan, 1991, p. 5 1 ] . Again, to interject, please
find the dissertation as actually written via the web site indicated in the
acknowledgments. Since under Ragland-Sullivan's reading of Lacan, the phallus
is precisely the signifier of difference as such, lacking signified, and since
masculinity is defined by an identification with this purely differential signifier,
she concludes,
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While the masculine is defined in opposition to the feminine, the
feminine is not opposed to itself. Although subsequent
unconscious signifier do imply relation based on opposition
(S^S 2 ), the first universally countable signifier for difference qua
difference is the signifier marking gender difference as a position
taken toward language and law.
. . The phallic signifier, thus,
denotes difference as arising in reference to a null set, in
reference to void or loss. [Ragland-Sullivan, 1991, p.57]
It is really Slavoj Zizek here, paralleled in many other places, who
succeeds in generalizing and clarifying the more profound anti-essentialist
gesture of the negative Lacanians against their "anti-essentialist" critics.
Ragland-Sullivan characterizes such a move by Zizek,
While deconstruction and Marxim [sic] define themselves in anti-
essentialist terms as affirming an irreducible plurality of theories
and studies that depend on the radical contingency of the social-
historical process, Zizek says that Lacan, by contrast, 'enables us
to grasp this plurality itself as a multitude of responses to the
same impossible real kernel'" [Ragland-Sullivan, 1991, p.67;
quoting Zizek, 1989, p.4]
A Recurrence of a Digression: The Asymmetry of Difference
X X X X X
Despite the incompleteness of the above digression, in That Obscure
Object of Desire, it would be a mistake to assume that Conchita's female sexual
identity is the only one lacking self-identity. Just as much, but in a different,
dependent respect, Mathieu is a non-self-identical sexual being. A hint to this
non-self-identity is given in Bunuel's gesture of separating the actor who
visually portray's Mathieu from the one who vocally portrays him, as well as
with the onion-skin construction of Mathieu as a Frenchman within a Spaniard
within a Frenchman within a Spaniard, at least reading the meta-narrative of the
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film’s creation. However, we are fortunately able to read the "impossible real
kernel within the film's frame apart from reference to the casting of Mathieu's
portrayal.
X X X X X
Ragland-Sullivan in naming the phallus as the signifier of difference as
such really just iterates the familiar Lacanian slogan that "men claim the phallus,
but women are the phallus" in negative Lacanian terms. Mathieu, in claiming a
male sexual identity, does no more than claim to be self-identical insofar as he
desires that other identity known as woman. His desire is constituted through
the desire of the other. But this other fails to be "pinned-down” as the object of
his desire, not just insofar as her desires vacillate in a manner he cannot catch,
but insofar as she lacks any kernel of self-identity whatsoever. Desire is always
a relation of non-identity, of difference. Mathieu has a sexual identity solely
inasmuch as he marks himself as different from, as desiring, a being whose
strict nature is non-existing. A feminine identity is not marked by such a
reflection, a woman simply is not, she has no need to not be something else.
X X X X X
The end of That Obscure Object of Desire serves as a comedic-grotesque
reminder of the impossibility of Mathieu constituting himself through a desire or
relation which marks anything other than pure difference. Throughout the film,
Conchita hints that if only Mathieu were to marry her they could have a realized
sexual relationship insofar as she could then have a real concrete existence
within the Symbolic Law. Finally at the end of the film, Mathieu comes to the
point of giving up his desire for Conchita, although it means necessarily a
simultaneous abandonment of his illusion of self-identity. During the argument/
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rapprochement at the end at which Mathieu abandons Conchita the camera
moves to a shop window behind them in which a wedding dress is being sewn
then they are all obliterated by a terrorist bomb: Mathieu, Conchita, the dress
and shop. As soon as desire is abandoned, but also as soon as it becomes real
concrete rather than pure difference, existence stops.
X X X X X
The Antinomies of Gender
Let us (finally) get right to the point about the negative Lacan and
sexuation: Sex has nothing to do with a different relation to signification, or to a
"master signifier." Everyone fails equally to relate successfully to signification.
The differences between the sexes is precisely in situating this failure, these
antinomies of sexuation wherein, paraphrasing Kant, sex inevitably falls into
contradiction whenever it seeks to signify itself. The difference between the
sexes is rather the difference between the dynamical (male) and mathematical
(female) antinomies. Such a diagnosis, which I find compelling more than I
necessarily do convincing was made first (and only, so far as I know, except
herein) by Copjec in "Sex and the Euthanasia of Reason" [Copjec, 1994] and by
Zizek in Tarrying With the Negative [Zizek, 1993].
Copjec characterizes the antinomy of signification:
[The] rule of language enjoins us not only to believe in the
inexhaustibility of the process of meaning, in the fact that there
will always be another signifier to determine retroactively the
meaning of all that have come before, it also requires us to
presuppose 'all the other signifiers', the total milieu which is
necessary for the meaning of one. The completeness of the
system of signifier is both demanded and precluded by the same
rule of language. Without the totality of the system of signifier
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there can be no determination of meaning, and yet this very
totality would prevent the successive consideration of signifier
which the rule requires. [Copjec, 1994, p.19]
One recognizes at once the parallel between this antinomy of signification, and
Kant's first (mathematical) antinomy [Kant, 1965, p.396 (A426/B454)]. When
the question is posed whether the world has a beginning in time, and a
limitation in space, both the thesis of such limits and the antithesis of infinite
space and time are demanded equally by our conception of the world as an
object of experience. On the one hand, the thesis points to the absurdity of
experience synthesizing a simultaneous infinity of experience of an infinite
world. On the other, the antithesis points to the symmetric absurdity of finding
a limit within experience, past which phenomena end, and which would place
the objective world in relation to the non-objects lying outside it. Kant's solution
is to assert at once that there is no phenomenon that is not an object of
possible experience and that not all phenomena may become objects of
experience. Both the thesis and antithesis are negated, shown false, insofar
they share a common illusion in conceiving the world as a thing in itself. Rather,
critical reason shows us,
[T]he world does not exist in itself, independently of the
regressive series of my representations, it exists in itself neither
as an infinite whole nor as a finite whole. It exists only in the
empirical regress of the series of appearances, and is not to be
met with as something in itself. [Kant, 1965, p.448 (A505/B533)]
Whither the world, thither signification!
Does a Brain-in-a-Vat Have a Gender?
Like the world, woman does not exist in the very Kantian sense that it is
impossible (within the Symbolic) to render of woman a judgement of existence
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ICopjec, 1994, p.34], ”[l]n order to say 'it exists', it is also necessary to be able
to construct it, that is to say, to know how to find where this existence is"
[Lacan, 1975, p.94, quoted by Copjec, 1994, p.32]. One might assume that
man, resting on an identical antinomy of signification similarly does not exist.
Copjec does not:
[Why is it] assumed that the philosophical subject must be
neuter?
. . . What grounds it, those who hold it suppose, is the
subject's very definition as constitutionally devoid of all positive
characteristics. From this we may infer that those who
desexualize the subject regard sex as a positive characteristic.
[But] male and female
,
like being
,
are not predicates, which
means that rather than increasing our knowledge of the subject,
they qualify the mode of the failure of our knowledge. [Copjec,
1994, p.24-5, emphasis in original]
A predicative gender would be a mere assignment of traits to define a gender: A
woman is a being who cares for children; a man is a being who wears a corset
(as with the Ibitoe of New Guinea); etc. As "sex radicals" like Butler are quick
to point out, the particular predicates defining a gender seem to be historically
and synchronously open ended: traits being recruited to define gender, traits
falling from significance, or even traits reversing their gender meaning. If we
start with the a priori that gender is predicative, then the sex radicals have a
point. The "predicates" '(is) male' and '(is) female' sure do seem open ended.
The negative Lacanians radicalize [find the roots of) the sex radicals by noticing
that the judgment of gender precedes the almost comical and trivial predicative
judgements we mistake for gender.
Copjec's surprising difference wherein we have no trouble asserting the
existence of man parallels our surprise at finding Kant asserting of the
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dynamical antinomies that both sides are true, rather than neither. For Copjec
and Zizek,
Since the existence of the universe was regarded in the case of
the woman as impossible because no limit could be found to the
chain of signifier.
. .
. [T]he limit on the 'sinister' [i.e. left], or
dynamical, side does not produce the possibility of metalanguage,
but simply covers over its lack. This is accomplished by adding to
the series of phenomena (or signifier) a negative judgement
regarding what cannot be included in the series. [Copjec 1994
P-37]
In Kant s third antinomy precisely the same negative element as limit occurs.
The complete determination of events by natural laws of causality is, for Kant,
consistent with the existence of a separate determination by freedom. I might
interject here, in a pattern of almost extra-textual terrorism, that what you hold
is not my actual dissertation, but a mutilation produced largely by the Office of
Degree Requirements. The consistency of the antitheses, as opposed to their
mutual inadequacy rests on the different arithmetic nature of the sets of
dynamical and mathematical antinomies. In the mathematical antinomy, the
addition of phenomena to a series produced contrary false conclusions when
this indefinite addition was pushed past its inherent limit to address the
question of the totality of existence. However, in dynamical antinomies, what is
performed is a subtraction. Taken away from the totality of causes is free
action, which then allows reason to form a closure of causality by the world's
limitation to natural causality. The world which could not exist as a totality of
phenomena is brought into existence as a totality of causation through the
exclusion of non-natural causation. But once the world is so conceivable as a
closed totality of causes, it's ultimate determination as object by other causes
(freedom) becomes graspable by reason.
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The same circuit of limitation as in Kant's third antinomy determines man
as a positive existence (albeit, a fictitious one). Man-whose name names a
sigmfier, a mark, not a being-is defined by lack via the castration complex.
Man's is the existence which lacks the Phallus. Woman, on the other hand,
lacks nothing, and thereby fails every judgement of existence. The limitation of
signification by a transcendental signifier he cannot claim to master allows man
(the category) to claim a positive totality of signification. That "all pretensions
to masculinity are, then, sheer imposture, just as every display of femininity is
sheer masquerade" [Copjec, 1994, p.41] does not contradict the existence of
man — to the contrary, it is the clearest expression of this existence. Lack is
simply the meaning of existence within the Symbolic Order; hence, as
previously quoted on page 82,
While the masculine is defined in opposition to [as lacking] the
feminine, the feminine is not opposed to itself. [Ragland-Sullivan,
1991, p.57]
The Logical Structure of the Antitheses
In his lecture, "A Love Letter" [Lacan, 1975/82, p. 1 49], Lacan first
presents his formulae of sexuation. As Copjec and Zizek each point out, these
formulae precisely mirror the forms of the two types of Kantian antinomies:
Dynamical/Male Mathematical/Female
3x —i <T>(x) ~i3x —i O(x)
Vx O(x) -iVx O(x)
The distinction here lies with two quite different negations of phenomena. Zizek
writes,
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This difference in the structure of mathematical and dynamical
antinomies hinges on the double negation which defines the
status of phenomena: noumena is a non-phenomenon, a limitation
of phenomena, and, furthermore, the field of phenomena itself is
never complete or whole. Mathematical antinomies are antinomies
of the "non-all" of the phenomenal field: they result from the
paradox that, although there is no object given to us in intuition
which does not belong to the phenomenal field, this field is never
"all," never complete. Dynamical antinomies, on the contrary, are
antinomies of universality: logical connection of the phenomena in
the universal causal nexus necessarily involves an exception, the
noumenal act of freedom. [Zizek, 1993, p. 55]
So with the dynamical antinomy of causation and freedom, Kant asserts at once
that every phenomenal X belongs within the causal order (Vx O(x)) and that
there is something (freedom) which lies outside the causal order (3x —i <T>(x))
. On
the other hand, with the mathematical antinomy of the finiteness or infiniteness
of time, Kant asserts at once that it is neither the case that there are
phenomena not preceded by other phenomena (-i3x —i ct>(x) ) nor that all
phenomena have precedent phenomena (-nVx O(x)). Similarly, in space neither
are any phenomena limited by an end to space, nor do all phenomena have
phenomena beyond themselves.
Read within the formulae of sexuation, the "predicate" Phi is simply
'submitted to the Phallic Law'. So whereas in male identity everything is
submitted to the Phallic Law (Vx <D(x)) just inasmuch as there is there is
something in masculinity free of the Phallic Law (3x -iO(x)), in female identity
not everything is submitted to the Phallic Law (-iVx O(x)) just inasmuch as
there is nothing free of the Phallic Law (->3x —i O(x)) . We can make an attempt
to understand these formulae by way of the Freudian parable of the primordial
sons who kill an originary father in a struggle to gain sexual access to women.
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In the parable, the dead father comes back as the Phallic Law confining the
sons’ pleasure within Symbolic dictates. In the parable, as well as in the
classical Freudian Oedipal complex, all those claiming masculine identity are
subject to the Phallic Law, but strictly on the condition that there is one
representative of masculinity who escapes the dictates of Law, who therein
serves as the very foundation of Phallic Law.
On the female side of the formulae the logic is more difficult. Not
everything in woman is subject the Phallic Law insofar as the Symbolic is
insufficient to name woman. Something in feminine identity eludes every
attempt to subjectivize it within a Symbolic frame. However, Lacan does not
thereby project a pure domain of femininity outside of Law and language, in the
manner certain French Lacanian feminists might (Irigaray, Wittig, Kristeva). This
is the point of the second portion of the formula. Merely because the Symbolic
does not grasp feminine identity does not mean that there is some other
positive feminine identity independent of the Symbolic order. In other words:
there is still no thing free of Phallic Law (^3x —«ct>(x)). The Symbolic cannot
encompass woman because she does not exist, not because she has another
nature parallel to the Symbolic masculine one.
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A certificate tells me that I was born. I repudiate this certificate:
I am not a poet, but a poem. A poem that is being written, even
if it looks like a subject. So fuck you bitch, don't try to pin that
rap on me. [Lacan, 1978, p.viii].
Hegemony and Signifiance
Parole Contra Langue
For my purposes in this dissertation, a centrally useful Lacanian concept
is sigmfiance. The first published use of this term, interestingly, comes from the
essay "The Phallic Phase and the Subjective Import of the Castration Complex,"
which was the unsigned first article to appear in Scilicet, in 1968-written by
students/disciples of Lacan whose identities I do not know. The concepts of this
article were derived from Lacan's Seminar XI, in 1964. The term denotes
precisely the sort of necessary and impossible relationship which I believe
political subjects have to hegemonic ideologies — including that grand hegemony,
Nietzsche's "Prison House," of language itself— which are unthinkable-beyond
at precisely the point where they create their own immanent contradictions.
Rose [Rose, 1982, p . 5 1 ] characterizes signifiance as,
the place where meaning falters, where it slips and shifts. It is the
place of signifiance, Lacan's term for this very movement in
language against, or away from, the positions of coherence which
language simultaneously constructs.
Kristeva, as well, makes use of the neologism (or more technically, the
archaism) signifiance, in a sense similar to Lacan's. While there are certainly
contrasts in the senses used by Lacan and Kristeva, both include the notions of
limits transgressed immanently in enunciation. It is perhaps worthwhile here to
provide the entire translator's notes for this term given by Leon S. Roudiez, and
certainly worthwhile to provide the last couple sentences:
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SIGNIFIANCE (signifiance). "Meaning" corresponds to sens and
"signification" to signification
; "significance" thus being available
for signifiance
,
it might seem unnecessary to resurrect the
obsolete "signifiance," especially since "significance" carries the
connotation of covert rather than ostensible meaning ("The
Rubicon
. . . was a very insignificant stream to look at; its
significance lay entirely in certain invisible conditions"
— George
Eliot, as quoted in Webster 2). "Signifiance," nevertheless, has
been retained, partly to avoid other connotations of
significance, partly because of its very obsoleteness.
Signifiance, as Kristeva uses this word restricted to its Freudian
sense (See Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Lecture 13).
It refers to the work performed in language (through
heterogeneous articulation of semiotic and symbolic dispositions)
that enables a text to signify what representative [i.e.
representational] and communicative speech does not say.
[Kristeva, 1 980, p.1 8]
While we are not here concerned with the challenges facing a translator as
such, Roudiez provides a useful framework in opposing the work performed in
language to what it (language) is able to say. I might interject here, in a now
familiar fashion, that what you hold is but a shadow of my actual dissertation;
the actual document can be found at the web site indicated in my
acknowledgments. We shall below employ our own usages of signifiance,
taking inspiration, if not loyalty, from both Lacan and Kristeva, and, in
particular, juxtaposing signifiance with another term, hegemony.
Ducrot and Todorov provide further inspiration for our adoption of the
term signifiance. In a discussion of "The Text as Productivity", they lead into a
definition of 'signifiance',
Defining the text as productivity amounts to saying— to bring
ourselves now, and symmetrically, to the ultimate theoretical
implications of such a definition — that the text has always
functioned as a transgressive field with regard to the system
according to which our perception, our grammar, our
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metaphysics, and even our scientific knowledge are organized, a
system according to which a subject, situated in the center of a
world that provides it with something like a horizon, learns to
decipher the supposedly prior meaning of this world.
[Ducrot/Todorov, 1979, p.357]
What we shall wish to call the "system to which our perception, our grammar,
our metaphysics etc. are organized is simply an "ideological formation"
— and in
certain cases forming a "horizon", a hegemonic one. Ducrot and Todorov
continue,
To the idealism of a meaning anterior to that which "expresses"
it, the text would then oppose the materialism of a play of
signifiers that produces meaning effects. ... To "work the
language" is thus to explore how it works, but on the condition
that the models for what speaks meaning on the surface and
what effectuates it in depth are not specified as the same. "We
shall designate by the term signifiance this work of differentiation,
stratification and confrontation which is practiced in language,
and which deposits on the line of the speaking subject a
signifying chain which is communicative and grammatically
structured." [Ducrot/Todorov, 1979, p.357-358] 31
The notion which Kristeva, in particular, is aiming at is the manner in
which the systematicity of a language — but also of any other semiotic
structure— fails to capture the enunciative possibilities of real concrete
speakers. Although language— and here I would add that language is, to my
analysis, one ideological formation among others— forms a horizon beyond
which no counter-language or metalanguage can be posed, that is not
equivalent to language (ideology) completing a closure of the possibilities of
speech. Language has no outside, but it does have freedom and indeterminacy
31 The quoted sentence defining signifiance might be reasonably presumed to be taken
from Semeioteke [Kristeva, 1968], but Ducrot and Todorov do not provide an explicit
citation for the quotation.
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at its interstices. Most specifically, language may be used against itself by
forcing the raw enunciative quality of words to fight against meanings.
A Return of the Positive
It can be recognized here that I have completed a return to the positive
Lacan, at least at a formal level. In signifiance, language forms a positive
horizon, not a merely negative limit. We can perfectly well know and say within
language what it is that language does not allow us to say. Rather than the
negative mathematical limit of a transfinite unreachable, and unapproachable,
by any series of enunciations, the limits of language are the most banal
commands made in grammar school. To put words or sounds together in
disobedience to the rules of our language's phonetics, morphology, grammar
and pragmatics is not to be damned to non-being, nor to find the
disincorporating immanent negativity at the heart of subjectivity; it is simply not
to speak meaningfully, not to be understood.
A Banal Example: Blue Star Blitz
The examples Kristeva and others adduce for signifiance, transgression
of language against itself, generally come from the canon of "high" literature.
Authors such as Beckett, Joyce, William Burroughs and Kathy Acker are good
English language examples of authors who strain the bounds of language "from
the inside" in the manner of signifiance. However, I would like to utilize a much
more banal, and, in fact, crudely non-literary text as an example here. I can not,
of course, guarantee that the below text will have an effect on other readers,
but I found myself unable to drive from my mind an insistent bewilderment at
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the slap in the face to meaningfulness which the below text "enunciates" for a
number of days after reading it. While the below text will be justly soon-
forgotten next to Burroughs profound cut-up methods or Surrealist
autonomatism, it has the advantage of being curiously straightforward in its
transgression.
Two points by way of background, before I present my text. One manner
(not the only one, clearly) of transgressing language within its system of
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic rules is by the imposition of additional
"artificial" rules on a text. These rules, through their artificiality, draw a sort of
deconstructive attention to the natural" rules through which meaning itself is
necessarily created. Examples here are anagrams (interestingly, the topic of
Saussure's uncompleted book), palindromes, texts written with restricted word
or letter choice (such as a book without the letter 'e' or the word 'the'). The
text I present falls under this category, mediated by the particular typographic
form in which electronic texts are often transmitted.
The second background point concerns the "urban legends" of which the
below is a (parodic?) example. A large number of stories or myths circulate very
widely, which although untrue (or expressing a more archetypal form of
particular true events), are almost universally reported as having the same sort
of truth of news stories. These stories, although subject to variation in details
tend to fall fairly neatly into finitely many types
,
32
crystallize constellations of
32
ln many, perhaps most, cases urban legends are identifiable by verbal elements quite
idiosyncratic to a particular legend. For example, a particular myth or legend which is
otherwise variable, will be "pinned down" by the near universal use of a particular proper
noun (a person's name, or a place, for example) which always crops up in the story, even
while having no essential connection to the moral of the story. In the below example, even
though the "moral" of the story has to do broadly with corruption of children by drugs, the
particular point-du-capiton of the name "Blue Star" remains throughout other variations in
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fears, anxieties, pleasures, prejudices, and other widespread social emotions or
attitudes. We hear these stories from the schoolyard, to the workplace, to
social gatherings; but the rise of fax machines, then of the internet, has led
both to new possibilities and new documentary fixity to these stories. One
particular event which occurs seemingly with the regularity of clockwork is that
one of several well-known urban myths will be re-discovered by a credulous
reader, who then feels so moved by the pathos of the story to widely (and
inappropriately) distribute the story over newsgroups, mailing-lists, and E-mail
(and earlier over fax networks). The possibility of ready mechanical reproduction
allows for the possibility that new readers will further distributing the story in
essentially identical form.
The story of the "Blue Star LCD Tattoos" apparently dates back to the
early 1970's in its earliest forms. However, during the last eight (or so) years of
widespread internet use, the story seems to have a cyclicity of about eighteen
months. That is, about every eighteen months it is widely and quickly
distributed, only then to disappear within a couple weeks, either from its
refutation by followers of urban legends, or through the simple forgetfulness of
internet readers. It is clearly ideologically loaded with all kinds of themes about
the innocence and corruptibility of children, the wickedness of drug-dealers, the
cravenness of profit, and other themes for which no great subtlety or insight is
required to see their appeal to many members of US cultures. This particular
urban legend has also repeatedly made its way into redistribution by credulous
police departments, schools, radio and TV stations, newspapers, and a variety
the story. But surely, the "meaning" of the story does not depend on this odd, although
perhaps memorable, name.
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of other ideological loci; eventually each is factually refuted, generally to the
embarrassment of the distributor of the story. This version of the "Blue Star"
story was distributed in early June, 1996. I have no knowledge of the actual
chronological date of the text, nor of its creator.
WARNING TO PARENTS: If you have children or know anyone who
does, regardless of their ages you should read this! A form
of fake tattoo, called "BLUE STAR" is being given to school
children. It is a small, postage - stamp sized piece of paper
the size containing a blue star. These papers are SOAKED IN
LSD, in order to addict children to this dangerous drug.
The moisture and oils on your hands will react quickly with
the paper, SIMPLY HANDLING IT is likely to cause the LSD to
be absorbed into your skin. It has been confirmed that some
contain deadly amounts of STRYCHNINE, which is used to bind
the LSD to the paper.
THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL DEATHS FROM OVERDOSES, AND MORE DUE
TO THE STRYCHNINE
. LSD is EXTREMELY DANGEROUS and extremely
addicting
.
Symptoms to watch for include: hallucinations, mood swings
uncontrolled laughter, drop in body temperature, dizziness,
severely dilated pupils, and severe vomiting. Up to an hour
can pass between contact with the drug and the beginning of
the LSD "trip". If you suspect that your child has become a
victim of one of these blue star tattoos, you must take him
or her immediately to the hospital and call the police.
These usually come wrapped in foil. Some have been reported
to have different designs on the paper, but by far the blue
star design is the most common. You are advised to call the
police immediately if you find anyone suspicious selling or
giving away fake tattoos to children, especially those with
a blue star design or wrapped in foil
.
Sources of above information are: Javier O'Donnell (Danbury
Hospital Outpatient Chemical Dependency Treatment Service)
,
Charles Fisher (New York State Police)
,
and Burton Goldberg
(Mount Kisco Hospital, Mount Kisco, NY)
.
NOTE: Please feel free to reproduce this article and spread
it within your community and work place. This danger to our
children must be made known. Distribute the warning as wide
as you can, this is growing faster than we can warn parents
and professionals.
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The syntactic, semantic, thematic and organizational structure of the above text
is an unremarkable example of the "Blue Star" legend
.
33 Even the grammatical
errors are characteristic of renditions of the legend. I might interject here, as if
such a voice could originate outside the text, the usual caveat about this
document s modification. The lead in is the address to the slightly absurdly
broad group of those who "have children or know anyone who does." A few
moderately clinical sounding phrases are used about the negative effects of LSD
and its contaminants" (another widely-believed urban legend in itself). Some
sources are cited as evidence (who would prove either fictional or unaware of
the text, if traced). Finally, a plea is made for redistribution of the text. All of
the above is the slavishly standard modus operandi of this myth.
Typographic Transgression
There is nothing remarkable, and most certainly nothing transgressive,
about the above "Blue Star" text, until one focuses upon a peculiar typographic
detail of its presentation. This typographic peculiarity would be unrecognizable
or non-existent if the text were read aloud. The peculiarity would even be
extremely difficult to discern if the text were presented in any of the
proportional fonts used in newspapers, books, magazines, and, for that matter,
33
For a rather exhaustive history of the origins and evolution of the Blue Star meme,
see the Web page http://www.nepenthes.com/Tattoo/index.html, created by Dave Gross.
Gross notes in personal E-mail that some of the concrete minor changes made in order to
fit the text to its convention. For example, the name J. O'Donnell which is frequently used
in the Blue Star legend is expanded with the first name Javier, which Gross asserts is
original to the cited text. Gross' own explanation of the cited text is that it has taken a
form fairly impervious to mutation in order to preserve within it a secondary hidden meme.
The structure of this explanation is interesting insofar as it casts the text as operating, in a
sense, as its own metalanguage. But insofar as I am unable to discover any real secondary
meme operating within the text, I am not convinced that preservation of such a covert
content is the actual value of the text's rigid structure.
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through most of this dissertation. The peculiarity would not even exist if
different margin widths were used in reproducing the text. However, the above
text was distributed to a network of computers, the vast the vast majority of
which will display the text in a monospaced font with the locations of line
breaks preserved by each display. It is also reproduced here in conformity with
that rule. Presented in this specific manner, it is not difficult to notice in the
above text that all lines except the last, in each of the seven paragraphs are
exactly 59 characters long. The effect is to right justify each paragraph; but this
is accomplished without varying the spacing following periods or other
punctuation (nor inserting extra interword spaces), as one might do in a
typesetting system. Whoever composed the quoted Blue Star story must have
spent an enormous amount of time playing with word choice, paraphrases,
word order, and so on, in order to accomplish this remarkable, but slightly
covert, typographic effect. It might seem like a trifling coincidence that the line
lengths are so uniform, but any reader who attempts to produce any single
paragraph on the topic of her choice conforming to this rule will quickly
recognize the challenge in writing according to this convention (much as with
restrictions mentioned above, such as finding palindromes). 34
34Another, less compelling, word play was later apparently posted from the same E-
mail address, morph10625@aol.com (MORPH 1 0625). The below text also takes a special
typographic form, and repeats the same Blue Star legend. On two points, this text seems
like merely wordplay as opposed to real signifiance. On the first point, the very
obviousness of the typographic convention prevents the text from passing, even
momentarily, as non-parodic (although the intent of the parody is not necessarily evident).
Having nothing covert within the parodic structure seems to weaken the transgressive
effect of the enunciative (or readerly) act. Secondly, the text is much more artificial in its
composition at a syntactic and semantic level. The sentence structure and semantic flow
appears forced in a way that fails to provide a gap between its overt meaningfulness and
its typographic reduction, or deconstruction, of this meaningfulness. If one were to
typographically reformat the below text to eliminate the evidence of its peculiarity of
construction, the text would still seem strange and unnatural. With the earlier 59-character
text, a typographic reformatting of the text would hide its peculiarity of construction, but
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The effect which the described typographic signifiance has is to make it
deconstruct the meaningfulness of a text, but not merely to make a text
meaningless. The 59-character Blue Star legend is not gibberish. It does not
violate grammatical or semantic dictates of language. But the text slips away
from each meaning we try to assign it. Whether we try to read the text as a
warning of the drug-menace facing children or as a stupidly credulous
condensation of a war-on-drugs ideology, its trivial typographic convention
prevents us from accepting an interpretation. It is natural, then, to step behind
the text by attributing various motives to the text's author(s) for creation. Quite
aside from the speculative nature of these assigned motives, and from well
known arguments of their undecideability, it should be recognized that this
stepping behind is not a way of pinning-down the meaning of a text, but rather
of making up for the (lack of) meaning. The text cannot be given stable
meaning, but rather than admit to this, we evade the subject by talking about
the conditions (i.e. authorial) of the text's creation. 35
the text would otherwise pass for a perfectly "authentic" example of a credulously
circulated Blue Star text. Of minor note here is that the below text is not even fully
consistent in conformity with its own line-length restriction.
Due to Office of Degree Requirements obtuseness, I have been barred from presentation of
this example in the submitted copy of this document. By way of explanation, I can indicate
that the original barred text was arranged in the shape of a diamond, by having each line
first increasing in length (1 character, 3 characters, 5 characters, etc.), then decreasing
back again after a number of lines. The left spacing is arranged so that — in a non-
proportional font — each line is centered within an 80 character wide implied screen width.
Here, as with so many other places, you must, unfortunately, consult the web address
indicated in my acknowledgement for the true version of this dissertation.
35 Derrida's extensive writings on logocentrism — a metalinguistic grounding of texts in
authorial authority — is, of course, of great relevance here. The author in many cases,
perhaps essentially, functions as a dodge to the question of fixity of meaning. But any
exegetical discussion of Derrida must remain, unfortunately, outside the scope of this
dissertation.
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An Evasion of Positivity and Negativity
Metalanguage can be described as a sort of second language which
assures the fixity of meaning in the language actually spoken or written.
Assumptions that meaning is necessarily found (or find-able) within those text
which at least obey all the ordinary precepts of language-syntactic, semantic
and pragmatic (in the Grice/Austin sense rather than that of
Pierce/Dewey)
— seem necessarily to posit this sort of ground. Zizek, in this
light, remarks,
Metalanguage is not just an Imaginary entity. It is Real in the
strict Lacanian sense— that is, it is impossible to occupy its
position. But, Lacan adds, it is even more difficult simply to avoid
it. One cannot attain it, but one also cannot escape it. That is
why the only way to avoid the Real is to produce an utterance of
pure metalanguage which, by its patent absurdity, materializes its
own impossibility: that is, a paradoxical element which, in its very
identity, embodies absolute otherness, the irreparable gap that
makes it impossible to occupy a metalanguage position. [Zizek,
1989, p. 1 56]
It is remarkable how prevalently meaningfulness has to be made up for.
We have arrived at this conclusion a number of times already, and shall
continue to so arrive throughout this dissertation. The negative Lacanians find
sex making up for meaning where self-meaning — i.e. sense or identity— fail.
Pursuing the notion of signifiance through some (post) Lacanians, notably
Kristeva, we can identify (additional) places where meaning immanently fails. In
the materiality of its enunciation (or of its otherwise physical, e.g. typographic,
production) speech can create a tension, an abscess, within language. Things
said in obedience to the dictates of language can still stubbornly resist
incorporation within these formal confines.
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On the face of it there seems to be a formal difference between negative
and positive Lacanians, even at the point where they both reach the immanent
failure of meaning. For the negative Lacanians the condensation of meanings'
failure in gender seems painfully determinate. Every failure of meaning must be
called gender, and never anything else. For those positive Lacanians focussing
on sigmfiance, and the openness of enunciation as against the formalism of
language, transgression is cast as absurdly volunteerist. Refusing meaning is
just something we do as we wish, and because we want to. A dialectical
synthesis here would realized the common identity of determinacy and
openness; it would draw forth an understanding subsuming both positive and
negative Lacanian meaning of gender.
I am no dialectician. I have already written on page 74 of this
dissertation that I will side with the positive Lacan, so there is no mystery here.
We really are free to transgress language or identity (in the signifiance sense)
pretty much as and when we wish. Perhaps a Marxian truism of the sort that
the Symbolic dictates which we freely transgress are not those we freely
determine is in order. Or perhaps this is merely a summary of the Saussurian
division of langue from parole. In any event, my sympathies are clearly
volunteerist, if not uncomplicatedly so.
Covering Fantasies and Hegemony
The negative Lacanians are in certain respects quite valuable. They well
diagnose the structure of the Real within the Symbolic as the point of immanent
negativity, or failure, of the Symbolic Order. A useful topological model is that
of a ball covered with hairs or iron filings: no matter what pattern of continuities
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exist overall in the direction and flow of the strands, at least two points exist on
the surface of the ball where a discontinuity exists, and no direction ( derivative
,
in calculus terms) can be assigned
.
36 Where the Symbolic Order-or, I argue in
this dissertation, particular ideological formations more specific than the
Symbolic Order sui generis- reaches its own impossibility, a fantasy covers this
gap. Gender is one such fantasy. On the same level Saussure's langue is
another such fantasy. To interject a reminder: it is worth remembering the grad
school's sadistic impositions on this literal text. And likewise, as I explicate in
another section, a (racial-)national identity is a covering fantasy in exactly the
same respect as are gender and metalanguage. In fact, quite contrary to the
negative Lacanians who, at least in those arguments addressed above, seem to
reduce every gap in the symbolic to sex, I would multiply the number of
covering fantasies indefinitely.
36No particular attention should be paid to this minimum number of discontinuities of
two for this particular topological/physical model. If anything, a better model for Ideology
(writ large) might insist upon infinitely many discontinuities, such as in the Cantor set.
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CHAPTER IV
IDEOLOGY, RACE, NATION
0: Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs,
dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same
food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same
diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by
the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us,
do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison
us, do we not die?
A: Hell if I know?
A Psychoanalysis of Race
The Racial Other in Nationalist Subjectivations
Etienne Balibar [Balibar, 1991], in an article in New Left Review, entitled,
Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today" raises the
question of the relation of the State to both racism and nationalism. The
question in his paper is more specific than shall interest me in this essay— his
particular interest is in the new forms of racism which are developing in Europe
at this particular juncture— however, by focussing on a few of Balibar's
remarks, and expanding them within the conceptual context laid out in Slavoj
Zizek's magnificent first book in English, The Sublime Object of Ideology [Zizek,
1989], we may be able fruitfully to address these issues of racism and
nationalism at a general conceptual level.
At the level of abstraction at which this essay shall operate, I hope to
identify a constellation of relations amongst racism, nationalism and State(ism)
which hold common through most or all of the myriad forms of all three within
104
the two hundred year horizon of their common existence. In the fourth section
of this chapter, I will attempt to show how the conceptual scheme which I
develop out of Zizek and Balibar belie Benedict Anderson's severing of the
relationship between nationalism and racism near the end of his otherwise
profound and fundamental examination of nationalism, Imagined Communities
[Anderson, 1983], The central importance of such a critique of Anderson lies in
his representativeness of many on the Left who believe it possible effectively to
combat racism within a context of nationalism. The argument in the first part of
this essay suggests that every political challenge which truly confronts
racism rather than simply altering its terms incrementally— must
simultaneously confront the ideological forms of nationalism and statism.
Let us examine an illustrative remark made by Balibar,
In essence, modern racism is never simply a 'relationship to the
Other' based upon perversion of cultural or sociological
difference; it is a relationship to the Other mediated by the
intervention of the state. Better still -and it is here that a
fundamentally unconscious dimension needs to be conceptual-
ized— it is a conflictual relationship to the state which is 'lived'
distortedly and 'projected' as a relationship to the Other. [Balibar,
1991, 15].
These remarks by Balibar divide naturally into two parts: first, modern racism is
a 'relationship to an Other based upon perversion of cultural difference'; second,
modern racism is not this relationship simpliciter, but is rather 'mediated by the
State'. The first of these parts is perhaps commonplace. And perhaps it is
equally apparent that Balibar's first thesis (if I may call it such) is not adequate,
that it requires a supplement— in the sense of a supplement as that which is
necessarily, and essentially, excluded by the original part. Such a connection
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between the two theses is the argument of this essay; it is not an argument
Bal'bar himself makes. That is, although racism is clearly a perversion of cultural
differences with an Other, it presents itself as such precisely to mask its true
nature which is something quite different from this.
Where Balibar suggests something interesting is with the phrase
'conflictual relationship to the State'. Let us look at a suggestion made in this
regard by Zizek. Zizek addresses a very particular racism in terms of its
"societal" function, namely anti-Semitism.
Society doesn t exist', and the Jew is its symptom.
. .
. [T]he
stake of social-ideological fantasy is to construct a vision of
society which does exist, a society which is not split by an
antagonistic division, a society in which the relation between its
parts is organic, complementary. The clearest case is, of course,
the corporatist vision of Society as an organic Whole.
. . . The
'Jew' is the means, for Fascism, of taking into account, of
representing its own impossibility.
. .
. [However,] far from being
the positive cause of social antagonism, the 'Jew' is just the
embodiment of a certain blockage— of the impossibility which
prevents the society from achieving its full identity as a closed,
homogeneous totality. Far from being the positive cause of social
negativity, the 'Jew' is a point at which social negativity as such
assumes positive existence.
. . Society is not prevented from
achieving its full identity because of Jews: it is prevented by its
own antagonistic nature, by its own immanent blockage, and it
'projects' this internal negativity into the figure of the 'Jew'. In
other words, what is excluded from the Symbolic (from the frame
of the corporatist socio-symbolic order) returns in the Real as a
paranoid construction of the 'Jew'. [Zizek, 1989, 125-7]
What is going on in this excerpt from Zizek? The passage cannot be read
"logically" insofar as it attributes to a non-being a definite attribute (a
symptom). Society does not exist but society is retroactively created by its own
symptom. This formula will be found suggestive of Laclau and Mouffe's use of
the concept hegemony [Laclau and Mouffe, 1985], which also concerns
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retroactivity in the foundation of group-being, and from which Zizek acknowl-
edgedly borrows much of his analysis. The 'Jew' is a symptom of society's
anxiety over its own unity; but this unity only exists retroactively insofar as the
'Jew' functions as the disruption of this unity. An organic unity of society exists
only in so much as this very organic unity projects onto some fictive figure of
alterity its own immanent contradictions. The unity "exists" Symbolically, but
not in the Real. Pay close heed to the paradoxical formulation of this projection:
the notion of alterity formulated by Zizek radically contradicts the simple notion,
also rejected by Balibar, of a simple loathing of cultural/racial differences.
Rather, the very possibility of anti-Semitism or other racisms presupposes the
existence of society as an organic unity, but this organic unity is created only
through the projection onto the 'Jew’ (or onto some such figure) of the fantasy
of Otherness.
The simple notion of loathing of cultural differences is naive precisely
because it supposes that cultures exist independently of their exclusion of
Otherness, that a culture may constitute itself as an entity without in the same
act constituting the "cultures" it excludes from its own definition. In fact, these
excluded "cultures" have logical precedence over the cultures which create
them; not in the sense that an "included" group, in order to form its sense of
self-identity, must have come in contact with a foreign group which had
historically preceded the "included" group in constituting an identity— indeed,
the process of identity construction retroactively creates an historical
aboriginality of the interior group— but in the sense that the existence of the
exterior group is conceptually necessary for defining the interior group.
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An excluded exterior group
-in respect to its function in the nationalist
fantasy
-is in no sense a concrete collection of people who, empirically, may or
may not have the traits loathed by the interior group, but is precisely a
fetishistic projection of the nullity of the interior group's existence. To be clear,
according to the analysis here, the image created of alterity used retroactively
to found identity has nothing whatsoever to do with the empirical traits of the
groups excluded (the fact that the excluded group may indeed have the traits
ascribed to it is quite simply irrelevant). In Poland, to choose an example, anti-
Semitism is becoming the unifying national identity of a nation unable to face
the fact that the Capitalism being rapidly introduced into the country is precisely
a system of schisms amongst "the people," a disunity of national identity.
Jews— or rather 'the Jew' — become the projected site of disunity which allows
Poles to maintain a fantasy of unity. What makes this situation's paradox
particularly glaring is the fact that there are virtually no Jews in Poland.
According to my reading of Zizek, the "Jew" in anti-Semitism occupies
the same position as that indicated by the sign S(0) in Lacanian theory and
analysis — or rather, anti-Semitism is the process of displacement from the
position S(0) to the "Jew." S(0) is the sign which marks the impossibility at the
core of the Symbolic order (marked by the capital 'Other'). Those familiar with
Lacanian theory 37 will realize that the use of the mark S(0) for the anti-Semites'
37An excellent beginner's introduction to substantially all major aspects of Lacan's
thought is Jonathan Scott Lee's Jacques Lacan [University of Massachusetts, 1991].
Zizek's Sublime Object of Ideology is a nice introductory text itself, although it does much
more than just introduce Lacan's thought.
Lacan's project as a whole might be said to be a succession of efforts to ground
the impossibility of the subject. Before all the later "postmodernists" who share his
conclusion, and more radically than the many "anti-Cartesians" who precede him, Lacan
performs a radical critique of Cartesian subjectivity, as a dictum for psychoanalytic
practice. For Lacan, psychoanalysis starts with the non-Being of the subject, then slowly
108
"Jew" indicates another conclusion shared by Zizek: that rac.sm is always tied
to a surplus of enjoyment, the jouissance of a fantastic projection of a moment
of subjectivity before subjectivation/castration. We have a fear of losing
something we never "really" had-and it is precisely this fear which
presupposes the existence of the object. This object grounds the Symbolic
order, but signifies an impossibility or self-contradiction (a thing which only
exists by virtue of the fear of its loss). But it is, in turn, only insofar as there
exists this strangely grounded Symbolic order that we are able to situate
ourselves within it and become Subject(ivated) within it. The role of fantasy is
precisely to mask to the Subject the impossibility which grounds the Symbolic
order within which she necessarily locates herself. To put this back in terms of
the racist/nationalist complex about which this chapter speaks, we may say, "If
society could constitute itself as a real-empirical unity, it would not need the
Jew."
Here we return to the initial question of the relation of the State to
racism and to nationalism. Interject. Wrong text. Document by intervention.
ODR, they suck. My use of Zizek has allowed me to claim that nationalism is a
function of racism in the special sense that racism is the mask which allows a
nationality to conceive itself. This does not seem to require the State to play
any particular role in this "spirit of nationalism." But then we can not help
notice that in the two hundred year history of "Nation-States," the State has
unravels the subject's pretensions to Being.
One of the blockages encountered in the Lacanian "unraveling" is the point at
which the non-subject "blames" its non-Being on the non-Being of the Symbolic Order. The
Symbolic Order is the common domain of communicative exchange in which the subject
demands it be subjectivated. This S(0) is merely one of several of what we might
fancifully describe as 'roadblocks on the road from non-Being to non-Being' — but it is the
important one for the conceptual analysis of the Racist/Nationalist complex at hand.
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always played a very marked and crucial role in every conception of nationality
and nationalism. Indeed, for these last two hundred years there has been no
Nation in Europe or in the sphere of European imperialism which did not at the
same time have statist ambitions, and no "State" which did not have nationalist
ambitions. To understand the brief history of the Nation-State’s syncretic self-
conception I will turn shortly to the recent book which, despite its recentness,
defines this field of understanding-and to which both Zizek and Balibar
acknowledge their debt- Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities
[Anderson, 1 983].
The Subject Supposed to Know
Let me present a thesis that I believe is consistent with the spirit of
Anderson's book, which attempts to insert Anderson's thinking into the
framework given in Zizek which I have adopted. If, for nationalists, a racially
alterior group holds the position of S(0), then the State holds that of the
Lacanian Subject Supposed to Know. If I can make a convincing case for these
two positionings, then I will have succeeded in finding something like the kind
of close relation between racism and the State which Balibar supposes to exist.
What is the "Subject-Supposed-to-Know?" The position of the Subject-
Supposed-to-Know has a fantastic function; it is the Subject in whom we
fantasize the ability to know the "truth" of subjectivity. In the classical psycho-
analytic encounter the analyst comes to occupy just this position for the
analysand, through transference; the analysand fantasizes that the analyst has
found the true unconscious nature which underlies her symptoms. The Subject-
Supposed-to-Know has a fantastic function because, as I have written, the
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function of fantasy is to mask the impossibility at the core of the Symbolic
order-and the Subject-Supposed-to-Know's fantastic ability to know the
truth of subjectivity allows the further fantasy that the Symbolic order
(through location in which subjectivity is possible) has an essential core.
In the psychoanalytic encounter, there is a fundamental resistance to the
"working through" of fantasy, because the end result of the full visibility of the
structure of fantasy would be the disincorporation of the subject, who is only
subjectivated within the fraud of the Symbolic Order. Transference is an
attempt by an analysand to block the process of analysis. Whereas the inherent
direction of the analytic encounter is to reveal the incoherency on which
subjectivity is founded, transference onto the analyst acts as a stop-gap to this
process by staking the claim that subjectivity must have a "truth" insofar as the
analyst may know and reveal it. Similarly, we may speak of the subjectivity of a
National Subject insofar as it becomes the State itself which acts as the stop-
gap to the realization of the incoherency of any real-empirical national-identity.
The central claim of this essay is just the following: Whereas racially
alterior groups are the object of displacement of the antagonism at the core of
the national/Symbolic order for nationalists, the State functions for them as the
Subject-Supposed-to-Know. For these explanations to make any sense at all, a
trick of prestidigitation must have been performed. This trick, however, is not
the blithe and unreflective equation of individual Subjects with "national
subjects." The correct trick involves making nationality central to a subjectivity
defined by the "natural" answer to the question, "What are you?" The history of
this "trick" is the subject matter of Anderson's book.
It must become possible for people to say 'I am an American' (for
example) with the same blind conviction and willful obliviousness to glaring
absurdities as one says 'I am a man' (or, alternately, 'woman')
-rather than
with the kind of measured confidence and assurance with which one says 'I am
a Marxist or even I am a Christian
.
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But somehow, through conditions which
were entirely historically contingent-almost accidental, in fact-over these last
two hundred years the majority of living human beings have come to believe in
nationality with just the conviction I have mentioned — what they are is
members of a given nationality. If we talk about nationalism, racism and the
State in the terms of the most basic processes of human psychic development,
it is nonetheless with the knowledge that it is entirely contingent, and only
recently, that we can talk this way— though no less accurate for that.
38The absurdity here is, of course, the presupposition that one names any real-
empirical trait with the claim of national-identity. A more accurate way of understanding a
claim of national-identity is as a pure performative which stakes a claim to a particular
enunciative position — but which has no referential meaning whatsoever. However,
nationalist— not only fervent political nationalist, but the ordinary citizens who conceive
themselves as nationals— inevitably insist that their claim to national-identity is a substan-
tive statement which describes an independent real-empirical nature. The distinction
between the claims of national-identity and those of political affiliation which I mention
becomes clear when one poses a question of the conditions of knowledge of the different
identities. With national-identity, it is possible to discover one was not what one thought-
— for example, by discovery of adoption into a family, or of other previously unknown
circumstances surrounding one's birth (or even of one's parents' birth or blood). However,
we cannot normally decide not to belong to our national-identity: we may reject the
values, politics, religion, etc. of our nation, but still it is the values, et alia of our nation we
reject. Just the opposite applies to a political/belief affiliation. It makes no sense to
discover that we are not really Marxists (or Democrats, Tories, etc.), as we had thought-
— but it may be possible to convince us no longer to hold such beliefs (I leave aside such
trivial possibilities as finding that one has forgotten payment of one's party dues, and
hence are no longer technically a member of a given group). This is clearly because our
political affiliations are better understood for what they are: performative claims to
enunciative positions.
One of the most influential discussions of the performative nature of sexual/gender
identities, in particular, is Judith Butler's Gender Trouble IRoutledge, 1990). She argues
persuasively that there really is something rather absurd in our belief in genders. Ann
Fausto-Sterling does likewise, in Myths of Gender (Basic Books, 19921, from the rather
different perspective of a biologist. In any case, to claim these absurdities are "glaring" is
hardly to claim they are widely noticed. Many things shine without being seen.
112
The State is, in some sense, composed of concrete individuals. But the
State as a Symbolic function is of a fundamentally different order than the
collection of individuals who compose it. Just as racism has nothing to do with
the empirical properties of Symbolically exterior groups, what we might call
Statism' has nothing to do with the empirical properties of the individuals who
compose the State. Of course, the particular individuals who have or seek
political power within (or over) States are quite likely to play off the racist and
nationalist sentiments of a State's populace, in as jingoistic and as opportunistic
manner as they are able. Of course, particular Capitalists do their utmost to
divide the working class on racial lines in order to break unions, and to create
situations of so-called "super-exploitation." Of course it is an empirical property
of most politicians that they actively increase the viciousness of the racism and
nationalism within their "nation." But all of this misses the point in explaining
the Statist function; just as much as does examining the actual properties of
Jews in understanding anti-Semitism (maybe they really do own the banks, and
steal our children, and so on, but so what?). The banal facts that Capitalists are
racists, and politicians Statists brings us no closer to understanding the
centrality of race, nation, and State in subjectivity.
If we, as Subjects, have an essence— as is, indeed, demanded by our
being as Subjects— we only have it as Subjects of something. The 'something'
to which we are Subject(ivat)ed is generically, in the Lacanian language, the
Symbolic order, i.e. the 'Paternal Law’; but this 'Paternal Law’ is only spoken by
a Subject-Supposed-to-Know, a Subject supposed to be able to speak the truth
of the Subject. The Subject has an essence only insofar as this essence has
been interpellated by the Subject-Supposed-to-Know, but the Subject-Supposed-
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to-Know exists only insofar as it can adequately (re)present the Subject. The
Subject-Supposed-to-Know is 'in us more than we are in ourselves’ since it is
always onto-symbolically prior to the self, though only as a fiction of the self. In
other words, in projecting onto an object the function of the Subject-Supposed-
to-Know, the Subject retroactively creates what must have always already been
at the core of the self.
All of this goes for the State. Insofar as subjectivity has become, in
these last two hundred years, a National — or, perhaps better,
Nationalized — subjectivity, the Subject-Supposed-to-Know which onto-
symbolically grounds the Subject has become, at least in part, the State which
onto-symbolically grounds the Nation. But, as I have written, the State may so
ground the Nation only insofar as it also (re)presents the Nation, insofar as it
speaks the truth of the Nation. Clearly it is not the essence of States, sui
generis, to represent Nations— as the existence of pre-National dynastic States
shows— but rather is an historical property of modern 'Nation-States'. Despite
its historical recentness, the National form which modern States have taken has
become the universal and necessary condition of their political legitimacy; and
they have taken this form precisely insofar as National-Subjective entities have
come into historical existence in relation to these States. We can see the
retroactive creation by States of always already given Nations quite easily in the
archaic pretensions of Nations. As just one of many examples we may notice
that one of the first acts of the Swiss State, at the very eve of its creation as a
political entity in 1891, was the decision of '1291 as the date of the "founding"
of Switzerland' [Anderson, 1983, 123]. Although no surety exists of such
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decisions entering the "popular imagination" (or more precisely, the "popular
Symbolic ), we can see factually that in a great many cases they have.
Let us turn, then, to Anderson's historical "reflections on the origin and
spread of Nationalism" (these words make the subtitle of his book). Anderson’s
text is crucial for understanding the history of nationalism wherethrough
subjectivity has become nationalized in the fashion I have suggested above. An
anomaly has already been mentioned regarding Anderson: although the last
topic 39 Anderson addresses in his book is the relationship between Racism and
Nationalism, he concludes that the two are unrelated. Yet my reading of his
own text serves strongly to reinforce my belief in the connection I have been
explicating. How can I explain my disagreement with Anderson? I believe that
Anderson, despite his brilliant explication of the contingency and recentness of
Nationalism, in the end — in a very subtle manner— actually winds up taking
Nationalism's self-perception of necessity and archaity too seriously. Where
Anderson notices the contingency of the historical construction of Nationalities,
he fails to notice their continuing contingency at every moment of their
existence; where he recognizes the creation of Nationality as mere machinations
of States, he still supposes that this creation comes to exist at the level of
reality as opposed to that of Symbolic fantasy. I should interject here, in a
Cagean disruption of this text, that what you hold is not my actual document,
but a mutilation produced largely by the Office of Degree Requirements.
39
ln the first edition — the second edition does not modify this conclusion, but only its
position within the text.
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Anderson s Imagined Communities
The single most important historical precondition for the development of
the Racial/National complex I analyze has been the evolution of a particular
conception of time. The notion of simultaneity is the conceptual forerunner of
nationalists' notions of the commonality or identity between national subjects.
Time, like any cultural meaning has a particular history and genealogy; and in
these last few hundred years, the history of time has been the history of
Nationalism. In order to understand how time has changed, it's useful to trace
the associated development of Nationalism.
Anderson breaks the development of Nationalism into three stages,
corresponding not only to the historical sequence in which they have arisen, but
also to the differing political and technological circumstances which make them
possible. In all cases an imagined community which corresponds to certain real
potentials for communication and interaction forms the basis of what becomes
a Nation. In the first two stages, the existence or creation of a common
vernacular across the imagined community plays a central role; in the third
stage, both because of the newer technological supersession of print by radio
and television and because of the universal "political" legitimacy of Nationality,
common language comes to play an ancillary role. The three stages are, in
thumbnail sketch, late 18th to early 19th century American nationalisms
claiming basically the same regions covered by British, Spanish or Portuguese
colonial administrative units; 19th century Statist/dynastic "official national-
isms," in which pre-National States more-or-less consciously reshaped
themselves to cover existing, or create plausible, linguistic/National boundaries;
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and post-World War I/League of Nations "last wave" nationalisms which adopt
nationalism essentially as a narrowly "ideological" tool.
In the first stage, that of nationalism in the Americas, we notice several
features which allowed for an imagined common community. Preceding, but
supposed by, all the specific determinants of American nationalisms, however,
was a conjunction of two phenomena in Europe during those same centuries in
which America (and so much of the rest of the world) was being colonized.
These were the simultaneous rise of print technology and of Capitalism-neither
entirely unknown outside this time and place, but never before present in
conjunction. It was these conjoined phenomena, as well as relatively
independent "literary" innovations, which through a kind of cunning of Reason
produced as an inadvertent consequence a widespread cultural belief in the
simultaneity of diverse events.
Two written forms whose importance in the history of Nationalism
Anderson emphasizes are also important for the analysis of the notion of
simultaneity. These are the newspaper and the novel. The other forms of media,
electronic, broadcast and so on, with which we are currently inundated fall
broadly under the category of extensions of one or the other of these two
printed forms. What is essential to each of these literary forms? The novel is the
easier case, so let us start with it. Novels generally, if not necessarily, have
contained in their literary form not only an implicit imagined audience who may
recognize themselves as addressed — any literary form must have such an
audience — but have also an implicit possibility of including the audience in the
narrative itself. How may this be so? When we give the answer our modern
reader may doubt that there is any literary form which does not also contain
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this possibility, but this first reaction will be too narrow in its cognitive
specificity. The novel contains the implicit possibility of including the reader in
its narrative because the novel takes place within a time structured by the
possibility of simultaneity and succession-a structure of time which only
became conceptually possible around the time that the first novels were
written.
The distinction which Anderson utilizes between homogeneous linear
time and messianic time is borrowed from Walter Benjamin. Time structured in
homogeneous linear form, like that in a novel, always allows for the imaginary
insertion of the reader into the text itself. Since the form of time of a novel
allows for the temporal relation of all events, it allows for the reader to be
inserted into this same temporal order. Perhaps there are some few novels
written which do not allow this, but we should notice that even novels of
"science-fiction" or "fantasy" generally place their narratives either in the
distant past or the distant future, or perhaps in a distant place, so as still to
allow the possibility of the reader existing somewhere within the temporal
relations of the novel, even if at a remove from the concrete events. Even those
few novels which may rule out a literal placement of the reader within the
narrative (or in an extended version thereof) give conceptual explication of the
homogeneous, linear time which is a condition of "national imagination."
With Anderson's remarks about newspapers we can see most clearly the
relationship between homogeneous, linear time and imagined national
communities. Insofar as time is homogeneous, every reader can be placed in the
(limited) relationship of simultaneity under the emblem of the date at the top of
the paper. A community of newspaper readers is imagined in part on the basis
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of the reality that a particular group of people will be reading this same
newspaper; and partially on the already "imaginary" fact that this news is news
for a particular imagined community rather than for any other human beings.
A conception of homogeneous time allows both for the direct
conceptualization of the real" fact that readership of newspapers is
simultaneous and limited and of the "imaginary" fact that the "news" is
simultaneously newsworthy for all the imagined readership. As I have
mentioned, the "facts" about newspaper reading repeat at both a "real" and an
imaginary" level the imaginary location of a reader within the narrative of a
novel. Of course, the structure of homogeneous time, and of the imaginable
communities which depend upon them, does not necessitate that imagined
communities be national communities, but it at least opens that possibility to
emerge from more narrowly "political" interests — in just the manner described in
Anderson's book.
Let me return to my accusation that Anderson takes the pretensions of
nationalists too seriously— or better, takes the reification of imagined nationality
as an accomplished act rather than a constant, uneasy process. Anderson
presents two data which he claims show the inconsistency of the linking of
nationalism with racism. The first,
In an age when it is so common for progressive, cosmopolitan
intellectuals (particularly in Europe?) to insist on the near-
pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred
of the Other, and its affinities with racism, it is useful to remind
ourselves that nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-
sacrificing love. . . On the other hand, how truly rare it is to find
analogous nationalist products expressing fear and loathing.
[Anderson, 1983, p. 1 29]
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In other words, argues Anderson, racism (loathing of the Other) is concerned
with hatred, and nationalism with love— so therefore they are different. Second,
since nationalism is concerned with one s own nation in opposition (moral,
military or ideological) to other nations, it must be different from racism which
manifests itself 'not across national boundaries, but within them'; whose
purpose is, 'not so much foreign wars as domestic repression and domination.'
[Anderson, 1983, p. 1 36]
Returning to "National" Subjects
What is wrong with the arguments against connecting racism and
nationalism which Anderson makes? Most broadly, Anderson fails to understand
the basic Freudian point that the self is divided and contradictory. If, for
example, nationalism is central to subjectivity, and the conscious form of
nationalism is love of country, that simply does not imply that there is not
simultaneously— and essentially— an unconscious basis for nationalism in hatred
and loathing (i.e. racism). Of course, merely pointing out that many processes
are unconscious does not in itself show that the unconscious desire of which
nationalism is the conscious expression is one of hatred and loathing. However,
when we realize that the "Nation" loved by nationalists is not an object with a
coherent identity, but is a teeming mass of contradictions and impossibilities,
we begin to understand the psychic imperative for exclusion of alterity which is
contained at the heart of the "love." To repeat and expand this critique at a
deeper level: Where Anderson writes throughout his book of an "imaginary"
identification of a Subject with a Nation, what is really central in the relation
between Subject and Nation is a "symbolic" identification. Although Anderson
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does not use his word 'imaginary' in a specifically Lacanian sense, his problem
is that his meaning turns out to concord exactly with the Lacanian meaning of
'imaginary', as opposed to with the Lacanian 'symbolic’.
Zizek asks,
[W]hy precisely is this difference between how we see ourselves
and the point from which we are being observed the difference
between imaginary and symbolic? [Zizek, 1989
, p. 108 ]
He answers,
In a first approach, we could say that in imaginary identification
we imitate the other at the level of resemblance-we identify
ourselves with the image of the other inasmuch as we are "like
him," while in symbolic identification we identify ourselves with
the other precisely at a point at which he is inimitable, at the
point which eludes resemblance. [Zizek, 1989
,
109 ]
Put in terms of nationalist "love:" if this "love" were an imaginary identification
it would really rest on a wish to be like the National ideal-like the sort of
nationalized subject created in Anderson's accomplished narrative; but since it
is, instead, primarily a symbolic identification it rests on a wish to be seen by
the "Nation" as having the proper National character. However, there is no
"truth" to the "National character," nothing empirically to emulate; all there is is
an almost infinite diversity of persons and several systems of schisms between
antagonistically divided societal groups. Of course, these societal groups
themselves are composed of diversity and antagonism (the proletariat, for
example, is unified in nothing besides their opposition to the bourgeoisie).
Since our "love" of Nation is actually an identification with the very
position from which "the Nation" views us ("how we appear in the eyes of the
nation"), it is always an unfulfilled love, marked by a blockage. In order to deny
this blockage within need (i.e. desire through the lens of an identification with
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that whose desire our desire is the desire to fulfill), the blockage is projected on
to an object of alterity which is fantasized as responsible for the blockage. We
might say: as in ontogeny, so in phylogeny; just as psychoanalysis finds a
particular site which condenses an individual's failure of subjectivation, every
National subject's failure to achieve national-identity is condensed onto the
racial Other. Our relation to that fantastic object which blocks the fulfillment of
our love of Nation is inevitably one of hatred and loathing. It may well be, as
Anderson claims, that the relationship to Nation within nationalism is one of
love, but this love like so many others is an unstable accomplishment of a
repressive psychic function-a function whose transferal side effect is a
loathing of alterity.
Anderson’s second objection vanishes also, under the reading we have
given in the above paragraphs. Nationalism as a consciously articulable state of
subjectivity is indeed directed against extra-national entities, and racism thusly
against intra-national entities; but at the unconscious level which unites these
two functions of subjectivity, the simple distinction vanishes. If racism is intra-
national that is simply because an intra-national Symbolic exclusion must have
already taken place before "the Nation" as an entity opposable to other nations
can exist. Racism and nationalism are related precisely in that racism is the prop
needed to maintain an illusory nationalist subjectivity.
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] hat is hidden behind the phenomenal appearances?
Precisely the fact that there is nothing to hide. What is
concealed is that the very act of concealing conceals nothing.
[Zizek, 1989, p. 193]
The American in Mp40
The first section of of this chapter suffers two notable failings. These
interjections form, perhaps, a sort of Burroughs cut-up of the text; a text
already subjected to capricious interventions by the Office of Degree
Requirements. While the "psychoanalysis of race" above may have managed to
point to the unity of the necessary/impossible pair in the form of its nation/race
instance, the analysis is purely synchronic, and completely avoids the diachronic
aspect addressed at greatest length in the Chapter V. The first section reveals a
phenomenological level on which neccessary and impossible are adhesed
together; but it fails to reveal the dialectic 41 enacted by the adhesion.
The second failing of the first section of this chapter is that it is just
plain not very American. The backdrop of U.S. notions of race and nation is
formulated in terms of black and white, and it always has been. While the
analyses of Zizek, Balibar and Anderson — and I hope, to a lesser extent, my
own contributions to their discussion— are both profound and important, they
feel desperately incomplete in a context of writing an essay in the U.S., to be
read predominately by life-long residents of the U.S. Race in the U.S. wears a
40With all respects to Greg Ingraham, Penelope Houston, James Wilsey and Danny
Furious for the title; and to those who know who they are.
41
l keep observing through this document that I am not a dialectician. I do so again
here, but without being able to eliminate a certain sentiment for a dialectic. I use my
insufficiently forbidden word again as a shorthand not just for the peculiar manner in which
'necessary' and 'impossible' are in an odd complimentary and contradictory relationship,
but for the manner in which the histories of ideologies need to be contemplated through
this relationship.
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different color than does anti-semitism in France, or even anti-African prejudice
in any parts of Europe.
However, I shall not examine the fundamental black/white horizon of
racial and national consciousness in the U.S. directly. Although this basic race-
formation of the U.S. has certainly evolved over two centuries, certain
panoramic features have remained enough the same that it is difficult to discern
the modes of ideological eclipse while focussing on the U.S.'s fundamental
ideological racial (and national) construct. Sometimes it is possible to see more
in a glimpse of peripheral vision than within that blindspot at the center of
vision. Therefore, I would like to discuss, briefly, in this section, the evolution of
the boundaries and concept of whiteness in the last century and a half. By
looking here, we can see racial ideologies which have undergone forgettmgs
that we can not quite yet imagine of black and white.
There are two recent texts I will rely on specifically in discussing the
changing boundaries of whiteness in the U.S. With a title that wonderfully
condenses the whole of this discussion, Noel Ignatiev's How The Irish Became
White [Ignatiev, 1995] provides a worthwhile touchstone. However, it is
Matthew Frey Jacobson's Whiteness of a Different Color [Jacobson, 1998] that
serves as my direct reference here. Jacobson, in his introduction, characterizes
U.S. racial ideology in much the same manner I have done above,
[T]he vicissitude of Jewish whiteness is intimately related to the
racial odysseys of myriad other groups— the Irish, Armenians,
Italians, Poles, Syrians, Greeks, Ruthenians, Sicilians, Finns, and a
host of others — who came ashore in the United States as "free
white persons" under the terms of reigning naturalization law, yet
whose racial credentials were not equivalent to those of the
Anglo-Saxon "old stock" who laid proprietary claim to the
nation's founding documents and hence to its stewardship. All of
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these groups became Caucasians only over time.
. . . White
privilege in various forms has been a constant in American
political culture since colonial times, but whiteness itself has been
subject to all kinds of contests and has gone through a series of
historical vicissitudes. [Jacobson, 1998, p. 4]
Jacobson later in his introduction chides anachronistic projections of our 20 th
century understanding onto 1 9 ,h century racial ideologies. We are prone to
imagine that where we clearly recognize a variety of ethnic groups, 19 th century
thinkers and legislators through mere carelessness characterized what they saw
as separate European races. Obviously, a more Foucauldian sensitive
observation
— or merely a greater common-sense
— will recognize that thinkers
actually did speak their own ideologies well, rather than merely our late-20 th
century ideology poorly.
Several points relevant to this dissertation might be drawn out of both
our blindness to older racial ideologies and out of the very fact of change in
these ideologies. In a way, all the points relate to ideological totalization. Racial
ideologies have been ones with comparatively distant horizons. Perhaps not
quite so distant as the notions of causality and of gender that I discuss in
Chapter VII, but by all means of more distant historical horizon than some of the
case studies I present in Chapter V. In general, the time scale of race (and
nation) is longer than the length of our individual lifes, but not so long as good
and concrete historical records documenting the ideologies.
It is difficult for us to believe — difficult as a phenomenological act — that
those fairly recent 19 th century American thinkers really meant what they wrote
about "the Irish Race," "the Slavic Race," and the "Anglo-Saxon Race."42 It
42
"The Jewish Race" is still recognizable today, however. Although the phrase strikes
us as a cue that the speaker is an "Aryan" white-supremicist type (or perhaps a Zionist!),
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seems that the phrases must be mere metaphors and hyperboly, devoid of any
referential fixity. For after all, we know what race actually is, and those are not
its categories. Racial ideology contains a totalizing closure that colors other
racial ideologies so that they appear just like our own version; or at worst, as
less clearly stated versions of our own racial ontology. The very same totalizing
closure functioned in nearly the same manner a century ago. And yet, our
ideology-while still unquestionably a racial ideology-somehow has obtained a
quite different ontological division.
The change in the categories of race was not achieved in the last 100
years through any critical attack on the epistemic basis of old racial categories.
Although eugenics and other various (pseudo-)sciences indeed made various
proclamations of an overtly objective and epistemic sort, these were never a
real motive force in ideological change. Both Spearman's statistical innovations
in the name of reifying intelligence, Herrnstein's and Murray's The Bell Curve
(for example) weakly echoing the same science, serve as scientific
"foundations" of racial ontologies. And yet it is distinctly different racial
ontologies they provide bedrock for— Spearman for the immigration exclusion of
undesirable European "races", Murray and Herrnstein for the abandonment of
educational programs for "blacks." The "science" is not fundamentally different
between the different social scientists, but they operate under different
ideological regimes; racial ontologies that necessarily function at a more basic
level than the relatively superficial epistemic "ground" that support these
ideologies. Indeed, Murray and Herrnstein probably do not even know or
the phrase does not quite sound like an entirely empty metaphor— rather just as a way it
would be better not to speak.
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understand that they are arguing for a fundamentally different ontology than
Spearman was . 43
What has happened, of course, during the change in racial ideology in
the U.S. has been that generally exogenous political histories have undercut and
reformed racial ontologies in ways and for reasons invisible to the ideologies
themselves. This is what I argue throughout this d.ssertation happens to
ideologies in general. In this special case of race, however, these political
histories have been uneasily both exogenous and endogenous. European races,
as an ideological construct, have always been somewhat sub,ect to competing
pressures to start with, have largely come and gone out of the very ideological
pressure exerted by the more fundamental dualism of white/non-white racial
ontology. So in this way, change in racial ideology has had an endogenous
element, although one could certainly not describe this pressure and motive
force as critical.
Jacobson provides a nice snapshot of the endogenous instability of
"white" races:
Thus in this period [circa 1870] of volatile racial meanings,
peoples such as Celts, Italians, Hebrews, and Slavs were
becoming less and less white in debates over who should be
allowed to disembark on American shores, and yet were
becoming whiter and whiter in debates over who should be
granted the full rights of citizenship. The discourse of immigration
restriction favored a scheme of hierarchically ordered white races,
that is, and found some of these sorely wanting in the
characteristics required for self-government, whereas
naturalization discourse discovered fundamental and unforgiving
43
For that matter, and perhaps ironically, Murray and Herrnstein probably belong to
precisely some of those "racial" groups that Eugenicist of the late 19 th century and eary
20 th century (such as Spearman) were trying to exclude.
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differences between the white races on the one hand, and the
hordes of nonwhite Syrian, Turkish, Hindu, and Japanese
claimants who were petitioning the courts for citizenship on the
other. [Jacobson, 1998, p.75]
Although the specific history of U.S. racial ontologies is not necessarily
central to my general observation of the nature of historical changes in ideology,
this history probably still warrants a brief summary at this point. Interject (dear
reader...): the text actually written, and that approved by the signing
committee, can only be found at the web site indicated in the acknowledgment,
not in the pages in your hands. In its broadest form, the history of racial
ideology in the U.S. can be divided into two chronologically disjoint (or just
slightly overlapping) trends. In 1790, the first U.S. Congress created
immigration law allowing the entry of "free white persons" into the U.S. This
law reflected the black/white ontology of race predominantly operative in
Colonial America. As a whole, the period between 1790 and 1924 saw an
increasing racialization of European immigrants, starting especially with the
large Irish migrations of the 1840s, and accelerating with the late-19 th century
immigration of Eastern European groups. As observed in the above Jacobson
quote, this trend was not univocal.
The Johnson Act of 1924 set immigration quotas according to 1890
census data, and represented a culmination of racial distinctions within
European immigrants, the victory of Eugenics, and politically, the exclusion of a
large number of "undesirable" European potential immigrants. In the period since
1924, previously racialized "white" groups have become more-and-more
uniformly "Caucasian"— an odd and almost accidental invention of 19 th century
Ethnology. The whitening of these various European groups (who have become
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ethnic ) has not been univocal either; but as much as it has been a dominant
overall pattern, the making of the Caucasian race has served to support the
ontologization of excluded "Negros," "Asians," and American Indians (with
Hispanic' occupying a strange not-quite-ethnic but not-quite-racial position in
current racial ontology).
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CHAPTER V
HEGEMONY, AND OTHER PASSING FADS
ut there must be still other countless errors of the same sort
that no living man can yet detect, because of the fog within
which our type of Western culture envelops us. Cultural
influences have set up the assumptions about the mind, the
body, and the universe with which we begin; pose the questions
we ask; influence the facts we seek; determine the
interpretations we give these facts; and direct our reaction to
these interpretations and conclusions. [Gould, 1987b, quoting
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944)]
Forgotten AIDS Myths
Time Flies like an Arrow, Fruit Flies like a Bananna.
[Jenny Holzer,
http://www.adaweb.com/project/holzer/cgi/pcb.cgi]
The New Left's AIDS-Related Scientism
In the last two decades, the so-called Sexual Revolution of the 1960s
and 1970s died. It did not die in the sense that people's sexual habits reverted
to some pre-1960 standard of heterosexuality and monogamy. Actual behavior
changed very little in the 1980s; and, at any rate, the 1950s and before were
never as sexually limited as they are often imagined in contrast to what
seemingly must have happened with the Sexual Revolution. In a sense, very
little has probably changed in human sexual behavior since the advent of mass
urbanization in the early nineteenth century.
What has changed dramatically in a decade is the ideological tools and
strategies used in conceptualizing sexuality, and the relation of sexuality to
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broader notions of social power, political struggle, freedom and responsibility.
Most of the renegotiation of sexuality has been a determ,ned effort on the par,
of the right-wing to reinstitute its fantasy conception of "family values,"
normative heterosexuality, and condemnation of non-monogamy. An additional
contribution to such a conservative renegotiation of meaning has come from
certain self-identified feminists who have repeated the puritanical strains of
1920s "first wave" feminism in its "anti-pros, itution/anti-vice" crusades. Both
of these renegotiations have been extensively critiqued and analyzed in leftist
philosophical circles. What has been overlooked by most of us on the Left has
been a third current of renegotiations of the ideologies of sexuality which is
associated with the meanings given to AIDS. Or perhaps we have not
overlooked it, but have been so completely blinded by its glaring ubiquity that
we have not seen the ideological functions of AIDS.
AIDS has succeeded in shifting the left-wing discourse of sexuality away
from one of liberation, freedom and resistance, to one of responsibility, danger
and obligation concepts much more at home with a right-wing scheme of
social control, xenophobia and authoritarianism than with anything on the Left.
"Safe sex" has succeeded in performing this conceptual shift-a shift which
would be seen through if it came from traditional conservative forces, and
which would be largely resisted if it came from anti-porn "feminism"-precisely
because the language of "safe sex" is one inextricably signed with the
imprimatur of medico-scientific authority. Sexual liberation has not always been
liberatory, sexual freedom not always free, and sexual resistance not always
contrary to broad forms of domination. Sometimes, and in some ways, it has
been, in other times and ways not. But there was a time, before these last
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decades of AIDS, when the discursive apparatuses of liberation, freedom and
resistance had not been blanched out of sex. My concern, and my belief, is not
that any given form of sexual activity is in itself an act of liberation, but rather
that certain ideological apparatuses act in advance to foreclose the liberatory
potentials of sexual acts which function situationally and contextually as
resistances to forms of domination.
The altars of science-in particular scientific sounding pronouncements
about AIDS— have been the one significant form of social authority generally
unquestioned
— or at least not very deeply questioned-by academic leftists.
Somehow science has served in dismantling the language of liberation in the
Left more than any other institutions possibly could have, because the Left has
not gone beyond an automatic doxastic presumption in favor of moralism
bearing the imprimatur of science.
A Factual Gloss
The places where AIDS-science and its popularization have gone wrong
are rather numerous. The HIV-hypothesis itself, despite its longtime almost
univocal acceptance by official science and by the media, rests on much shakier
evidence than would be accepted in a less politically contested area of
science . 44 For reasons having little to do with the sexual moralities discussed
herein, there is a bias of reductionism and mono-causalism in science which
makes the HIV one-virus/one-disease model very appealing, even where
44See, for example, Root-Bernstein (1993).
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evidence does no, support it « Beyond that, ,he "war on cancer” o, the 1970's
promoted a more limited Was towards explaining disease with v,ruses, and w„h
retroviruses in particular. 46
Quite independent of what is causing it, something is going on with
some new kinds of deaths in the last twenty years. 47 The two dogmas, as it
were, of the folk-ep,demiology of AIDS seem to be (1) that it is an ongoing
epidemic; and (2) that it is poised on the verge of afflicting non-traditional
groups (basically non-drug-injecting heterosexuals). These dogmas have been
held pretty firmly by just about everyone since about 1984: both scientists and
laypersons. I recommend disregarding all the articles, scientific and popular,
which excitedly, almost reverently, declare an explosion of AIDS cases amongst
heterosexuals, and go straight to the raw data. AIDS is mostly a gay-male
disease, and those persons with AIDS who are not gay-men, whether male or
45r-
For general remarks on reductionist bias in biology, see, for example, Levins and
Lewontin (1985). Many feminist critics of science have observed this bias also For
example, Keller ( 1 985).
46An excellent discussion of this appears in chapter 3 of Adams (1989). See also
Root-Bernstein (1993); Lauritsen (1993).
47
This section was originally written, and presented at the Radical Philosophy
Association national conference, in 1994. A subsequent revision of that conference paper
was published in Rethinking Marxism [Mertz, 1996/1997], This section, in turn, expands
upon the RM article. Much of the factual presentation in this article might perhaps benefit
from additional analysis of recent data; however, despite my general observation that more
recent data strongly supports my points, such data would miss an important point. The
purpose of this section is primarily to examine some mechanisms of transient ideologies of
the late- 1 980s and early-1990s. The real point of my use of specific data is to show that
a variety of false beliefs were easily accepted, that could easily have been established as
false during the period under discussion. 1994 already marked the beginning of the end of
the ideological mechanisms I am interested in. Any facts which happen to post-date the
ideological mechanisms and effects I discuss cannot provide any real justification of false
beliefs held in, for example, 1992, by those I criticize. Similarly, it may well occur that
some new form of disease will occur decades after the moment I write these words (May,
1999). Whatever the factual contours of this hypothetical disease, they will say nothing
about those specific discourses of 1992.
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female, are overwhelmingly intravenous drug users.-' An argument can
additionally be made that even many of the cases wh.ch are reported as
exposure from heterosexual contact are false reports wh,ch h.de other risk
categories. 49
The other dogma about the plague-like epidemic does not do too well
with the raw numbers either. In 1994, the total number of new AIDS cases in
the United States declined significantly. 50 They will very likely continue to
“Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (19941. See Table 3. "AIDS cases bv acregroup exposure category, and sex, reported July 1992 through June 1993, July 1993
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and cumulative totals, by age group and exposure category, throughJune 1994, United States. Fifty-nine percent of cumulative AIDS cases are in the
exposure category of men who report having sex with men (some of whom also inject
rugs), while an additional 25% of cumulative cases are reported in injecting drug users
exc usive of men who have sex with men. Seven percent of cumulative cases are
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! cTmT^ bV heterosexual contac t- See Mertz, Sushmsky and Schuklenk(1995) and Schuklenk, Mertz and Richters (1995), for evidence that the actual
heterosexual transmission may be less than is here reported.
The simple noteworthy fact is that people sometimes fail to report to their doctors
their engagement in stigmatized activities, such as homosexual intercourse and injection of
illegal drugs. Such underreporting is facilitated by a widespread prior belief by doctors and
patients that AIDS is, in fact, being transmitted heterosexually in significant numbers.
Hence patient reports of exclusively (non-stigmatized) heterosexual contact are an easily
accepted evasion of unpleasant inquiries from doctors. However, more than just as a
general sociological observation about people's reticence about stigmatized activities, the
demographics of the reported heterosexual risk category indicate that misreporting is
occurring. See Schuklenk, Richters and Mertz (1995); Mertz, Sushinsky and Schuklenk
(1995).
50
Just how far cases declined is more difficult to say than one might expect. Unless
the CDC changes its reporting procedures yet again, it will become easier to quantify the
1994 decline when later reports are issued. My own estimate is that the real decline was
of the order of about 1/3. The actual reported numeric decline in the report current when
this section was researched, between the period July 1992-June 1993 and that of July
1993-June 1994, was small: from 85,122 to 84,268 adult/adolescent cases (CDC (1994)
Table 3). However, as discussed in the main text, January 1993 saw a significant change
in the criteria for AIDS, which classified many more people as suffering from the
syndrome. Since the earlier annual interval only contains six months under the expanded
definition, it is not fully comparable to the later interval in direct numeric terms. Under the
1987 and pre-1987 definitions of AIDS, there was, in fact a decline in AIDS cases
between July 1991-June 1992 and July 1992-June 1993 from 50,802 to 42,714, or a
16% decline (see Table 10, ibid). The reported figures by definition category for July
1993-June 1994 seem to be incomplete (although this is not indicated in the appropriate
chart), but of the 40,946 cases classified by definition category for this first reporting
interval fully under the 1 993 expanded definition, 56% of cases fell under the expanded
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decline at roughly the same rate, year by year, that they increased prior to
1 994. 51 The increase in cases in 1993 was purely a statistical artifact of a
definition change in January 1993 which defined a lot of people as having AIDS
who would not have been defined as having AIDS had they presented to
doctors in 1992. If you look at only the cases under the 1992 definition, 1993
also showed a significant decline in cases. 52 If you look at deaths, rather than at
new diagnoses, the peak was probably reached sometime in 1991 or 1992.
Whenever the normal distribution reached its exact maximum, the fact is that
AIDS is not going to be fundamentally different from every other new disease in
human history in following a bell curve of initial incidence.
As terrible as it is that as many people have died as have, the worst is
over, and this worst doesn't come close, for example, to the three million
people who died in a much shorter time of so-called Asian Flu in 1917 and
1 91 8 — when the U.S. had about half its current population. My point is not
insensitively to dismiss AIDS deaths on the grounds that they lack the
definition. Retroactive diagnosis of earlier cases, because of the inherently incomplete
information on which they are based, show smaller percentages of cases which would
have fallen under the 1993 expanded definition had it been in effect in earlier reporting
periods.
51 The epidmiological principle of a bell-shaped curve of disease incidence plotted
against time is known as Farr's law. Bregman and Langmuir (1990) summarize Farr's Law
as,
Farr's Law of Epidemics, first promulgated in 1840 and resurrected by
Brownlee in the early 1900s, states that epidemics tend to rise and fall in
a roughly symmetrical pattern that can be approximated by a normal
bell-shaped curve.
They further attempt to use an analysis of the change of inflection in increase of AIDS
cases to deduce the total expected incidence of AIDS. Although their 1990 estimates for
the total epidemic of 200,000 cases is an underestimate, even accounting for the
significant broadening of the definition of AIDS since then, the decline in cases over the
last several years suggests the general shape of the epidemic obeys Farr's Law.
52CDC (1994), Table 10. See footnote 50, supra.
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magnitude of influenza, bu, rather to observe that however many more people
d.ed of influenza earlier this century than will die of AIDS, influenza never
earned the same pretense of its very numbers making moral and political
arguments. Those were merely deaths: tragic, regrettable, unfortunate, but not
able to convince us to compromise a language and hope of political liberation.
Similarly, a lot of things like cancer, heart-disease and auto-fatalities kill a lot
more people than AIDS-but leftists do not insistently and obsessively lecture
on the techniques for prophylaxis against these deaths. On the other hand,
there was another disease of the early 20th century which wore the same
shady deontic veil that AIDS does now: syphilis, which is discussed later in this
paper.
Abjection and Moralism
When I was writing an earlier version of this paper, and mentioned it to
friends and colleagues on the Left, the very first reaction I received was
inevitably a sort of gasp, followed by an exasperated warning that I had best be
careful to emphasize the importance of "safe-sex." For speaking before a group
of leftist academics, my colleagues' implicit premise remained that lest I
admonish my audience explicitly on the virtues of condoms — and perhaps of
monogamy-1 might precipitate a breakdown of all standards of sexual restraint
in my audience, thereby exposing them to the sexual diseases. Most importantly
and insistently, a ritual prescription of safe-sex is insisted upon for speech
before the "innocent" undergraduates whom we teach. The magical powers
attributed to a simple lack of obedience to the idol of safe-sex is quite
remarkable. A faith in this new orthodoxy of safe-sex has, in my experience,
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brought out some shockingly unprofessional behav.or in leftist academics whom
I know. Leftists have been amongst those who vilify HIV-dissenters like Peter
Duesberg on the grounds that insufficient dogmatism about the HIV-hypothesis
might somehow lead to insufficient respect for condoms and monogamy-even
though etiological doubts are quite orthogonal to epidemiological facts. It is not
just those who denounce safe-sex, like the Christian Right, but those who fail to
preach safe-sex with sufficient enthusiasm, who raise the ire of safe-sex'ers.
Safe-sex
,
I believe, has become a secular scientistic religion of the
Left. Certainly many non-leftists share in the faith, but the fundamentalism is
greatest amongst us. I should interject here, although Derrida might accuse me
of logocentrism, that what you hold is not my actual document, but a mutilation
produced largely by the Office of Degree Requirements. The cardinal sin
according to this religion is an old Catholic one: accidie, the failure to perform
one s duties with sufficient zeal. Under this sin, silence becomes death, or more
precisely murder; wherein everyone not mentioning condoms in every context
becomes culpable for AIDS deaths. The absurdity of the imperative only
witnesses its structural importance. Condoms are now made to be exhibited, in
a kind of paean to the regulation of sex. Condoms serve as talismanic objects
for the feel-good "do something about AIDS" testifiers, amusingly safety pinned
onto clothing in a manner to render any functional potential void, and advertised
on buses and billboards underlined by homilies intended to affirm the political
radicalism of the passive viewer who assures herself that she knows their
importance. The content of this regulation is a bit ethereal: it doesn't prescribe
all that much, and what it does prescribe is hardly ever followed by its
proponents. The percentage of heterosexuals in any demographic group who
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use condoms with any regularity hoyers below twenty.* The percentage of gay
men who use them is higher, which is fortunate giyen that it is gays who are a.
a real risk; but this religion is quite catholic: its prescriptions, like its grace,
apply equivalently to all the devout.
Two related points need to be drawn out to see where the officially
positivistic reasoning of leftist AIDS discourse breaks down. Overtly, leftist
safe-sexers have no more than a purely objective concern with public-health.
However, those whom we-as academics, the same does not necessarily apply
outside the academy-most forcefully and frequently try to "educate" about
AIDS, are precisely those at the smallest-and in fact quite minuscule-risk.
Basically the message of "safe-sex" is one we preach to our undergraduate
heterosexuals. It may have a magical power to proclaim that "everyone is at
risk!
,
but on the facts, not everyone is. The arguments in favor of AIDS
Catholicism, and arguments on the greater ease of convincing everyone than
convincing those who matter, are simply so many "Noble Lies." The second
point in critiquing the official legitimization of our AIDS ideology is that the
many risks which are greater than that of heterosexual AIDS are treated with
absolutely none of the moralizing quality which is given to slogans on safe-sex.
Neither is the insistence ever so great; nor the almost compulsive quality
present.
53Schuklenk, Mertz and Richters (1995). See p.29 for discussion of this. Also
illustrative is De Vincenzi (1994), which suggests that even heterosexual who have a
known HIV seropositive status use condoms from inconsistently to not at all with their
longterm partners who are known to be seronegative.
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Our False Catholicism about Who Is At-Risk
I have communicated with AIDS educators who have asserted that only
5% of all U.S. AIDS educational materials are directed at gay-men. I don’t want
to put too fine a point on that particular fraction, since it is very difficult to
trace even the federal funding of AIDS, let alone all the local efforts. Further,
not every safe-sex pamphlet and billboard not specifically targeting gay-men
thereby automatically exclude them. But the overall pattern is clear: a sizable
majority of safe-sex material is specifically targeted to young, white
heterosexuals. Injecting drug use receives similarly short shrift in these
materials. When, occasionally, the actual demographics of AIDS faintly tugs at
the consciousness of safe-sex pamphleteers, gay-men and intravenous drug
uses might receive a passing footnote for their specificity of risk. The tone here
is generally one in which, in a pamphlet warning of the dangers of unsafe-sex,
one might read a parenthetical allusion to the fact that gay-men are at
particularly high risk, or that sharing-needles should also be avoided. These
pamphlets never contain a frank acknowledgement that, depending on how
many men are, in fact, having sex with men, the risks are different by powers
somewhere between several hundred and several thousand— on par, for
example, with the difference in risk that men and women face from breast
cancer.
The attitudes which leftist academics bring to our pedagogy surrounding
AIDS and sexuality also shapes intellectual and political climates. While it is
both easy and common to overestimate our influence here, our reactions to
recent sexual ideologies are relevant to my analysis insofar as one might have
hoped for resistance to repressive changes from us leftist academics. Were we
139
leftist academics merely to tell our students that insofar as they are men having
sex with men, and insofar as they share needles, they face relatively high risks
of developing AIDS, I would have no ideological critique against such factual
advice. Below is a bit of discussion about what I think is a false normativity
often accompanying such statements; but this suggested statement, by itself at
least, is quite fair.
In my experience, however, these prosaic accuracies are not what most
of us leftist academics are telling our students. What we are doing is warning
our predominantly heterosexual and non-needle-sharing undergraduate classes
that they had, sui generis, all better be careful so as not to contract AIDS.
Occasionally, we are getting scared young heterosexuals coming into our office-
hours after having had their first one-night stands, terrified that they have now
contracted AIDS. What most of us are telling them is exactly what gets us off
the hook most easily: that they should go to the local health-clinic for HIV
testing, and use condoms in every future sexual contact. The first part I think is
rather bad advice inherently
.
54 The second, however, while not harmful of itself,
reflects a backing down from a radical stance, and a failure of leftist pedagogy.
What we are doing in giving this "safe" advice is granting the legitimacy of our
students' irrational fears because of their sexual contents. Thereby we fail to
critique the systematic regulation of sexuality in the maintenance of a
repressive social order. Even if the content of the regulation— at least of
54The arguments which can be made against testing of low-risk populations — or
generally against treating HIV testing as a responsibility, rather than a choice— are several,
and beyond the scope of this paper. At the least, it can be observed that the rate of false-
positives probably exceeds the number of true positives for testing in low-risk populations
and, further, that no non-toxic or effective therapy exists for AIDS treatment regardless of
the accuracy of an antibody test.
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condoms, if not of abstinence or monogamy-is fairly uninteresting, our facile
advice simply affirms the necessary primacy of regulation itself. We ourselves
embody a sort of psychoanalytic Paternal Law, for which it matters not so
much what is commanded as that something, at least, be so commanded. I
think the failure is easily understood by analogy with places we, hopefully, do
not fail. If a young woman student despairs, to us, of ever "finding a man," I
hope we do not formulaicly assure her of her future marital bliss-but rather say
a few (gentle) words on the dependent position women are cast into by
patriarchy. And if a young Christian becomes convinced of his future
damnation, I hope we do not tacitly mutter a few words about redemption of
sin-but rather a few about how moral ideologies serve to blind individuals to
their material realities.
Our Lack of Catholicism about Risky Activities
While the notion that everyone is at risk” from AIDS is dogmatically
prescribed by the Left, our concern for risks is oddly curtailed to those
accompanying sex. If I tell them I am going rock-climbing, my leftist friends
might say "be careful" or "use precautions" offhandedly; but they probably
would not say anything besides "have fun." If, on the other hand, I say I am
going to go fuck around heterosexually and promiscuously, without condoms,
they will react angrily with accusations of my foolishness and moral
irresponsibility. But in fact, the rock-climbing — even with ropes and such safety
measures — poses significantly more actuarial danger (to myself, or also to my
climbing partner). Of course, a lot more people have sex than rock-climb, so the
totals are higher for heterosexual AIDS, despite the percentagewise greater
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mortality risk of rock-climbing. Part of the difference in reaction is simply a
misappraisal of the relative odds-but
I think there is a much larger part which
IS symptomatic of an adoption of a normativity of sexual regulation.
Even clearer examples of differently preached risks come with other
diseases. Heart disease is every bit as much behaviorally related as is AIDS, but
recommendations for its prophylaxis are seldom stated so moralistically by the
Left as are those for AIDS. For non-drug-injecting heterosexuals (or lesbians),
dietary-linked deaths are a good bit more numerous both proportionally and
absolutely than are sexually-linked ones. This is not the case for gay-male sex,
nor is it for drug-injecting
— but our proselytizing is not directed solely, or even
primarily, at those activities. One might receive a word of friendly advise from a
leftist about the health dangers associated with fatty foods, lack of exercise, or
smoking. But if one persists in these activities, our good leftists will probably
shrug to themselves over the foolishness of fat-eating, but recognize that such
a risk is simply each individual's to take. Such magnanimity over the self-
endangerment of others does not generally extend to sexually incurred risks . 55
55
ln defense of moralizing over safe-sex, and sometimes of criminalizing "unsafe sex,"
the argument is often made that safe-sex advocates are concerned not about harm-to-self
,
but rather about harm-to-others. A general Millean distinction between these types of harm
is assumed to be accepted on all sides; and I, in fact, endorse such a distinction myself.
The question becomes one of whether engaging in unsafe sex presents a nose at which
my right to swing my fist ends. I argue that there is something a bit absurd about thinking
of unsafe sex in these terms of harm-to-others. One simply cannot engage in non-
masturbatory sex alone, and hence any choice to engage in such acts — endangering or
not— cannot be made without the involvement of another person. The moralizing safe-sex
proponents seem categorically to remove sex thereby from the realm of personal
autonomy. Further, given that universal awareness, or at least belief, of the danger of
AIDS in sex (at least in the U.S. and other places where AIDS education has been
widespread), it is implausible to maintain that by engaging in consensual unsafe sex I
might expose another to a risk of which she is unaware or does not, in fact, deliberately
choose. This mutual consent to mutual endangerment (which sex must be considered,
quite regardless of any knowledge by one or both partners of serological status), is much
like the choice one makes by engaging in a contact sport in which one chooses to risk a
harm which, if inflicted, will come at the hands of another person (who has also chosen a
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Rather, leftists-here acting no differently than most everyone else, the
distinction being only that we should know better-ding to the supposition that
those indulging in "risky" sex (however small the actual risk) must be doing so
out of lack-of-information, self-deceit, or because of some sort of repressive
imposition of the sexual acts upon them. While I do not wish to proclaim some
high romanticist sentiment about untamed passions, it seems the Left has
curiously overlooked the rather commonsense point that people generally have
sex because they want to; and they want to even though, or sometimes even
because, sex is not free of risks. Within feminism, much of this sanitized notion
of sexuality harks back to some familiar refrains of cults-of-true-womanhood,
and to the moral pureness of women. Again, to interject, please find the
dissertation as actually written via the web site indicated in the
acknowledgments. Perhaps now women maintain their purity through condoms
rather than marriage, but either is ritualistic at best as far as the near-
nonexistent risk of heterosexual AIDS is concerned.
similar risk). Ethicists and jurists have long recognized risks such as that of contact
sports— absent conduct well outside the bounds normal to the activity — as covered by a
civil-libertarian advocacy of rights to harm oneself, and legally as free of liability to the
causal agent of one's harm. For much better elaboration of this discussion, see Schuklenk
(1994); Mohr (1987); Illingworth (1990).
A frequent retort by safe-sex advocates to the claim of a right to sexual self-
endangerment is an attempt to shift the discussion to one about non-consensual sex. I
believe this fourth-term argument is a bit dissimulative. The recommendations of safe-sex
proponents are inherently directed towards consensual acts, even if these proponents fail
to recognize the moral autonomy of such choices. Safe-sex recommendations are not
meant as helpful guidelines for rapists; neither are they hints to rape victims, who are,
after all, by definition not choosing the manner of performance of the acts they are forced
to undergo.
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Naturalistic Fallacies
The unequal treatment of sexual and non-sexual risks leads to a
Philosophical observation. An ontological error, I think, has been committed by
the Left in its derivation of a political ought from an alleged biological is. This
naturalistic fallacy reasons that since AIDS is pandemic, there exists a moral
obligation for each person to minimize her risk of AIDS. Failure to utilize
prophylaxis is thus cast as an ethical failing. It happens that even the factual
premise is rather weak for heterosexual contacts, but among gay-men AIDS is
indeed fairly prevalent, albeit not actually epidemic since the incidence is
decreasing. 56 It has been suggested to me that underlying the Left's naturalistic
fallacy about safe-sex is an enthymematic moral principle according to which
avoidance of disease is good. There may indeed be such a moral principle to
which leftists subscribe
— although more likely the valuation is mostly
pragmatic-but the problem is that we simply have no right to impose this moral
principle on the unwilling. Deep down we all value other's autonomy enough to
recognize that we should not try to impose our moral valuation of health and
risk on others; but most often that respect for autonomy is paved over with the
specious rationalizing claim that all those others are merely ignorant of the risks
they face. This claim is facile. Very few people, gay, straight or lesbian, drug-
injecting or not, are really much unaware of the health risks of sex— how could
they be after a century of constant barrage on this, and after 15 years of this
56See footnote 50. In particular, between the discussed intervals of July 1992-June
1 993 and July 1 993-June 1 994, the decline in new AIDS cases among men who have
sex with men was from 47,533 to 42,156. This includes those cases who have an
additional injecting drug use risk, but the pattern is the same if they are excluded. As
discussed in the mentioned footnote, this relatively small numeric decline represents a
much larger numeric decline under a constant definition of AIDS, since the case-definition
was greatly expanded during the latter interval.
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barrage having the name 'AIDS'? Indeed, those who misevaluafe risk almost
universally believe their danger greater than it is.
People, in full awareness of risks, decide to engage in "risky" sex. Both
heterosexuals and lesbians whose risk is minuscule, and gays whose risk is
much greater, choose the psychological, physical and political benefits of
"risky" sex to be more important than the associated risks. It is easy enough to
say that had the eventually afflicted amongst them known the result, they
would have acted differently. That might well be true most of the time.
Similarly, that subset of pedestrians who are struck by cars almost universally
retroactively evaluate their injury as more serious than the purpose of their
errand. This reasoning is quite a bad argument for avoiding walking (or for
avoiding walking on unnecessary errands), and just as bad for avoiding unsafe
sex. It IS only by abandoning a possibility for the discursive construction of
notions of liberation and freedom in sexuality that we have come to believe
every virtue associated with non-risk-free sex to be outweighed by the potential
for harm also accompanying it. In the end, this is a perfectly legitimate choice
for each of us to make for ourselves, but it is not one we should try to impose
on others, as we have so univocally done.
Syphilis and History
It happens that AIDS is nothing like what is widely believed in its
epidemiology or causality; but there was a disease, not so long ago, which fit
almost to a 'T' the current misconceptions about AIDS: namely, syphilis.
Progressive groups of the nineteen-teens, such as the American Social Hygiene
Association, produced stunning estimates of syphilis affecting as much as 10%
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of the adult U.S. population. 57 While such estimates were, no doubt,
exaggerations used to support a political agenda-much as are most projections
of AIDS cases today-it is nonetheless quite believable that several percent of
U.S. residents had indeed contracted syphilis. Mortality and crippling morbidities
were common in the disease. What I find most interesting in the history of
syphilis is that virtually every argument made today about AIDS was made
almost verbatim prior the 1930's about syphilis: the arguments of the public-
health authorities, of today's feminists, of today's gay-press, of leftists and
liberals, and the arguments of today's rightwing Christian fundamentalists. Alan
Brandt's Social History of Venereal Disease [Brandt, 1985], is a remarkable
description of these myriad confluent groups who united around venereal
diseases.
Disappointingly, the Left suffered all the same failures in its ideological
construction of syphilis as it has with AIDS. It was largely self-identified
progressives, and especially self-identified feminists of the nineteen-teens who
led the anti-prostitution and anti-vice campaigns which were some of the most
widely orchestrated state-repressions of 20th century U.S. history. The victims
of these repressive campaigns were, of course, poor women. Aside from a
language of "female spirituality" — often invoked also by feminists
nowadays — the chief argument for these police-state measures was syphilis.
The very same derivation of moral laws— and thereby state actions— from
epidemiological facts was the centerpiece of much progressivism and feminism
57 Brandt (1985). See particularly, pp. 12-17. The mentioned ten percent figure is by no
means the highest estimate of syphilitic infection promoted in the early twentieth century,
either. The assertion of Prince A. Morrow in 1911 is perhaps typical of estimates of
venereal disease among social progressives, "[The] morbidity of venereal disease exceeds
that of all other diseases combined." Brandt, p . 1 3
.
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of the early century, just as it is today. Then, as now, it was only a specifically
sexually-related disease which convinced leftists of the need for police action.
Other diseases, then as now, never seemed to carry such an imminent demand
for the forfeit of freedoms.
An Hegelian remark on the history of venereal disease might serve to
conclude these observations. Despite the analogies I suggest, there has also
been a developmental process in the language of venereal disease. The
dominant ideological construction of sexual disease had a religious framework in
the teens. The language concerned moral failings and corruptions, and
mentioned the essentially ethical dangers of unsafe-sex. By the 1940’s, when
treatments for syphilis had become much more effective, a much more
medicalized language became dominant. A positivistic discourse of public-health
and biology was the rhetorical strategy widely used in understanding sexual
dangers. With the emergence of AIDS as a discursive phenomenon the
positivism was not abandoned, rather the very language of science was
recycled into the construction of a fully scientistic theology of disease. The
language of science, remaining on the surface value-neutral, became the
framework for conceptualizing moral necessity]
Epilogue
The essay of this section was written, in the main, back in 1994, as I
mentioned in footnote 47, and as is implicit in certain now-dated remarks. It is
worthwhile, in 1999, to consider what has happened in the five years since
then. Numerically, it would be difficult to find a better empirical example of
Farr's Law than that exhibited by U.S. AIDS cases, with the apex of cases
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probably falling in 1992-3. I suspect that even inflectional points on the curve
would exhibit their projected symmetries, but I have not followed this closely
enough to verify this. In short, I was factually right (and had been in published
form a couple years previous to that), and mainstream AIDS discourse of the
time was wrong.
This dissertation, however, is not about epidemiology, but rather about
ideology. Therefore, what is of actual interest for us is what has happened to
AIDS ideology in the last five years. I would like to say that it has been
forgotten in that time-both in order to mutter 'good riddance' and in order to
affirm my philosophical concept of forgetfulness in ideology. Of course, the
actual course can not be characterized quite as simply as my wishes would
have it.
AIDS ideology, in the main, has been forgotten in its specific discourses.
The indignant and disbelieving reactions I described in my 1994 colleagues
would be replaced by yawns and indifferent stares were I to announce
delivering the same essay in 1999. Obviously, a certain set of background
knowledge and belief about AIDS has been retained for the last five years, but
the specific discursive practices— especially their associated urgency— has
largely disappeared. The disappearance I indicate is perfectly flat-footed: people
do not bother to say those things that they said five years ago. The reason for
this disappearance is not mysterious. I might interject here, in a pattern of
almost extra-textual terrorism, that what you hold is not my actual dissertation,
but a mutilation produced largely by the Office of Degree Requirements. The
disappearance has nothing to do with any stunning success of myself and a few
other critical writers on AIDS ideology. AIDS discourse has disappeared because
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AIDS itself has disappeared-not entirely, of course, but by an order of
magnitude decrease, which is practically the same thing.
Disappearances in ideology tend to be external in origin, as with the
AIDS example. Inasmuch as causes of ideological disappearance can be
traced-sormetimes they cannot, at least not easily or better than
contentiously— they mostly rest in unexpected brute realities. I think the
disappearance of AIDS has this sort of externality to AIDS ideology, though this
may sound paradoxical. Certainly the overt meanings of the phrases of AIDS
discourses do, after all, refer to AIDS the disease. But I think I have already
shown how poorly and approximately this reference ever attached. Most of the
logic of AIDS ideology always was ideological logic, moreover— something
hermetic, with its own internal frame of reference, not the ostention of a
disease. From this point of view, the disappearance of AIDS cases, the
disappearance of deaths, was not within the potential purview of AIDS
ideology, certainly not within the ideology considered as totalization.
There are a few clues I think we can discern after the disappearance. Of
greatest significance is an official lack of acknowledgement of the
disappearance of AIDS as disease. The last few years of CDC summaries of
declining AIDS cases have nearly suffered a news blackout. A report, in mid-
1998, that AIDS cases dropped an additional 33% between 1996 and 1997
(after similar drops for several years prior) generally earned only bottom-of-the-
hour TV news coverage, and then without commentary, and for one day only
(similar remarks apply to print or radio coverage, but TV seems best to illustrate
the point). Compare this with the feverish flury of stories which accompanied
reports of a symmetrical increase in 1989 or so. I realize that there are many
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factors which go into this asymmetry besides the mechanism of forgetfulness
which occupies much of this dissertation: the media favoring bad news, for
example. But even considering outside biases and motivations, it really should
strike one as remarkable what a non-story the abovementioned CDC snippet
was.
When social ideas become eclipsed, where those ideas do not have the
totalizing tendency I describe in AIDS ideology, the outcome is markedly
different. A public and social recognition of the causes of the eclipse is possible,
and ideationally functional. When a war is won (or lost), the victory is officially
acknowledged in congratulatory (or mournful) tones. A few occassional
intonations of, "AIDS has been cured by AZT and polymerase inhibitors", were
heard around 1996; and this would be consistent with the war example I
mention. But the victory meme just never had the grab to it necessary to catch
on in the ideology-or more generally, in the mass media. It was tried, but it
never much functioned. Most certainly, there was never an acknowledgement
of refutation of the sort, "We admit projections of a pandemic were not born
out" — of the sort as does sometimes happen in actual scientific investigations.
AIDS discourses never had an acknowledged end, but rather they just sort of
slinked away, without much anyone being quite conscious that anything has
actually changed. We are left with an ideational blind-spot regarding our own
recent discursivity and belief.
The general moral of forgetfulness I wish to draw is present in these last
few post-AIDS years. But AIDS ideology nonetheless left a stain on our
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collective unconscious
.
58 Even without the survival of most of the specific
tropes of AIDS, a general sullying of sexuality, a permissiveness toward a
medicalized State, and even some nostalgic effectivities of homophobia 59 have
been retained in a half-memory of AIDS ideology. Even a general piousness
towards safe-sex strictures is fairly widespread, even if we cannot quite
remember what specific Commandment we obey by our observance. The
ideology is long forgotten, but not quite gone.
It Is When Something Terrible Happens That One Realizes How
Much People Are Asleep.
Terrible People Wake up When Something Happens.
When People Wake up Something Terrible Happens.
When Something Terrible Happens People Eat Lunch.
When Something Terrible Happens People Try to Sleep.
When Something Terrible Happens People Wake up.
When Something Terrible Happens Plaintive Wails Occur.
When Something Terrible Happens Some People Wake up.
[Jenny Holzer,
http://www.adaweb.com/project/holzer/cgi/pcb.cgi]
Dav-Care Devil Worshipers
Lest we forget some events in a recent decade, it is worthwhile
reminding ourselves of the furor of articles, arrests, prosecutions, classroom
discussion, etc. about 'Satanic Ritual Abuse' (and a few allied concepts) which
58Do not read any Jungian theoretical system into my slightly fanciful phrase. It just
reads well to my eye; but I clearly do not endorse the literal idealism of a 'collective
unconscious'.
59The aspect of homophobia which was a parcel at a certain end of AIDS ideology is
not something I would now — nor would ever have — accuse the leftists addressed by this
essay of. But clearly, outside the left, a certain repulsion towards "the gay disease" was a
large part of the social effectivity of representations of AIDS.
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occurred between, approximately, 1980 and 1993. During this time, hundreds
of people were convicted based on evidence that seems laughably absurd from
the "outside" of the transient ideology of ritual abuse, thousands more were
accused and hounded, and dozens of the convicted remain imprisoned on
sentences ranging from tens to hundred of years. America's newspapers-of-
record reported — and advocated — these goings on pretty much without demur
until the early 1990s. Journals which should have known better60 engaged in
obsessions of taint and impurity. Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on
fantastic police and prosecutorial investigations (mostly at local or county levels
in a few places), and hundreds of millions more were spent on institutes,
conferences, training materials, and the other academic trappings of legitimation
(mostly at a federal level). Although the scale of this particular hysteria cannot
compare to the vaster scope of our drug-war state, it certainly exceeds the
scope of other famous American witch-hunts: those in Salem and by HUAC.
It is not my goal in this section to provide anything original in terms of
empirical description of what I will call 'ritual abuse ideology' 61
. The cat has
been let out of the bag by a number of writers more familiar with the historical
details than I am. What I hope to do instead is show how the ritual abuse
ideology of our recent past illustrates some of my concepts of totalization,
60
l think particularly of the shameful participation of Ms. in the witch hunt. During its
"academic", ad-free, incarnation, no less!
61
For my purposes herein, let us allow the inclusion of several related
concepts/ideologies within the general term. The notions of 'rape trauma syndrome',
'repressed memory syndrome', 'sadistic abuse' and some other pseudo-clinical terms are
markers of a few slight variations on the themes of ritual abuse ideology. The history and
functioning of the several notions is close enough that they may easily be considered
under a common term for my general purpose of determing their mode of ideological
functioning.
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hegemony, and the non-refutational demise of ideologies. As far as that
empirical description which I shall find relevant, I shall rely on the quite
excellent text, Satan's Silence [Nathan and Snedeker, 1995], which although
written from a journalistic and legal perspective, well illustrates many of the
philosophical concepts I want to implement. Other recent books and articles
have covered similar ground, although none probably quite as thoroughly.
Forgetting Everything
The very first paragraphs of Nathan and Snedeker's book point towards
both of the complements which I have tried to articulate in this dissertation: the
necessary and the impossible. More narrowly, the complements (at least
complementary in a diachronic sense) are totalization and amnesic non-
refutation 62
. Both elements in the histories of hegemonies serve to remove the
"ideas" which make up these ideologies from the discursive dialectic of a
Habermasian or Millean "contest of ideas." Let us look at Nathan and
Snedeker's remarks, which are proffered without any particular philosophical
intent:
Writing this book has been hard for us. There was a time when
publicly expressing skepticism about small children being
ceremonially raped and tortured by organized groups was, as one
journalist put it, practically an indictable stance. We can testify to
this: in the late 1980s, one of us had the police at her door, on a
maliciously false report of child maltreatment, after publishing an
article suggesting the innocence of a day-care teacher convicted
of ritual abuse.
62See the discussion below, at page 173, about this slightly specialized term I
advance.
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Several years later, the national mood has changed. Doubting is
easy now and, for many of the people we know-especially
lawyers and journalists
— even fashionable. Both of us have been
lauded for our early skepticism, praised for helping free innocent
prisoners, and asked how we were able to remain clearheaded
when so many others didn't.
For people not caught up in a hysteria, it is easy to demonstrate
its absurdity. What is hard is to appreciate its sense, to recognize
how a social panic "works" for people-people who may not be
very different from the skeptics who deride them. [Nathan and
Snedeker, 1 995, p.ix]
I fear that in certain cases I participate in a sin of my discipline by expressing
ordinary ideas "theoretically." Here is a chance for a partial remedy. Totalization
and amnesic non-refutation, for all their neologistic sound, are quite ordinary
phenomena of everyday lives. I might interject here, in a now familiar fashion,
that what you hold is but a shadow of my actual dissertation; the actual
document can be found at the web site indicated in my acknowledgments.
Nathan and Snedeker stand innocent of my theoreticist sin.
Totalization, in the end, is just a name for the historical sequences by
which certain things become "unsayable"-or at least, not sayable within the
bound of "normal" discourse. Saying certain things— things which were quite
ordinary a few years before, and which become quite ordinary a few years
later— becomes met with a number of mechanisms of social eschewal. Such
eschewal can take a number of forms. We can say things only ever to be met
with blank stares; or we can say things only to have a "principle of
generosity" 63 kick in according to which every time we say 'X' it is quickly
interpreted as 'Y', since only the latter "makes sense;" or we can encounter
63A certain amount of discussion of Davidson's concept occurs beginning on page
190. I believe enough is apparent from immediate context.
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insistent, but empty, refutations of "you certainly cannot mean that!"; or, where
necessary, we can be arrested, lynched, or run out of town when we say
eschewed things.
One key to deciphering totalization is in its transience. Or more precisely,
it is totalizing ideologies' amnesic non-refutation. If it were the case that an idea
held sway for a time, based on a bunch of evidence supporting it, but was given
up by agreement after dispassionate discussion, I would not want to call the old
ideas totalizing. Even ideas which somewhat less than entirely met this picture,
but had a lot of tendencies it that direction, would hardly be totalizing
ideologies. The picture I briefly sketch is a common lay-positivist one of
scientific progress. One could mention Popper here, but the picture is nothing so
specific as that. But in the same approximate way that non-totalizing ideas can
be described as Popperian, totalizing ones can be described as Kuhnian (or
maybe Feyerabendian). The step of positivistic refutation just never happens to
totalizing ideologies. Rather, the old totalizing ideas just get old, and the
constellations of forces which made the ideas non-refutable (by all the social
eschewals mentioned above), just do not operate any longer. I do not have a
theory of why this happens in just the same way that Feyerabend [Feyerabend,
1975] does not have a theory of scientific change. Things change for a chaotic
assortment of reasons which operate at all levels of description, and all levels of
social agency; one does not have a unified theory of anarchic regularities.
Let me note here that we have a luxury with ritual abuse ideology, with
AIDS, with the terrorist imago, even with the war-on-drugs frenzy, that we — or
I — do not have with other ideologies I argue are totalizing throughout this
dissertation (or social forms, for that matter, that I have to argue are ideological
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at all). Some ideologies are short enough temporally that I and my readers can
live through both sides of them. Others we might see only the start or end
of— hopefully the end-which might still give us the comparative viewpoint to
understand what we could not from within the totalizing ideology. Of still
others, we might get glimpses of the outside from old writing by long-dead
writers (or painters, builders, etc.). But of still others, no reasonable outside
exists which is substantially or concretely available to us. The outsides of sex,
or of causality, are thousands of years gone, or in some indefinite distant
future. It would be nice to "critique" sex (or causality) sometime after its
amnesic non-refutation, but that is not an available position from which I can
identify sex as a totalizing ideology.
The luxury provided by ritual abuse ideology is the luxury of homology.
All my case studies are just that. I can track these histories of a few totalizing
ideologies, show how they operated, start to finish, then bring those modes of
operations to ideologies with larger horizons. I cannot see from the outside of
some larger closures, but at least I can see that the view from the inside looks
an awful lot like the view from the inside of those totalizing ideologies whose
horizons we have transcended (by historical accident, not by force of will). The
conclusion of this examination of homology is the following: if big hegemonies
are ever transcended, it will be in the mode of amnesic non-refutation, not in
that of refutation. If we get past sex or causation or subjectivity, it will not
have been by critique. Just like it was not by critique that we got past the little
ideology of ritual abuse.
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Motives, Right and Left
Like anything which can function in a totalizing manner nowadays, ritual
abuse ideology has its special appeal to both the Right and the Left; and every
political slant (which can be multiplied by more than one split, of course) feels
its participation in the ideology as an intrinsic and organic outgrowth of what it
really always believed all along.
Ritual abuse ideology grew out of some ideological movements which did
not function in a totalizing manner, but which also had a parallel appeal to both
Left and Right wing thinking in particular, both feminists and anti-feminists had
an interest in proto-ritual-abuse ideas. 64 A unified appeal to opposite groups for
opposite reasons seems to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, property of
ideologies which totalize. The crucial proto-ideology leading up to ritual abuse
ideology is that of father-daughter incest. 65 Feminists of the 1970s focussed
much of their critical analysis on the functioning of patriarchy within family
64As is obvious, 'Right' and 'Left' cut up a number of axis which are not identical.
There is a Right and a Left on welfare-policy, on individualism/communalism, on corporate
vs. government autonomy, on "social issues" like sexual choices, on regulation of speech,
on income distribution, and so on. Although opinions on such ideas cluster, all kinds of
permutations occur. Saying feminist vs. anti-feminist is actually not just one such axis, but
several. And even these several axes do not exhaust the dualities in the appeal of ritual
abuse ideology and its predecessors. However, in a broad sense, ritual abuse ideology can
be understood as growing out of strong pro- and con- reactions to the women's movement
of the early 1970s. The ideology is not reducible to that movement, but it cannot be
understood without a strong sense of the connection to the women's movement (and to
the movement's enemies).
65
l hope it will be obvious to readers of the rest of this document that by describing
father-daughter incest as an ideology, I am not dismissing a legitimate concern about the
crime. But the discourse of father-daughter incest in the late-1 970's was not generically a
"legitimate concern." Discourses — ideologies — have their own ways of conceptualizing
their object, of legitimizing their inquiry, of propounding their viewpoint, which are not
crudely reducible to an unreflective "legitimate concern." Actually, such a reduction to
"common sense" — to a claimed purely non-ideological status — is always a good marker for
the ideological function of an idea (but not, I think, evidence of totalizing function). In this,
father-daughter incest was very clearly an ideological formation.
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structures, on domestic violence, on heterosexuality as a control mechanism.
An attention to father-daughter incest is a short step from these concerns. But
incest ideas would not have done as well had they been relatively univocal in
arising from feminist concerns. Instead, they simultaneously arose from
distinctly anti-feminist sentiments.
It was not just patriarchy that was to blame for father-daughter
incest-so say some of its ideologues-but also the women's movement.
[They] saw this domestic Lolita as a reincarnation of the good
traditional wife. While her mother engaged in neurotic job and
community pursuits, the daughter greeted her father fondly when
he returned after a miserable day at work... Under the
circumstances, the poor father could hardly help being aroused,
and there was no one around to save him from his lust. His wife,
after all, acted remarkably oblivious" to the developing incest
since it promised to free her from her husband's unwanted
demands. For [the anti-feminist incest ideologues], the foundation
of a good domestic system was a husband and a wife who got
along well. If they did, incest was unlikely... Part of the repair
work involved getting the mother to apologize to her daughter.
[Nathan and Snedeker, p.21]
As with the following ritual abuse ideology, these apparently opposite
approaches to conceiving incest had more than just a coincidental confluence.
[F]eminists did not back the [...] pro-family program simply as a
compromise with moral conservatism. On the contrary, many
women's advocates found much to like about the [...] approach to
incest intervention... Feminists [...] were also excited by [...]
efforts to control men's private behavior and, in so doing, to
make them "more submissive and nurturant" towards their wives
and children. [Nathan and Snedeker, p.22]
In this strange alliance— in what seems to be an identificatory mechanism with
an unfolding ideology— we start to see the glimpses of totalization which comes
to fruition in ritual abuse ideology.
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Another predecessor ideology which contributed to ritual abuse ideology
was the kiddie porn crusades. I might interject here, as if such a voice could
originate outside the text, the usual caveat about this document's modification.
Kiddie porn was a godsend for anti-porn feminists. Totalitarians like Dworkin
and MacKinnon never carried much sentiments for civil liberties, but,
[Mjany feminists, who found pornography distasteful, were torn
by their belief in the First Amendment right to produce and view
it. On the other hand, sexual depictions of children seemed
incontrovertibly wrong... But now, as the congressional witnesses
paraded their dire statistics and pictures of nude children,
[feminist columnist Ellen] Goodman felt "a sense of relief." Now,
she wrote, Americans could register their disapproval of
pornography in a "refreshingly uncomplicated" way. [Nathan and
Snedeker, p.42]
From the other side, an anti-feminist "family-values" ideology found kiddie porn
a similar godsend. Kiddie porn, to them, had a similar moral disambiguity in
proving all that was wrong with "deviant" sexual practices— homosexuality,
exhibitionism, promiscuity, etc. -which to them were all of a piece with kiddie
porn. Kiddie porn was probably the start of the totalizing function in this cluster,
and certainly provided the necessary ideological tools with which to build ritual
abuse ideology. Although,
At its height, kiddie porn grossed far less than $1 million per year
(compared with billions of dollars for the adult industry)... [T]his
information was publicly available by 1980, but during the next
few years, officials and much of the media continued to claim
that commercial child pornography involved millions of children
and a vast underground network of pedophiles engaged in a
multibillion-dollar business. [Nathan and Snedeker, p.42]
With the intellectual and epistemic pieces in place, a totalizing ideology came
together.
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Flashpoints
Ritual abuse ideology congealed in a couple places, fairly rapidly. In some
ways, the "outbreaks" 66 were triggered by quite accidental particularities. But
given the elements which came together in the above discussed kiddie porn and
incest ideologies, I think the occurrence of ritual abuse ideology-in its manifest
form of prosecutions
— was bound to occur somewhere. Prosecutions of persons
for ritual abuse of children have clustered in a few places, although in those few
places as many as dozens of child-sex abuse rings have been "uncovered." That
is the manifest form of the ideology; the latent form was certainly much more
widespread, and the ideology was generally believed in a more passive way
pretty much throughout the USA.
As the motive cause of the first two waves of ritual abuse prosecutions
were the delusional fantasies of two Southern California women suffering from
severe mental disorders. In 1982, Mary Ann Barbour, in Kern County, began
making accusations of molestation against a wide range of people whom her
daughters had been in contact with, mostly extended family. Over the course of
the following year or two, these accusations spread to include many more
"abusers", and through a network of social-services and police agencies, many
more "victims" as well. In 1983, Judy Johnson, of Manhattan Beach, began a
similar range of accusations, although this time specifically against day-care
66Even though the disease metaphors of 'outbreak', 'spread', 'infection' and so on
have some connotations I do not want to make, overall the imagery fits the pattern of
ritual abuse ideology too closely to disallow the metaphor. I do not think the ideology
affects only 'infected' communities in a broad sense, nor that it is as self-contained as a
virus or germ which really is in a distinct geographic location. But still, the pervasiveness,
and the concrete effects (i.e. prosecutions), have the uneven distribution of an infectious
disease, and much the same pattern of spread. The preconditions are global, but the
outbreaks still have their identifiable "Typhoid Mary's."
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providers. Again, as police, prosecutors and social-workers were recruited into
the cause, dozens or hundreds of additional victims were recruited into the
prosecution of the infamous McMartin Preschool case. Testimony of
children
— children more and more peripheral to the original accusations- was
evinced over time using some of the techniques and "expert knowledge"
described below; as more testimony was evinced, grander and grander
conspiracies of Satanist sex rings was revealed (or rather, imagined).
It is not particularly remarkable that a couple women with histories of
delusional mental illness could imagine scenarios in which their children had
been sexually abused. To Barbour and Johnson, these frightful events (made
ever more fantastic with the later invention of child-abuse "professionals") must
have seemed terrifyingly real, as are many delusions of schizophrenics. What is
shocking in retrospect is the manner in which a variety of centers of
professional, official knowledge were put into the service of legitimating and
enforcing these delusions. The police initially treated reverentially the none-too-
subtle and semi-coherent rantings of accusers. Psychologists and social-workers
stepped into to "interview" children with the effective result of producing
imaginary stories wilder than any original delusions of Barbour or Johnson.
Children who invented stories about the original accused, in the same coercive
situations invented further stories about unrelated additional perpetrators; and
these secondary accusations in turn led to new waves of investigations, new
groups of children recruited to "testify," new "sex-rings" being uncovered,
The social hysteria that McMartin incited upped ritual-abuse cases
to another level. While at first they were products of delusional
individuals, by 1984 whole social systems had been set up to
justify and develop accusations and prosecutions. What happened
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in Kern County is an example. There, local officials assembled a
remarkable apparatus for generating massive investigations and
trials. It included sheriff's deputies, social workers, prosecutors,
and [doctors]. [Nathan and Snedeker, p.93]
The irreality of the construction of "official knowledge" in the ritual abuse
communities quickly encompassed the judiciary also,
[Kern County Defendants'] sentences ranged from 273 to 405
years in prison; the women's time shattered previous state
records. When a newspaper reporter asked Friedman [the judge in
the case] why he had meted out such draconian punishments, he
answered that it was because he had seen pictures of the
defendants molesting the children and committing "every
perversion imaginable." Yet no such evidence had been presented
to the jury, nor was there any found by the sheriff's office after
countless searches... The judge's phantasms were shared by all
of Kern County; indeed, it seemed that the whole community had
plunged into a collective nightmare. By the beginning of 1985,
four sex-ring trials clogged the Kern County courthouse, and a
total of eight had been uncovered in an area containing about
130,000 people. [Nathan and Snedeker, p.98]
The ideological preconditions must have existed in many places. But in a
few places where initial accusations were developed, they spread quickly to
encompass many additional prosecutions. The same phenomena which occurred
in Kern and Manhattan Beach in 1983-5 occurred again over the next few years
in Wenatchee, Washington; in Lowell, Massachusetts; under the inspired
fanaticism of eventual Attorney General Janet Reno, in Dade Country, Florida;
and in a handful of other places. The image of a forest in a drought springs to
mind. Anywhere throughout the forest could burst into wildfire at any time, but
that crucial spark only happens to occur in a subset of the places. Such was the
USA in 1984.
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Obtaining Outsidelessness
The ideology of ritual abuse is more sophisticated in its internal structure
than a simple dismissal as 'hysteria' or a 'witch hunt' might lead one to think. 67
The ideologues of ritual abuse rely on many true and cogent observations. They
carry through deductive reasonings. They integrate other areas of thought and
knowledge. For example, one common premise of ritual abuse ideology almost
seems to be a Freudian truism,
The daughter's lie, cautioned Summit, "carries more credibility
than the most explicit claims of incestuous entrapment. It
confirms adult expectations that children cannot be trusted. It
restores the precarious equilibrium of the family. Children learn
not to complain. Adults learn not to listen. The authorities learn
not to believe. [Nathan and Snedeker, p.222, quoting Roland C.
Summit, "The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,"
Child Abuse and Neglect, 7(1 983)]
Psychic repression, at some level, is an undeniable property of human thinking.
To interject a reminder: it is worth remembering the grad school's sadistic
impositions on this literal text. When used by the ritual abuse ideologists, like
Summit, it forms the linchpin of a mechanism of justification. It is an argument
to trump all non-totalizing ones which might be counterposed to it, and in that
creates precisely the kind of outsidelessness which I discuss in this dissertation.
670f course, other social 'hysterias', and other witch hunts (literal and figurative), have
often had their own associated ontologies and deductive systems. It is not the case, for
example, that European witch hunts over decades or centuries were simple unstructured
fears which overcame otherwise sensible people. That movement also had its own internal
logic, its own "philosophers" and ideologues, its metaphysical reasonings, and so on.
People believed in witches, and in satanic possession and the like, for reasons that played
into a variety of social reasonings, and fit moderately systematically with other belief
schemes. I take no position, just for lack of sufficient study, on whether, or in what
respect, older witch-hunts participate in the trends of totalization and amnesic non-
refutation which are my concerns in this particular discussion.
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The totalizing quality of ritual abuse ideology's repression explanation
lies in its ability preemptively to coopt the very argument which most
immediately refute its claims. The "abused child" is firstly granted a privileged
epistemic status, in an echo of Hegel's master/slave dialectic or of much
feminist standpoint theory, which grants special knowledge to the oppressed.
But then a special hermeneutic is introduced to truly understand the meaning of
the abused child s testimony
— and this interpretive principle performs the
foreclosure. Another prominent ritual abuse ideologist describes the "unfolding"
of truth in children's testimony,
In May 1 984, Kee MacFarlane told Congress: "What we capture
on videotape on the first interview is an incredible kind of
spontaneity, this eye-opening reality that comes from children's
first descriptions of abuse." [Nathan and Snedeker, 1996, p.224,
quoting Kee MacFarlane, "Child Sexual Victims in the Courts,"
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, May
2,22, 1984, p.88]
Of course, MacFarlane's "spontaneity" is still one mediated by the enclosing
principle of an outsideless ideology since,
[Ijnstead of revealing heartfelt narratives by children, the
recording starred the interviewers [such as MacFarlane]
themselves, and showed them working strenuously to lead
children from denials to "yes" answers. The same tapes were
instrumental in producing jury verdicts favorable to [defendants].
[Nathan and Snedeker, p.224, notes added]
As mentioned, an outsideless ideology is not merely spontaneous, as the term
'mass hysteria' might be read. Totalization cannot function without a certain
sort of spontaneity, inasmuch as a large number of people must be in some way
predisposed to participate in an enclosing reasoning. I have discussed some
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such motives. But at the same time, spontaneity also requires a lot of leg-work
for the ideologists.
Much of the work in establishing the right interpretive framework, the
hermeneutics, of ritual abuse ideology, is getting the right social system of
official expertise in place (as with most ideologies). In this, the ideologists
quickly realized that videotape could not be relied on to provide an adequate
hermeneutic, and interpretation must be left to experts best able to understand
the meaning of children's spontaneous testimony (which generally takes the
form of denial of the events proposed by prosecutorial staff, even after
moderate coercion). By 1985,
[Attendees learned at the FBI's 1985 ritual-abuse conference,
abandoning their tape recorders and notepads "worked" for
prosecutors. [Nathan and Snedeker, p.226].
Such a hermeneutic was given even more explicit imprimatur within a few more
years,
Child-protection authorities institutionalized their phobias about
interview records in 1987, when the National Center for the
Prosecution of Child Abuse (NCPCA) published a voluminous
manual instructing district attorneys on how to handle child abuse
cases. Titled Investigation and Prosecution of Child Abuse... [it]
contains reams of advice on how to gather pro-prosecution expert
witnesses. ..perhaps most important— on not videotaping
interview with children, since doing so may help the defense.
[Nathan and Snedeker, p.226]
Once the ideological leg-work is done, most people are pretty inclined to believe
what "all the experts" say about a matter, especially if not to believe is to be
cast in the same boat with child-molesters and the like. And even more
especially if the right internal mechanisms exist to incorporate apparent
refutation into the conceptual scheme of ritual abuse ideology.
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Remembrance of Ideologies Past
What happens when totalization is a thing of the past? The actual
positivistic step of refuting the old ideas is the rarest of beasts. But for almost
everyone who remembers an old ideology, it is de rigueur to experience a
homologue of refutation. I believe that it is in the nature of life within ideology
(not to say there is another kind, of course), to require the structure of belief
which positivism endorses in a general way. Perhaps not the whole
progressivist structure we have experienced for a few hundred years of rigorous
science and Capitalism, but at the very least a structure of experiencing the
past in terms of overcoming-, Benjamin's undoubtably more accurate Angel of
History, who sees only the accumulation of horrors while being blown
backwards, is not the Angel of Ideology. Nathan and Snedeker give an
illustration,
The older reporters always passionately recount how, while
everyone else at their newspaper or TV station ten years ago
thought Kelly Michaels or the McMartin teachers were guilty, they
saw the whole thing as a witch hunt (even though they filed no
stories to that effect and did not argue the point with their
colleagues). [Nathan and Snedeker, 1996, p. 245]
The truth is, I do not know what happened to ritual abuse ideology. It seems to
be gone now, and I think probably no more waves of mass prosecutions of
supposed Satanists will occur in the next few years. In some manner, the
preconditions which congealed by 1983 have dissipated by 1995. The eventual
acquittals of a some defendants has (mostly on appeal, therefore outside the
immediate communities) probably had a certain effect. Kiddie porn and incest
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have faded from media foeus-although those fadings are no more obvious
causally. But far more than these "refutational" aspects come into play, an
ideological forgetfulness has come over us. The ideological alliances which
shaped ritual abuse ideology have moved into new formations (for example,
anti-welfare ideology grabs a similar range of elements). Attentions have shifted
to new fantasies and new anxieties. Totalities follow fashions, hems rise or fall,
a new band or movie is all-the-rage, and it is hard to imagine the appeal of what
we recently believed with what was in us more than we were in ourselves. 68
[Allongside the 'war machine', there has always existed an
ocular (and later optical and electro-optical) 'watching
machine capable of providing soldiers, and particularly
commanders, with a visual perspective on the military action
underway. [Virilio, 1989, p.3]
Tsars and Jihads
The drug wars have been long time fixtures of American political life
since the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 (and even a bit before). The purpose
and function of these wars has quite consistently been the production of
"criminals" in the place of ablated "undesirable" social subjects— most
especially of subjects that are so undesirable in racialized terms. The drug wars
enact a dialectics of visibility and hiddenness; of speech and silence; of literal
presence and absence. "Unruly" subjects are removed from visibility, vocality
and physical presence while their simulacra — criminals— are instituted in their
68
For some general discussion of the notion of "more than we are in ourselves", see
page 1 14, and the notion of "Subject-Supposed-to-Know.
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place; or rather they are restored to a place in the media, so that their inverted
image replaces their prior actuality.
Two Disappearances
There are actually two ideological closures associated with the drug
wars. The first is the matter that I had originally intended to address in this
section. The discourse of the drug wars has long been an official ideology of the
U.S. The imprimature of this official ideology has not merely promoted specific
answers, but has simultaneously submersed deeper questions by posing
superficial substitutes. The question one must officially answer is, "how do we
deal with drug-criminals?" This question subverts and undermines more basic
questioning of the underlying assumption that something about drugs (use, sale,
possession, transport) can define a class of people as criminal, deviant or
diseased. The kind of occlusion that operates between the asked and unasked
questions of the drug wars looks a lot like occlusions I have discussed
elsewhere: we normatively must ask "How can we best inform people about
(heterosexually transmitted) AIDS dangers?" rather than "Is such 'information'
merely a covert puritanism?"; "What defines the boundaries of the races?"
rather than "What is this absurdity called race?"; "What precisely in gender
differences is nature versus nurture?"; rather than "What is the origin of the
ideological edifice called gender?" In all these kinds of cases, a specific
question, with broad presuppositions provides an unspoken answer to an
ontological question that has never actually been answered by ideology (nor by
ideologues).
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Those issues that can make it into official discourse-legislative bodies,
schools, the broadcast and wide-circulation print media, courts, academia,
"think-tanks"
— are the comparative superficialities of how draconian criminal
sentences are to be; what funding (if any) is given to treatment/rehabilitation
programs, and what approach these will take; the relative role of federal and
state police agencies; just how far to suspend and override traditional due-
process protections in the name of fighting the drug wars; and so on. The
prohibition of questioning of the "official dogma" of the drug wars has been
pretty overwhelmingly effective in official discourse. Opponents of even broad
aspects of the drug wars have still generally been forced into the false ontology
of merely selecting more civil-liberatarian than statist and punitive answers to
the above "superficial" questions. I would certainly never claim that the
answers given politically to the "superficial" questions listed does not make a
huge difference in the lives and liberties of everyone in the U.S. (and
correspondingly elsewhere in the world, where similar ideologies operate). The
superficial questions are important questions; but they nonetheless serve to
forclose on their own oppositional stance, no matter how "radical" are the
answers given within the inherently reactionary ontological framework they
presuppose.
Criminal Phantoms
A more fundamental closure operates alongside the "official ideology"
mechanisms of the drug wars. In this, the drug wars have a supplementary
ideological mode that is not represented in most of the other examples I give.
The removal of subjects from the space of the social under the aegis of the drug
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wars is deadeningly real, as well as a merely symbolic dis-conferral of subjective
validity. Even before the Harrison Act, the 1909 Opium Exclusion Act closely
paralleled its contemporary Chinese Exclusion Act, the two nearly identical in
both purpose and effects. The two acts enacted a physical removal of "racially
undesirable" Chinese from the physical geographic territory of the U.S. Each
physically absent Chinese subject, however, was simultaneously mirrored in a
socially imagined opium-crazed Chinese immigrant. Interject. Wrong text.
Document by intervention. ODR, they suck. The two Exclusion Acts functioned
to replace each flesh-and-blood Chinese immigrant to the U.S. with his
deviant69— but thereby fundamentally unthreatening-criminal double.
Since the Harrison Act, and accelerating with each draconian twist of
drug legislation and "policy," the primary mode of removal of undesirables has
been from neighborhoods, schools and workplaces, to prisons, and in the
ultimate case to execution chambers. Overwhelmingly, the removed and
invertedly mirrored subjects have been racialized black men. As a secondary
mode of removal, criminals- which now predominately means "drug
criminals" — are removed from voting rolls, jobs, geographic locations (e.g.
restrictions on travel from parole and probation terms), and other social and
physical modalities of visibility. It is not merely in the content of their
discourses, but in their actual physical persons, that drug-criminals are blocked
from participation in official ideological discourse.
69
l believe I show with some success in my section Hysterical Movies the manner in
which deviance is fundamentally a mode of social control. Deviance is the official
ideological form of what might otherwise be a non-interpellatable transgression.
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In relation to the removals mentioned, it is worth pointing out something
obvious: prosecution and sentencing in the drug wars is always highly selective.
Use and possession of drugs is close enough to ubiquitous in the U.S.-and
specifically in those communities that are the underlying targets of the drug
wars-that the actual criminal enforcement functions mostly in the mode of
pretext. This pretext is not so much the matter of police carrying out vendettas
against specific individuals (although such is hardly uncommon) as it is the
general justificatory mechanism for the operation of a juridico-police state. The
laws themselves are adjusted as need be to serve this pretextual function: early
on in a distinction between criminal "Chinese" opium and benign "White"
morphine; recently in the distinction between White cocaine and Black crack;
and along the way in the addition of various synthetic compounds to controlled
lists, and in revisions of control schedules.
The disappeared persons of the drug wars, however, return instantly as
simulacra. This return, I think, is something overlooked by most critics of the
prison-state, and reveals something about the mode of drug war ideology. There
is more to the drug wars than just the raw exercise of state sanctioned violence
against undesirable communities. Drug criminals may be the "dark underside" of
society— dark literally in complexion, imagistically in terms of taint and
threat— but the fascination of drug war ideology is in creating hyper-visible
simulacra of the drug criminals. Their roles are enacted with great fanfare as the
stars of TV cop shows (see, also, my Bey section), as the protagonists of
political rhetoric about every manner of social issue, as international celebrities
(for both the left and right: both Contra drug runners and Columbian drug lords),
and even in counter-culture myths of rebelliousness (rock-and-roll stars, Beat
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writers, etc.). Hardly any ordinary conversation or media event can occur
without a ghoulish crowd of drug criminals standing in its discursive corners.
Quite opposite the mode of those discursive positions I discuss which remain
"unsayable" within hegemonic ideologies, the ideological mode of the drug
criminals is to say everything always, or at least to have ideology constantly
chatter for them.
172
CHAPTER VI
THE MEANING OF IDEOLOGY
Dominant idsas ar© not ovsrcom©... thsy ar© msrsly
occassionally forgotten.
Refutation and Forgetful Affirmation
The mode of hegemony and its aspirants— the "little" ideologies
discussed in Chapter V, for example— is not the mode of science and
philosophy. At least not as science and philosophy are idealized as Popperian
discourses. Ideology is not refuted 70 in social histories. Moreover, it is more rare
than not that ideologies suffer a dialectic fate of sublation and overcoming. Yes,
on occassion bigger, better and ever more hegemonic ideologies come along in a
manner as to encompass— and overturn by their embrace— previous ideologies.
But sublation is a footnote. The dominant mode of ideological change is
forgetfulness.
70
lt might be noted here — with reluctance by me — that the word 'refute' has suffered
some terrible ordeals in years of late. Like many other distinctions elegantly expressed by
the English lexicon, the seemingly obvious difference between the verb-of-attempt 'rebut'
and the verb-of-completion 'refute' has been thoroughly ignored in most media and
business uses. We now encounter painful jumbles of words from newscasters stating, for
example, "The President's statement refuted critics' claims that his budget will diminish
military preparedness." Naturally, when I write of refutation herein, I mean what the word
means.
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Amnesic non-refutation
Nietzsche took some pains to observe just what an active psychic
process forgetting is. He was right, of course; and this philosophical observation
might well be called the 'Central Dogma of Psychoanalysis' in a useful analogy
with another famous central dogma. It is far less than clear what the agency of
ideology is though, so the activity or passivity of forgetfulness is
correspondingly unclear. Certainly, as subjects who are not merely vacuously
interpellated, but simultaneously carry all the psychic traces of interpellations
past, we each individually must be rather aggressive in our forgetfulnesses.
Those little ideologies of my Chapter V that have actually gone away in our
lifetimes or others like them in this regard — must have been associated with
active repressional processes for their current vacuity to have been
accomplished. Regardless how much forgotten work must have gone into our
personal acts of forgetfulness, forgetfulness at a social level seems almost to
have a hidden hand behind it. Perhaps this hidden hand is the hand of God, or of
some Cartesian demon. Perhaps it is a Smithean hand of unintended
consequences. Perhaps something else. But there always seems to be an eery
coordination in spontaneous repression, millions or billions of subjects arriving at
the same blockage of subjectivation at more or less the same time.
In the end, for so very many reasons, this cannot be a theoretical
dissertation — to be theoretical would just be another totalization; not something
I wish to suffer from. Nonetheless, I would like to introduce the rather
theoretical sounding term 'amnesic non-refutation' to indicate the social agency
of forgetfulness. Even though we each individually forget what needs to be
forgotten — for example, our own individual guilt in propogating those ideologies
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of yore-a social Subject Supposed to Know (or Subject Supposed to Believe)
also forgets for us. Once an ideology ceases to be an official ideology, an
ethereal imprimature commands us not to believe. In this regard I cannot agree
with Althusser's characterization of history as a "process without a subject."
Ideological history- which may, nonetheless, not be quite the same matter as
the history of ideologies-is principally a history of the amnesic non-refutations
of the Subject Supposed to Know. This subject is fictive, no doubt; but that
hardly differentiates him from any other subject.
Outsidelessness
The tendency of an ideology towards totalization can best be understood
in relation to the outsides of an ideology. Once totalization functions fully,
ideologies become outsideless
.
There is no other idea with which one might
contrast a specific totalized ideology.
Some protestations here are obvious: if an idea has no contrary or
contrast, maybe that just means that it expresses something about the nature
of thought, the nature of the world, the nature of human beings, or some such
nature, sui generis. Believing in the unity of apperception, for example, is surely
not to be trapped by an ideology, but rather just the essense of what it means
to be a thinking being. Seeing 'this-here-now' is no ideological construct, but
rather the most basic primitive of understanding sense perception. It is difficult
to argue against these types of self-evident propositions, especially to mount an
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ideology-critique against them, precisely because there is no position from
which to critique
.
71
The paradox of transcendental truth is that a lot of systems of belief that
were once self-evident are so no longer, and a lot of systems of belief that did
not used to be self-evident are now. Comparatively little ideologies-those with
time frames of mere years or mere millennia, like those I discuss throughout this
dissertation — look from the inside much like transcendental universal of
consciousness, or of being (human), do. I urge and argue for two procedures
here. The first is to remain wholly neutral and descriptive in naming a set of
beliefs an 'ideology.' It is not enough to observe that "anything else is
inconceivable to differentiate a mere ideology from an analytic or
transcendental a priori. Maybe there really are such differences in the last
instance, but we have been trapped on the insides of outsideless transient
ideologies enough times to remain wary.
The second procedure epistemically matches the practical wariness of
the first. I should interject here, in a Cagean disruption of this text, that what
you hold is not my actual document, but a mutilation produced largely by the
Office of Degree Requirements. I would urge an understanding of belief systems
in terms of their sets of coherencies instead of their correspondences to reality.
71
Notice, of course, that the most obvious way to speak of the lack of a position from
which to critique is to speak of, well... a position from which to critique. The language of
self-evidence of knowledge is already structured by a metaphorical frame of spatialization.
Even for the most basic of totalizations of (as I would characterize) our self-evident
knowledge, there is no way to avoid speaking metaphorically. To me at least, this
suggests a temporal limit in the creation of categories such as 'thought', 'mind', 'subject',
which were preceded, presumably, in some pre-history by earlier notions. Nietzsche, and
Heidegger also (despite my reluctance to mention it), make remarks in this direction. But
the most expansive and enlightening discussion of metaphor is in the works of Lakoff and
Johnson. [Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Johnson, 1990; Lakoff, 1987; Lackoff and
Johnson, 1 983]
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Such an urging is a surprisingly ordinary position within philosophies of science
and epistemology; none of my post-whatever excesses are really necessary for
this. Even without being able to find any contrary or contrast to a given way of
understanding, we can still discover a system of coherence in our total belief
systems that are nonetheless homologous with ideologies that are partial and/or
transient. Totalization has only an inside, but that interior still looks quite
familiar in its family resemblence to exteriorizable ideologies. The proscription I
make here is to reverse our common-sense and philosophically traditional
understanding of truth and self-evidence. Rather than thinking that those things
that we must believe are right in any extra-ideological sense, those very self-
evident facts should be regarded with a heightened suspicion. Suspicion of this
sort can have no object-by definition-but I do not think that even totalization
fully circumvents simple (agnostic) refusal of belief. I try to explain this notion
of non-theoretical refusal of belief around the concepts of abandonment of
valuation (in the discussion preceeding footnote 100) and that of revolutionary
ennui (discussing Butler, from page 250).
Language is made not to be believed but to be obeyed, and to
compel obedience. .
. Words are not tools, but we give children
language, pens, and notebooks as we give workers shovels
and pickaxes. A rule of grammar is a power marker before it is
a syntactic marker. [Deleuze and Guattari, 1987]
Why Ideology is Not Ideational
A common conceit in understanding Ideology is to suppose that it is a
matter of beliefs or of attitudes. We imagine, with a great many famous Marxist
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philosophers, that an ideology is a system of beliefs-a distorted one,
perhaps-which lend credence to certain modes of action and ways of being.
As the story goes, inasmuch as we hold to the truth of certain ideological
stories of nature, God, society and politics (et cetera), we achieve our own
subjectivation at a particular location within this, essentially epistemic. Symbolic
Order. I argue it is not so. There are two basic aspects to my argument: (1) In
important ways, ideology just cannot be understood as residing in the heads of
its subjects as opposed to making up an underlying social reality; (2) Inasmuch
as ideas do make up ideology, their modality is not firstly one of belief, but ones
of identification and desire.
There is a slogan presented by Zizek which I believe it is important to
understand. In the frame of laws and social structures mandating racial
segregation, a bench might contain the sign "Whites Only." Zizek asks of this
sign "wherein lies the ideology?" Common responses in analyses of ideology
might locate the ideology of segregation in the beliefs of the creators or
benefactors of racial systems, or in the attitudes, fears, or indeed beliefs of the
victims of this racism. Other analyses might de-subjectify racial ideology by
locating it in legal systems, class structures, or corporate policies. However,
Zizek proposes a somewhat different solution by proclaiming that the ideology
is in the bench itself! I think there is something profoundly correct in the
approach of this slogan, so I wish to try to make a certain sense of it.
Zizek characterizes a common Marxist explanation of ideology, which
might be described as the Engels/Gramsci approach as follows:
[IJdeological illusion ... is a matter of a discordance between what
people are effectively doing and what they think they are
doing — ideology consists in the very fact that they have a false
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He continues with a common presentation of the Marxist concept of "money
fetishism" or "reification" in which,
[M]oney is in reality just an embodiment, a condensation, a
materialization of a network of social relations... But to the
individuals themselves, this function of money-to be the
embodiment of wealth-appears as an immediate, natural
property of a thing called 'money', as if money is already in itself,
in its immediate material reality, the embodiment of wealth
[Zizek, 1989, p.31]
However, this analysis of money fetishism is inadequate as an understanding of
ideology. Rather,
When individuals use money, they know very well that there is
nothing magical about it-that money, in its materiality, is simply
an expression of social relations... The problem is that in their
social activity itself, in what they are doing, they are acting as if
money, in its material reality, is the immediate embodiment of
wealth as such. [Zizek, 1989, p.31]
Here we come close to understanding the sense in which the ideology of
money, its reification or fetishism, lies not in the beliefs of its exchangers, but
rather in the materiality of money itself. That is, money may not embody wealth
itself directly, but money does embody ideology!
Ideology in Opaque Contexts.
Our own Dr. Gettier's famous problem provides an insight into the nature
of ideological statements. The Gettier Problem could be seen as pointing to a
number of different morals; but let me take as cannonical the negative assertion
that 'True beliefs whose justification rests on errors do not constitute
knowledge.' The insight into ideology comes out of the specific mode of failure
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the Gettier Problem-as least the Problem in the cannonical form I
give-encounters relative to a class of ideological truths.
To understand the ideological mode of failure in the Gettier Problem it is
worthwhile to consider a somewhat homologous failure in linguistic reference.
In a famous problem of analytic philosophy” it is commonly observed that
reference is opaque in intentional contexts. In a counterexample to Le.bn.z'
principle of identity as a commonality of attributes, these intentional contexts
are noted. That is-in a worn example-the evening star must necessarily share
mass, color, shape, position, etc. with the morning star, since they refer
differently to the same planet, Venus; but nonetheless, what I believe of the
evening star might well still differ from what I believe of the morning star.
Phrased as an attribute/proposition, we can construct something like, 'David
Mertz believes that X is a planet.' It is well possible that we might obtain
different truth values for different signifiers filled in as 'X'-even If these
signifiers turn out to designate the self-same thing.
Intentionally corrupts designation, in a way. The world of things pure in
their possession of attributes becomes clouded once minds enter the picture.
Outside of this very special sort of thing that is a mind, Leibniz' axiom gives us
simple equivalences. Minds ruin the equivalences, and create failures of
designation in what should by all rights be identicals. What Gettier helps me
observe here is a sort of dialectic: Ideology in turn corrupts intentionality, and
72A pantheon of analytic philosophers have written interestingly about the opacity of
reference, with a variety of clarifications and additions to the problem. Of particular note
are Frege and Kripke. But contributions by Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are certainly
noteworthy also. I do not wish to provide detailed citation of this discussion, since the
internal issues here are simply too far from the observation I wish to make herein.
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creates successes for des.gnation where mere intentionally warrants failures.
Or at least this is one specific mode in which ideology functions.
The Gettier Problem points out a specific type of referential opacity. If
our beliefs could just pass straight through to the actual things, then our
confusion of w.ne with water substituted for wine is of no consequence. If
reference could only be transparent, our bewildering array of misconceptions,
misrecognitions and misapprehensions would be of no significance. Knowledge
could just be that collection of beliefs that happen to be true. Motives would
not matter, and that stickling matter not even just of justification, but of the
right sort of justification, could be forgotten. Unfortunately, it is not so, and
intentions matter. Except in ideology!
In ideology, the light of truth shines through the clouds of intention.
Misrecognition is the very modality of ideology; and it is this act of
conscientious misrecognition that exposes truth in its sickening materiality. Let
me give two examples, two examples of ideological knowledges par excellence.
The first of "race," the second of (homo)sexuality. I have discussed the first
sort of truth at some length in this dissertation. I might refer readers to some
outside writing of mine in relation to the second [Mertz, 1991; Mertz, 1992],
but I believe the nature of this ideological truth will be clear on its own.
I am inspired as to the first example by Jacobson's discussion
[Jacobson, 1998] of several literary representations of the construction of racial
categories, most especially in Arthur Miller's Focus. Miller's 1945 novel [see
Jacobson, 1998, pp. 187-1 99] details the recognition and misrecognition of
Jewish identity. These interjections form, perhaps, a sort of Burroughs cut-up of
the text; a text already subjected to capricious interventions by the Office of
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Degree Requirements. Miller's story, specifically, is one of an anti-semite who
becomes (mis)recognized as Jewish (via his facial characteristics, firstly), and
ultimately becomes (and embraces being) what he is marked as ideologically.^
This example is interesting, but let me use a similar personal experience instead
as my primary illustration of the ideological transparency of truth (or perhaps,
the epistemic transparency of ideology’).
Although the patronym, 'Mertz' is not, as these things go, a "Jewish"
name, my maternal relatives (as many as I know about) were people who
identified themselves, and were identified by those around them, as Jews
(having various patronyms other than 'Mertz'). To a fairly large number of
people I have met, the name 'Mertz' marks me as Jewish. At an epistemic level
their justification is flawed: most likely they specifically associate the consonent
cluster and letters 'tz' at the end of the patronym with the occurrence of the
same cluster in many Yiddish names, and misrecognize the fact that this cluster
can occur in German also (and perhaps in other Germanic languages). In fact,
orthographically the 't' is somewhat anomolous, and one would generally
expect the German based name to be spelled as 'Merz.' Epistemically, the
knowledge that these acquaintances possess of me should suffer
staightforwardly from the Gettier Problem. But ideologically, the "truth" speaks
louder than the whisper of misrecognition. These acquaintances' ideological
knowledge— their racial knowledge— is irrefutable.
73The mode of becoming that Miller postulates is interesting. The character Newman
does not become 'Jewish' in the manner of converting to Judaism religiously. 'Jew,' as
Miller understands it, functions as a racial category more than a religious one. In becoming
Jewish, Newman becomes racially a Jew. But for Miller-and in this he is certainly
insightful — racial identity is a matter of ideological stigmitization, not a matter of some pre-
existing biological marker or taint.
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In a broad sense, the name-based claim of Mertz' Jewishness is
irrefutable according to the dominant principle of interpretation, as this term is
defined in a portion of my discussion of Mocnik, beginning at page 195.
Roughly, the claim already presupposes an ideological frame of either
affirmation or denial of the specific individualized assertion. Mertz either is or is
not Jewish. Either affirmation or denial, moreover, has already bought into the
ideology of racial identity (specifically, Jewish racial identity). However, the
broad matter of ideological presuppositions is not the main point I wish to make
right here (although I do elsewhere in this document). Rather, I want to look at
how even as a specific assertion about an individual, the assertion "Mertz is
Jewish, his name shows it" operates ideologically, i.e. in a truth-preserving
manner.
An ideological belief-or specifically, attribution-is not neutrally
epistemic; rather it functions as a type of accusation. 74 In believing Mertz
Jewish, the believer does not merely make a judgment of evidence, but rather
assigns a whole set of obligations to both Mertz and herself. Depending on the
political inclination of the knower in this act of racial belief, Mertz incurs an
obligation either to share sympathies as a "co-religionist" or to act according to
a set of experiences foreign to the knower; Mertz becomes normatively
avaricious; or Mertz becomes normatively spiritualized; the knower incurs either
an affection or a repugnance towards Mertz; and so on. It is certainly not
74The accusation may be valuated in various manners. It might be condemnation by an
anti-semite, or the grant of special legal privilege by a Zionist state. 'Accusation' as a word
does not precisely capture the ideological act in the sense that the word is normally used
to characterize something as merely bad in some regard. But whether an accusation marks
something as bad or as good, there is always as much of a deonotological as an epistemic
element in the assertion.
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specifically ideological that one judgement leads a knower to a se, of associated
judgements. The knowledge, or false-knowledge, that a person is holding a
glass of wine, might easily draw to mind a se, of associated beliefs: we believe
she paid a certain amount for the drink at the bar, we believe the spilled drops
will or will not stain the rug, or whatever. These beliefs, right or wrong, and
whether based on right or wrong prior belief (is it water or wine?), do not entail
any specific obligations upon the parties.
But once the accusation of Jewishness is laid before me for having the
name Mertz, the "truth" itself becomes the judge of my incurred obligations.
I
could deny the accuracy of the deduction, of course (for it is, after all, a false
justification); but to do so is simultaneously to state as truth that I am not
Jewish. The questioning of an accuser's justificatory reasoning cannot stand, in
an ideological context, on its own. The question itself immediately resolves to
the truth claim of whether I really am Jewish. I must think to myself, "Well
what then? Am I or am I not?" Or not even this, but rather, "Am I so judged (by
the Other), or am I not so judged?" This imposed judgement for me personally
becomes absurd
— although I am not thereby freed of the obligation
— since I
think so little of the very categories of most ideological terms. But even were I
not quite so deconstructive of terms, biographically, I would be faced with a
whole series of obligatory judgements: Do these relatives count more than
those others? Do I share some religious connection despite a lack of religious
practice? Should I, morally, feel sympathy with ancestral victims of anti-
semitism? Do I really have those characteristic facial features? Those
intellectual habits? Finally, at the end of judging each of my constitutive
essenses, I must finally either affirm or deny that I am truly Jewish. As the
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most minor of sublated footnotes I might be allowed to add-whether spoken to
my interogator, or merely thought to myself-that 'Mettz' is, nonetheless, a
German name
.
75
A better example than that of my own name, 'Mertz', occurs with
knowledges of people's sexual identities, specifically, their homosexuality. The
difference falls chiefly out of the more significant valuation given by a larger
number of people (hereabouts, nowadays) to the mark 'homosexual' than to the
mark Jewish.' Spotting homosexuals is a perversely familiar habit of both
homophobes and self-identified gays-and probably of a fair number of folks
who are neither. Aside from the obvious difference in valuation granted by the
various gay-spotters, the act performs precisely the same accusation that is
described in the previous case (not the same in content, of course; but the
same in ideological form). Once spotted, an identified homosexual has imposed
on her a burden not merely to affirm or deny the observational and justificatory
process, but to affirm or deny the identity.
There are any number of popular literary enactments of the homosexual
accusation I describe; in movies, books, TV, wherever. Let me present just one
specific commonplace hypothetical. I think the lines of clumsy dialogue I give
75The name, as it happens, of an adoptive paternal grandfather, who has no genetic
connection to me. So assuming my grandfather was really German, am I? Or am I, rather,
truly English, as marked by the biological patronym Smith? Obviously, there are other
names that occur in other ancestral lines than a straight patriarchal one. I am sure readers
are justifiably bored by my biographical cladistics. The only point I would make is that
behind each "truth," one encounters the same justificatory demands. In our particular late-
20th century American ontology of race, however, the notion of a "Jewish Race" has
been retained to a greater extent than the notion of a "German Race" (versus, say, an
"English Race"). So my example more-or-less works. Probably folks who are accused
relative to being "black" or "latino" have a clearer example in current American racial
ideologies. See, particularly, Jacobson [Jacobson, 1998], and to a lesser extent my own
discussion of him herein.
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show just how badly the Gettier Problem fails if applied to such ideological
knowledges-.
Knower: I can tell you are gay, because I saw you with your boyfriend.
Accused: He is not my boyfriend and we have never had sex; and
furthermore, he is not even gay.
What happens to the knowledge of Knower in this ordinary-albeit
stilted-dialogue? Quite contrary to dismatling the knowledge of Knower,
Accused has simply confirmed (if not quite affirmed) the knowledge. In
pragmatic terms, it is not ideologically possible in this context to even speak to
the context of justification." Every conversation is about the truth of the
assertion. Even substituting more authentic sounding dialogue, every
statment— and every silence also— of Accused is, if not explicitly a denial of his
homosexuality, its assertion.
Sloterdijk on Enlightened False Consciousness
There are a great many things in Sloterdijk's Critique of Cynical Reason
[Sloterdijk, 1987] that support and expand on the themes I address in this
dissertation. Unfortunately, for banal reasons of length, time and research
focus, I shall only present a few remarks relating to Sloterdijk's important
concept of enlightened false consciousness. The first remarks of Sloterdijk's
main text set the stage,
The discontent in our culture has assumed a new quality: It
appears as a universal, diffuse cynicism. The traditional critique of
ideology stands at a loss before this cynicism. It does not know
what button to push in this cynically keen consciousness to get
enlightenment going. [Sloterdijk, 1987, p.3]
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The puzzle faced by ideology critique is explained,
Cynicism is enlightened false consciousness. It is that
modernized, unhappy consciousness, on which enlightenment has
a ored both successfully and in vain. It has learned its lessons in
enlightenment, but it has not, and probably is not able to put
them into practice. Well-off and miserable at the same time, this
consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of
ideology; its falseness is already reflexively buffered. [Sloterdiik
1987, p.5]
J '
Sloterdijk's concept is an epistemic match to Marcuse's liminal repressive
desubhmation, as I see it (but a similar limitation exists proscribing any
sustained discussion of Marcuse). Where ideology critique and
enlightenment
— from Marx to its most developed form in Adorno-had always
supposed that lifting the blinders and shackles of a repressive society would
lead to liberation, the paradoxes pointed to by Sloterdijk and Marcuse show it
otherwise. Liberation has simply become the form of repression.
In Sloterdijk s cynical modern subject, ideology critique is a fait accompli)
but the result is no revolutionary subject, but simply one in whom detachment
and resignation has become her operative mode of being. As Zizek characterizes
this subject, they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing
it [Zizek, 1989, p.29]. The cynical subject needs not misrecognize the nature
of social reality to comply with it. She recognizes it in its full horror, its full
unreality, and its permeating falsity, then believe the proclamations of official
knowledge. Knowledge becomes indifferent with respect to belief. 76
76A joke expressing this formula is frequently mentioned in various of Zizek's books, "I
know [clams] are edible, but still I do not believe it."
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Rastko Mocnik and Enlightened False Ideology
In a mirror analysis to that provided by Sloterdijk of enlightened false
consciousness, Mocnik points the way to the "objective" correlate of this false
consciousness in enlightened false ideology. This phrase is not used by Mocn.k,
but his analysis in "Ideology and Fantasy" [Mocnik, 1993] is a touchstone for
my proposal of the concept. The basic notion I would like to suggest is as
follows: Where with an enlightened false consciousness, people act against
their own interests and desires, desp.te full knowledge and comprehension of
their interests and desires, under an enlightened false ideology people act
according to the dictates of a social mandate they fully know to be false,
without even the illusion that any one else believes it true.
A traditional Marxist schematic of consciousness and ideology in their
true and false forms will be familiar to readers. In the analysis of the early Marx
(and of many later Marxists), Ideology is not firstly a pejorative notion, but
rather the name for a system of ideas which directs understanding and
schematizes the world. Interject (dear reader...): the text actually written, and
that approved by the signing committee, can only be found at the web site
indicated in the acknowledgment, not in the pages in your hands. In this
schematic, consciousness occurs through ideology, and ideology is realized in
the cognitive acts of individuals who comprehend the world within a particular
ideological framework. This particular Marx is practically Kuhnian! To this
neutral schematic of ideology and consciousness, a Marxist critic will add the
possibility of false ideologies and correspondingly false consciousness. A false
ideology acts not as a lens, but as a blinder. As a means of controlling the
working classes, the dominant classes create hegemonic false ideologies in
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order to produce in workers false consciousnesses with which the latter cannot
formulate critiques of capitalism, nor act to resist their oppression. This picture
is well-known.
A good hint toward the notion of enlightened false ideology is provided
already in Zizek's discussion of money fetishism which I discuss on page 178.
That is, it is perfectly well possible that an ideology make not even the pretense
of epistemic veracity, and yet function with a perfect efficacy. The materiality
of money commands a compliance with a money-ideology without needing to
resort to any criticizable truth claims. Money simply, baldly, embodies social
relations, without fooling anyone, nor even requiring the formal structure of a
truth claim.
Mocnik gives another example of a sort of "cunning of reason," which
proves deeper than its merely game-theoretic overt face.
If, in an appropriately unstable social situation, the rumor starts
that "the oil (or sugar...) is going to run out," this rumor may not
be true at the moment of its launching (the stocks of oil being
sufficient for the normal trend of its consumption); but when
people start acting upon this (originally "false") rumor, it may well
become true. How do people act upon such a rumor? Suppose I
am enlightened enough not to believe the rumor. I may even
positively know it to be false. But notwithstanding my rationality
and/or knowledge, I will reason this way: "I know the rumor to be
false; but other people may beleive [sic] it; acting upon their
(false) belief, they will rush out and pile up private stocks; and the
oil is likely to run out. So I better rush to the store myself and get
some oil." [Mocnik, 1993, p.142]
He continues in generalizing the possibility of enlightenment, but also by
bringing the scenario to a crucial concept.
Even under the supposition that everybody in the population
reasons this way, the implicit consensus as to the falsity of the
prediction will not prevent its finally coming true; the general
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recognition that it is possible to believe the rumor, i.e. the
identification of every member of the population with the subject
supposed to believe, will do the trick. [Mocnik, 1993
, p. 142 ]
Under a simple reading of Mocnik's scenario, all we have is a moderately
expanded example of a Prisoners' Dilemma. No one can individually act in a
manner which would produce optimal results for every individual (normal
consumption level) because an individual failing to act in a moderately
personally subopt,mal manner (hoarding) risks incurring dramatically suboptimal
results (non-availability). But then again, should not Mocnik's example apply to
every (necessary) commodity at every time in every market economy?! Clearly,
markets do not generally function in this manner; and when they do so function
there is a specific ideological effect at issue. To wit: whether or not one
believes particular falsities is largely irrelevant. Those false beliefs which one is
supposed to believe have concrete social effectivity, while all the beliefs
carrying no particular ideological imprimatur can be weighed on merely
epistemic terms.
The interpellate "principle of generosity"
Donald Davidson unknowingly characterizes what is, for Mocnik, the
basic modality of ideology in his term "principle of generosity ." 77 In our
interpretive predisposition toward assuming that most of what most people say
makes sense if we grant it the proper unstated background beliefs and context,
77MoCnik himself does not explicitly mention Davidson's principle either. However,
Mocnik, like Davidson, relies to a large degree on the analyses of Grice. Davidson would be
likely to acknowledge that his "principle of generosity" is in many ways simply a
formalization of the earlier work done by Grice. In any event, I believe mention of
Davidson's principle is illustrative of the gesture made by Mocnik.
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we submit our selves to the formal structure of ideological interpellation. Mocn.k
writes,
[l]f an utterance is meaningful, then there must be a way to
understand it, and this particular utterance is meaningful, since its
speaker has offered it as such, so let us try and find the way to
understand it. [Mocnik, 1993, p.141]
But this principle of generosity in interpretation catches us in a trap.
An interpreter may figure out the meaning of an utterance if (s)he
is able to produce a suitable definition of the intersubjective
situation in which it has been uttered. But since this situation is
structured by the utterance itself, and its only available indication
is its cause, i.e. the utterance under interpretation (falling back on
the notion of the "context" would not help, for it simply means
more utterances), the interpreter seems to be trapped in a vicious
circle: the key to the meaning of an utterance is the definition of
the intersubjective structure, and this structure is defined by the
meaning of the utterance. [Mocnik, 1993, p.141]
The resolution of this trap is something like that of the Lacanian trap of
subjectivation: there is no means by which either meaning or subjectivity can be
secured, but through a covering fantasy the failures of either become disguised.
Mocnik's explanation rests on the forced solidarity of beliefs between speaker
and listener (or reader and writer). In order to participate in the communicative
acts, a speaker must "identify her/himself with a structural position (the subject
supposed to believe) from which a meaningful, i.e. interpellative, utterance
might be pronounced [Mocnik, 1993, p. 1 45]." The interpreter, in turn,
“identifies her/himself with the same instance which, from her/his side, operates
as the position from which it may be believed that the utterance 'makes sense'
[Mocnik, 1993, p . 1 45]." "The mutual 'recognition' of the two parties is thus
mediated by a third instance with whom they both actively identify [Mocnik,
1993, p . 1 45]." To wit: the subject supposed to believe.
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The "subject supposed to believe" acts as a covering fantasy by its
creation of a structural position from which ideological beliefs may be believed,
even beliefs which everyone knows to be false. Let us return to our racist park
bench from page 1 78. As with Mocnik's example of rumors leading to hoarding,
it might be that no one in a society actually "believes" the incoherent ontology
of human racial divisions (and it certainly is the case that no one understands
the entirely fictive basis of the categories). Neither the "whites" allowed, nor
the blacks" prohibited, to sit, can possibly make a rational sense of irrational
racial categories. Yet the sign proclaims "Whites Only!" To treat the sign as
meaningful is to suppose, with a principle of generosity, that there could be a
set of presuppositions and contexts within which the sign, and its requisite
ontological baggage, is meaningful. But once subjects are interpellated through
identification with the position from which the park bench can be understood,
they have already granted the meaningfulness of the bench's categories; and for
the bench to exercise a social effectivity, once its meaning functions, questions
of its truth vanish into irrelevance. It is enough to believe that there could be
racial categories to make the question of whether there are such categories
seem perverse and semantic.
I would argue here that the position of identification for subjects
understanding the racist park bench sign is with the park bench itself. The
subject supposed to believe is a purely formal ideological position, but this
position is embodied in the quite material bench. The ideology is in the bench\
This particular object condenses, and supports in both a symbolic and a physical
"opposes gravity" sort of way, a series of otherwise ungrounded racial social
relations (not ungrounded in that there is only this one bench, but ungrounded in
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that there are no non-fictive enunciative position from which the "truth" of race
could be spoken). In this structure, the bench works as a Lacanian objet petite
a, but as a petite a not for a subjectivity, but rather for an ideology]
The question of belief comes back here. We might wonder in just what
sense those racial subjects gazing upon the park bench do or do not "believe"
what it says. Obviously, it is a false simplification for me to propose that no one
in a racial society epistemically "believes" in the false ontology of race. In a
similar light, Zizek's critique of traditional Marxist discussions of money
fetishism falsely simplifies somewhat. Some (but not all) members of a racial or
a monied society consciously endorse the false ontological statements
presupposed by the communicative frame of paper money or segregated park
benches. But everyone, whatever their epistemic attitude towards race or
money, acts as if they believe the ideological ontologies. An ideological
statement is one from which we can not escape as easily as by mere factual
analysis.
What could our options be in relation to a racist park bench? Suppose we
are one of those folks sufficiently "enlightened" as not consciously to endorse
any sort of racial ontology (as there certainly have been plenty of, even in such
deeply racial societies as the recently segregated USA or SA); how could we
bring our "practical beliefs" — those beliefs concretely and actively enacted— into
line with our "theoretical beliefs." Whatever we might say, how can we not
perpetuate the ideology of the bench?! There seem to be two bifurcations in our
possible positions. The first bifurcation is one given by the bench's ideology,
and after we follow either path, the second bifurcation is irrelevant to our
concrete endorsement of racial ideology. This first bifurcation is just simply the
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question of whether we are white or not. The second bifurcation concerns our
actions towards the bench: we can sit on it, or not sit on it. If we "are" white
and we sit, we directly obey the strictures of the bench. If we "are not" white
and we do not sit, we similarly obey. I should interject here, although Derrida
might accuse me of logocentrism, that what you hold is not my actual
document, but a mutilation produced largely by the Office of Degree
Requirements. Disobedience, however, does little better to act out a less racial
practical belief. In "resisting", either as a "white" conspicuously not sitting, or
as a black disobediently sitting (as did many American civil rights heros of
disobedience who hazarded all sorts of violences for such simple actions as
sitting), we nonetheless do not succeed in not endorsing the racial ontology of
the bench. If blacks should be allowed to sit on the bench — and our
disobedience is a protest and advocacy of this right— we believe practically (if
not "theoretically") that it is still blacks who should be allowed to sit. The racial
ideology is refuted only in its superficial strictures, not its deep ontology. The
bench itself, with two words written upon it, not only acts as an ideological
agent, but as a totalizing ideology which closes its outside the moment it is
understood. At greater length in my chapter "The Poverty of Causality",
particularly in the section "Hysterical Movies," I discuss this problem of
totalizing ideology. Here the question is less that of totalization than of location
of ideology.
There may be a solution to the problematic of the bench, but it certainly
cannot lay in the bifurcations allowed above. Rather, since this solution is the
underlying subject of this dissertation, it would be unladylike to reiterate it here.
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Identification with the Subject Supposed to Believe
For Mocnik, as we have seen,
The identification with the "subject supposed to believe" is a
forced move in the communicational game.
.
. [I]f asked for the
reasons why (s)he interprets an utterance in a certain way.
. . this
justification must be a proposition that refers both to the
utterance and to the intersubjective situation. We will call this
minimal description of the intersubjective structure and of the
utterance in it the principle of interpretation (PI). [Mocnik, 1993
P- 1 42]
Let us examine an utterance by LBJ which Mocnik gives in example,
5) I won't be the first President to lose a war. [Mocnik, 1993,
p. 1 46]
For this utterance, Mocnik provides two possible Pi's:
5a) 5) & L.B.J. has a specific interpretation of U.S. history.
5b) 5) & the U.S. has never lost a war. [Mocnik, 1993, p. 1 46]
The ideological force of LBJ's statement lies in the dominance of 5b) over 5a).
According to our definition of PI, 5a) should have a much better
chance to impose itself, for it may be justified by a proposition
that refers both to the utterance and (via the mention of the
speaker) to the inter-subjective communicative situation. Still,
intuition tells us and history teaches us that 5b) is much
"stronger," although its PI is evidently deficient. It is precisely this
"deficiency" that makes for the strength of 5b); on a closer look,
we see that 5a) already implicityly [sic] refers to 5b) as to a
"universally accepted truth" that can only be challenged by a
specific justification. [Mocnik, 1993, p.146]
The strength, Mocnik argues, of 5b) over 5a) lies precisely in its failure
as a specific PI. By evading a specific contextualization and analysis of the
communicative situation of 5), 5b) acts as an ideological "covering fantasy"
which allows us to suspend the vicious circle of interpretation. If our PI can
refer, not to the actual specifics of communicative context, which can
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ungroundedly only be defined vis-a-vis the speech act itself, but to an assumed
background of common belief-to an identification with the subject supposed to
believe
— we can feel more subjectively "satisfied" with our interpretive act.
Rather than risk the hypothesis that a speech act we attempt to understand is
simply meaningless, we fill in the blanks with the position of the dominant
ideology, the position from which a subject is supposed to believe.
Mocnik characterizes this identification with dominant ideology,
The relation between 5b) and 5a) is the relation betwen the
dominant ideology and a non-hegemonic ideology, where the
dominant ideology defines the field of the argument, while the
burden of justification falls on the subordinated ideology,
stereotypes of this kind can only be accepted in the modality of
sheer belief. To the interpreter, they pose a radical dilemma: is
this nonsense, or is it to be believed? This is precisely the basic
dilemma an interpreter faces with every utterance (s) he wants to
"understand," because every utterance fundamentally involves
this problem. [Mocnik, 1993, p. 1 46]
In a not particularly subtle fashion, I made a verbal affront against my
reader(s) on page 194. What possibly could it mean for me to claim that an
explicit evocation of a chant like "Burn, baby. Burn!" was "unladylike?" Even
with my lack of subtlety, my reader will have been drawn into creating a PI for
my utterance (as probably witnessed by scribbled marginal notes). This is an
effect also noticed, for example, by the Dadaists and Surrealists in a political
sense, and by cognitive psychologists in a scientistic way. After the fashion of
Mocnik, I would suggest a few Pi's for
DQM) "It would be unladylike to reiterate it [the solution] here."
In the first case, the epistemically best PI is probably,
PI-1) DQM) & Mertz put words together without literal meaning.
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PI-1) is pretty much doomed to fail. The ideological force of our proper
belief that people (even Mertz) write words meaningfully and with
communicative intent is too strong to allow PI-1). A compromise PI between an
epistemically meritorious one and an ideologically effective one is,
PI-2) DQM) & Mertz is trying to show off, and/or refer to his allegedly
ungrounded gender position, and/or refer to his internet nom-de-guerre 'Lulu'.
PI-2) has a greater initial plausibility than PI-1) did. It shows a sort of
resistance to the ideological force of DQM) by psychologizing the utterance, and
by attempting to narrowly contextualize the utterance. In other words, PI-2)
functions a lot like 5a); or again, a lot like the effort to disobey the racist
bench's command. But PI-2) catches us too closely in the vicious hermeneutic
circle discussed to provide an interpellate ground for DQM). The ideological
identification just does not seem to latch on to PI-2).
The ideological PI for DQM) seems to be something like,
PI-3) DQM) & The 'fittingness' and femininity of providing "the explicit
solution" is questionable.
There are several ideological effects wrapped up in PI-3). On the one
hand, if this PI is used, we are brought to supposing the meaningfulness of the
question of propriety of making a particular statement (without even knowing
quite what that statement might be). A marginal comment to the effect of
"Please discuss the solution here" already falls into this ideological trap. It puts
one in the position of asking the otherwise absurd question in PI-3), even if it is
to answer the question in a manner contrary to the answer apparently given by
DQM). The even more invidious ideological effect of PI-3) is its promotion of an
equation between fittingness and femininity. This effect reinforces a dominant
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ideology proclaiming that women should be normally taciturn. The trap here is
with an unreflective "resistance" to PI-3). An immediate resistance to PI-3)
takes the form of "Mertz is not in the proper (gender, etc.) position to question
the 'ladylike'ness of his writing." But this resistence takes precisely the form of
the deeper ideology: Mertz may not be in the right position to identify with
propriety/femininity, but somebody could be. Again, to interject, please find the
dissertation as actually written via the web site indicated in the
acknowledgments. The "resistance" gives up the game!
In the huge cathedral of electricity, [...] in a specially built
chamber shrine, Tesla acheived his apotheosis. Transformed
by fire that did not burn, he was filled with electricity's near
supernatural power. Not only were the sheets of "cold fire" that
coursed over his body harmless, but, he believed, actually
therapeutic. [...] Engulfed in electric fire, he rose—in his
view—to the next step in human evolution.
In Sing Sing, Dannemora, Auburn, prisoners waited in cages to
be strapped into a chair, killed, and quickly forgotten. But Tesla
stood before awed crowds, a tall gaunt man who played with
the basic constituents of nature, like a shaman or priest.
Celebrated as the greatest electrical genius of his century, he
was transformed by the same "godlike power," which, in secret
basement chambers cooked prisoners to death, nameless
sacrificial animals. [Metzger, 1996, p. 1 82]
The Irrelevance of Critique
I would like to do something in this section that I do not do elsewhere in
the dissertation: explain my epigraph. The wonderful, rather Foucauldian, book
by Thom Metzger, Blood and Volts [Metzger, 1996], could well have served as
an illustration of "little ideologies" in much the same style as do my discussions
of AIDS, satanic abuse, drug-wars, maybe race in certain aspects, and other
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matters. I did not use Metzger's book back in Chapters IV-V, and there is no
need to use it now in quite that same mode of analysis. What I would like to do
instead is a bit of forshadowing of some themes in Chapter VII— specifically, the
causal/historical connections by which ideologies sometimes glom on to one
another. I forshadow, in turn, in relation to the subject of this section, to
propose an adhesive theory of ideological change in juxtoposition to critical
theory's notion of ideology critique.
The subject of Metzger's book is two ideologies that obtained a curious
alignment around the beginning of the twentieth century-one of the ideologies
pretty well forgotten nowadays, the other fairly current in somewhat different
forms. The curious pair consists of ideas about electrification and about human
execution (in the U.S.A.). On the face of things, the technical issues
surrounding distribution of electricity across power grids and popular attitudes
towards capital punishment seem like wholly unrelated areas of belief and
knowledge. But between 1885 and 1905, these two ideologies became deeply
intertwined. The notion of progress is shaped by and refers to technical marvels
that science creates, certainly; but simultaneously, justificatory mechanisms for
criminal punishment— perhaps especially the most final of punishments-must
be supported in the same schematism of progress. Metzger notes,
All the changes in the methods of execution reflect changes in
the way a society sees itself. Talk of humaneness in execution is
an act of self-delusion to hide a deep discomfort. As will be seen
shortly, various alternatives to the gallows were proposed. And all
but the electric chair were rejected — supposedly because they
were inhumane. More accurately though, they were unacceptable
because they said someting about late-nineteenth-century
America that it did not want to hear. What New York (the Empire
State, the most prosperous, populous, and powerful state in the
199
union) wanted was a way to enhance its prestige. Its goal in
doing away with the gallows was to further its image as being
progressive, reformist, and at the forefront of cultural evolution.
[Metzger, 1 996, p.28]
The connection established between electrification and execution was much
more specific than simply that both related to a background ideology of
progress. A technical conflict arose in the late 19 th century over the relative
merits of AC and DC currents; this conflict was partially narrowly technical, but
in broader scope it drew in the popular reputations and patent/property interests
of celebrity-scientists, Tesla and Edison. Edison favored a DC infrastructure,
Tesla, AC. Tesla was right on the technical grounds (as well as holding broad
related patents, and the sponsorship of George Westinghouse), but Edison was
far more influential, being a semi-mythic figure of his own time.
Onto the scene, in 1888, came a third-rate scientist named Harold
Brown, who, for whatever reason, was vehement in his claim that AC current
was a "grave threat to public safety." Brown came to have the sponsorship of
Edison in his alarmist project, and the two together took a gruesome,
carnivalesque show on the road, electrocuting hundreds of animals with AC
current on a tour of the country. Brown and Edison made various challenges and
taunts directed at Westinghouse and Tesla in a media flurry over the "war of
the currents" and performed increasingly gruesome and cruel "experiments" on
a variety of animals. At the same time he was basically stumping for one
technical approach to electrification— for the benefit of one set of commercial
interests over another— Brown developed both the mechanical techniques and
the cool, clinical, progressivist language that allowed the electric chair to serve
as the solution to the problem of the barbarity of capital punishment. By
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surrounding the technologies of electrocution with objective, at the time
futuristic sounding, descriptions suggesting scientific precision and clinical
exactness, human execution-if performed by electrocution- became a
technical problem of application; the humanistic issues of morality and social
justice became thereby eclipsed, and superficially "answered."
It would be far too pat (and idly utopian) to claim that capital punishment
would have ended in the U.S. if not for Edison's patent interests. Obviously,
other histories and other political motives would have entered debates over
capital punishment in the absence of the electrification issues. But it is at least
less likely that the electric chair would have become the means and the symbol
of ultimate juridical violence in the absence of these patents. Perhaps a broader
political effect would have arisen from a hypothetical absence of the electric
chair as a specific technical deontological symbol, but perhaps not; speculation
on such counterfactuals might make for good novels, but nothing can really be
positively asserted. What is nonetheless fascinating is the way in which some
broad ideological conceptions of juridical violence and the human body did in the
concrete get shaped by a far narrower technological, commercial, and only
peripherally ideological issue. Something big can sometimes ride piggyback on
something far smaller.
I presented this digression on electrification and electrocution because I
believe it illustrates the fundamental modality of ideological change.
Agglomeration — or 'adhesion', as I write above— rather than critique is the real
instrument by which ideologies can be overcome... or undercut. Critical
interiority persistently fails to defeat totalizing ideologies; and yet comparative
trifles that operate in non-critical ways can have large counter-hegemonic
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effects. I wish, of course, that I could give some formula or advice: "Just do so
and-so to attach your transient belief system to grand ideologies."
I suppose
this would be rather like Vaneigem's "Guide for Young Persons Recently
Established in the World ." 78 Unfortunely, I am not so sanguine as to give such
advice. I believe I have illustrated numerous ideological adhesions in this
dissertation (most of them for the worse), but can provide neither a procedure
for their creation nor a solvent for their dissolution.
Every normal person in the world, past infancy in years, can
and does talk. By virtue of that fact, every person—civilized or
uncivilized—carries through life certain naive but deeply rooted
ideas about talking and its relation to thinking. Because of their
firm connection with speech habits that have become
unconscious and automatic, these notions tend to be rather
intolerant of opposition. [Whorf, 1956, p.207]
Ideology and ideologies
I would like to give some not entirely unfamiliar senses to a few words.
In particular, there is a particular structure of relation between Ideology (writ
large, or The Symbolic Order), ideology (writ small) or ideological formations,
and hegemony, which seems most natural to me. With a capital, Ideology— or in
more Lacanian terms, The Symbolic Order— is the totalizing abstraction which
simply denotes that the social existence of human beings is one of
symbolization. Human being is a relation between signifiers. There is no outside
to Ideology in the quite ordinary sense that anything we might say or
18
Traite de savoir-faire a /'usage des jeunes generations, more popularly titled in
English as The Revolution of Everyday Life. [Vaneigem, 1994]
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understand about human beings and their social and natural reality is something
we say or understand: to wit, it is a relating of signifies.
Ideological formations (or ideologies with a small letter) are much
"smaller" things, practically no more than "beliefs," or perhaps "belief
systems. It is this ideology, small letter, which is contained in Marx's earliest
use; for example, in the title The German Ideology. It is also in this smaller
sense that Althusser identifies the ideological formations of the Church, or of
the schools. I might interject here, in a pattern of almost extra-textual terrorism,
that what you hold is not my actual dissertation, but a mutilation produced
largely by the Office of Degree Requirements. A system of beliefs, likely
somewhat in internal contradiction in a narrowly logical sense, arises out of a
social milieu, and assumes a certain specificity of social effectivity (thereby
demanding at least a bit more than a mere "belief system," which might be
more idiosyncratic or accidental). An ideology is not a logical system in anything
like a mathematical sense, but it nonetheless maintains a certain degree of
consistency in its concepts and elaboration— some made explicit, some
remaining hidden to a degree. 'Ideology critique' — especially of the immanent
sort — is generally an exercise in making explicit beliefs or assumptions which
must be present implicitly for an ideology to work, but whose explicit revelation
in some respect undermines the ideology. The first thing I would like to notice
about ideologies in this sense is that they have (potentially) perfectly clear
outsides, thereby lending themselves, for example, just as well to exogenous as
immanent critique. For example, the ideology of the churches can be perfectly
well criticized by standing within the ideological formation of the
universities— from which latter perspective the beliefs and practices of the
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churches seem arcane, irrational, archaic and reactionary. Such were, for
example, Marx's early critiques of Feuerbach, Stirner, Baeur and Hegel.
Hegemony we can say is an (mere) ideological formation, which has
managed to evade an outside. But hegemonies do not evade an outside in the
tautologous and definitional way that Ideology lacks an outside, but rather in a
purely contingent and historical sense. At certain times, in certain places, for
certain people ideologies function in a totalizing manner, such that no contrary
site of social effectivity, no other ideology formation, is able to exogenously
address a hegemonic ideology.
The most beautiful thing in Tokyo is McDonald's.
The most beautiful thing in Stockholm is McDonald's.
The most beautiful thing in Florence is McDonald's.
Peking and Moscow don't have anything beautiful yet.
America is really The Beautiful. But it would be more beautiful if
everybody had enough money to live.
Beautiful jails for Beautiful People. [Warhol, 1975, p.71]
Spectacular Ideology
Trying to write about Situationism brings to mind insistent images of
rhizomes, at least in my head. Things shoot up where you do not expect them;
and in truth, have a tendency to strangle other ideas. The rhizomes are
several — or more probably just one, but operating in a rhizomatic manner: the
Situationists in a century-scale history of ideas grow at just the moment to let
us spot some submerged continuities between early Marx and post-modernism;
within this document, this section is an outgrowth of some submerged
204
contiguities between my introductory provocations, and my last section on
Hakim Bey, with some odd shooters mingling with most of the rest.
It is not simple to write systematically about the Situationists. For one
thing, they were some of the first anti-systematic thinkers
,
79 preceding and
forshadowing "post-modernism" by a decade or two. For another, there were
actually quite a few Situationists or near-Situationists, whose unity tended to be
mostly of a negative sort. All the thinkers close to the Situationist International
made efforts to critique radically 'alienation at the locus of representation ,' 80 but
that does not quite make up a unity of positive theorization. For this section, I'll
follow the normal conceit of simply allowing Debord to stand as a fair
representative of Situationist ideas. If the reader wishes to impose a greater
honesty on the section, she may simply read Debord's name where most
general mentions of Situationism are made. That is not to say that certain
snatches of Vaneigem, Baudrillard, Lefort, and others do not cloud my reading
79Dada preceded Situationism, of course, as did Surrealism. Assuming the needed
caveats are expressed as to the multiple members of those loose affiliations ('groups'
seems like too much), I think we could say this: The former, Dada, certainly intended to be
anti-systematic; but I do not think it intended to be theoretically anti-systematic in the way
post-modernism is. Dada was more of a gut-level disgust with systematicity than a
theoretical movement. Surrealism, at least inasmuch as Breton was a fair spokesperson,
had its own kind of systematicity of non-hegemonic states of consciousness. Surrealism
was not without elements in common with its near-term 'successor' Situationism, but the
anti-systematic move was not so central.
Of course, one can find anti-systematic precursors going back quite a ways, if one
is willing to be a bit loose in analogizing. Heraklitus can be read in some of these ways. So
can elements of Taoism or Buddhism be read in an anti-systematic light. A bit more
recently, the Ranters, Levelers and Diggers have a certain antinomian anti-systematicity.
All of these are very interesting in their own right. But in terms of standing as responses to
modernist totalizing gestures, as Situationism and post-modernism do, their significance is
only by analogy.
80This is an imperfect attempt to characterize in a few words just what it is being
critiqued by Situationists. I think it does pretty good, for a short phrase.
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of Debord; but the occlusion remains slightly below (above?) the level of
reflective consciousness.
Repetitions
In many ways Situationist analysis of spectacular society is simply a
repetition of the early Marx's critiques of alienation in the 1844 Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts and the Theses on Feuerbach. The same sort of split
of consciousness between a utopian genuine consciousness 81 and an imposed
false consciousness characterizes both critiques. What changed in the one-
hundred twenty years between Marx's early writings and the Situationists was
not so much the form of the critical analysis as the form of the society itself. In
terms of objective conditions, the central locus of alienation has moved from
production to consumption. Or maybe a better characterization would be to
write that the locus of alienation moved from commodity-alienation to the
alienation of desire.
The changes in the locus of alienation have occurred by bits and pieces,
of course . 82 Unionization and a welfare state were instituted or achieved in a
81 Marx, of course, took pains (mostly a few years later than 1844) to distinguish
himself from utopian socialism. I am not trying to refute Marx's self-characterization of his
middle writing. Instead, the word 'utopian' which I use is the rehabilitated sense which has
been available since Adorno's reclamation.
82Curiously, the reductive Hegelianism of Anti-During and Dialectics of Nature, in
which Engels lays out the "rules of the dialectic" seem fitting here. Transformations of
labor conditions by slow quantitative steps, and equally slow changes in disposible income,
over a century come to create a qualitatively new character of alienation. Quantity
transforms into quality. The "negation of the negation" rears its head in the cycle of, first,
the relative liberation of labor in liberal Capitalism, then second, the recapitulation of
alienation as a mechanism of control. The twice negated alienation obtained in spectacular
society is of a different character than the original alienations. As always, it remains more
difficult to do much with the "interpenetration of opposites."
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series of small changes. The net effect was a large reduction in work hours, a
corresponding increase in "leisure" time, and (at least for major sectors of the
proletariat) the achievement of a large degree of material comfort. These
economic aspects have gotten generally worse most places since 1967, but the
intense physical labor conditions of the industrial proletariat of 1844 is still fairly
rare in the industrialized" world. During these changes, alienation has not faded
away, but rather the mechanisms of ideology and power have reworked
themselves to perpetuate new forms of alienation. Separation itself has acted
almost as an agency of history.
At a first most literal level alienation continues as a universal feature of
shop-floor Capitalism — an assembled widget passes out of the hands of a
worker, at which point she loses all control of that individual widget. But at a
second level, a worker who is not absolutely impoverished in direct relation to
the extent of her productive activity, is no longer alienated in this modality, at
this level of abstraction. The socialized, unionized worker can now purchase
with her wage nearly the same bulk of commodities she produces through her
labor. As alienation has decreased on the shop-floor— and correspondingly as
Fordist workers have had money to spend — Capitalism has had the impetus and
the necessity to create the consumers who would desire to spend this cash on
produced commodities.
In their physicality of existence, workers/consumers do not need to buy
anything beyond bread and rags, which they already bought in the darkest days
of 19th century Capitalism. Beyond that, spending enters a different economy
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of differential preference. 83 As a matter of degrees, but also in a transformation
of the quantitative steps into a new quality, spectacular alienation is the
alienation of produced preferences. It is tempting to see spectacular alienation
as an abstraction or generalization of the creation of consumption preferences.
From product advertising to the creation of a complete spectacular modality of
being-we are a type of person who votes a certain way, uses certain slang,
dresses in a certain fashion, has certain types of affective relations, likes certain
forms of art, all as an internalization of external cultural media.
The 30 years between 1 968 and 1 998 seem to have revealed even this
abstraction of the Spectacle as transitory. Now it is nothing but product
advertising, no abstraction, no generalization. Slang is a series of product
nicknames; clothing style is used for nothing more than to mark the prominently
emblazoned fact that you bought a certain brand; your style of relating to
friends simply identifies the brand of beer you drink together; art is a just
collectibles; and preaching freedom is a way of saying you drive an SUV. I
might interject here, in a now familiar fashion, that what you hold is but a
shadow of my actual dissertation; the actual document can be found at the web
site indicated in my acknowledgments. If anything, elections, which are bought
by corporations, are the last exception to the rule of Spectacular Capitalism in
that the electorate is still bribed and cajoled, rather than paying up-front and
out-of-pocket (or at least on credit-card) for their own subjegation.
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lt is not, of course, the case that before "consumer spending" (either before in
chronology or in bookeeping senses) there was nothing differential about spending. Marx
has a famous remark about the differential necessity of beer for the English proletariat and
wine for the French proletariat. But the type of differentiation clearly moves from a cultural
to a consumer preference.
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Ideas in Heads 84
A very interesting gesture is made by what is probably the best known
Situationist slogan, "Our ideas are in everyone's head." Of course, at one level
the slogan is evocative of the rhizomes and cerebral overgrowths making up
some imagery of this section. Revolutionary ideas pop up all over the place,
showing they rely not on a single origin, an authority, but rather on a
distribution, a field, a potentiality which is diffuse. As a utopian hope, a hope of
revolutionary potential, the slogan is compelling, and optimistic.
There is a deeper level at which the slogan can be read as a subtle ironic
reversal of the reality of the Spectacle. Despite the immanentist aspect of the
slogan, the claim of the Situationists is not that revolutionary sentiment is
indifferently and uniformly diffused over all the members of of spectacular
society. It is, after all, our ideas which are in everyone's head! Who are we,
here? Obviously, there is no one clear answer; I do not think the intention was
ever to limit us to, say, the member of the SI editorial board. But there is at
least an outward radiance of ortho-doxy or orthopraxis
.
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Situationist critiques
have a central intellectual locus with cultural revolutionaries, and a secondary
diffusion to the working class-or the consuming class-in general.
This analysis starts to sound a bit like the corruption of another
slogan — "All power to the Soviets!"— which managed to move from a radically
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lf this topic name reminds the reader of the rhetorically insightful, but ultimately
dangerously misguided, slogan of ACT-UP, "drugs in bodies," so much the better. A great
deal of my argument parallels both in trope and in topic what one might do well to say
about "drugs in bodies."
85Perhaps for this context, neologisms sinistrodoxy and sinistropraxis would better
express our conventions of political left and right. In any event, the orthodoxy in question
is certainly not meant to describe ideas which are conventional or dominant, but those that
are correct.
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democratic slogan for shop-floor democracy to a State-Socialist slogan for
totalitarianism between the years 1917 and 1922. It is superfically easy to read
an authoritarian core into the Situationists radical-democratic slogan. But such a
reading is not what I intend here. Instead, I think one can more generously take
a Luxemburgian attitude and read the radial structure of the Situationist slogan
in terms of the essential prematurity of every revolutionary action. As is familiar
enough, for Luxemburg the objective conditions for revolution can only be
brought about by revolutionary action which comes before these conditions
exist, or before they exist more than in pontentia [see, for example, Zizek,
1989, p.59]. So with this generosity— in this case fairly commonsensical — we
can read the Situationists simply as claiming that their critique of spectacular
society is already implicit, if not quite realized, in the minds of 'everyone'. It will
take Situationist disruptions to realize the implicit potential for revolution
though.
Fair enough. The observation / wish to make is a bit different. What
interests me is that the structure of outward radiance in the slogan, "Our ideas
are in everyone's head," is precisely the opposite form as that of ideological
interpellation. Interpellation by ideology is an inward radiance wherein the
"ideas" of a common Symbolic (or spectacular) order flow into our heads to
create a subject there within (all in a manner of speaking). Perhaps I can clarify
most easily by discussing the voices in my head. 86 They say the most noxious
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lt seems almost like I should somehow verbally eschew having voices in my head.
Perhaps the phrase could be cast in some metaphorical, or literary light. Obviously, there is
the negative connotation associated with paranoia and madness. But ideas are essentially
verbal in form, and presumably cognition is not immediately identical with insanity (maybe
not). I would be somewhat surprised to find folks whose subjective experience was not of
hearing voices within their head (both that of the Other, and their own). The distinction
here between 'normality' and paranoia seems to be a question of misrecognition of the
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things. Sometimes they carry on with awful racist and sexist invectives, for
example. Other times they relate experiential objects to the advertising jingles
adhesed to them. Or the cliches of CNN's talking heads and newspaper
editorials urge a framing of observation in the terms of the ideology du jour.
Among the din of all these echos of externality, I try to discern the voice which
is "mine"
— and perhaps I generally succeed. But "my voice" is simply a possible
voice which could stand in a discursive position beside these other voices. That
is what it means for me to be a subject, after all. 87
location of the voices. On the one hand, the overtly paranoid seem to misrecognize this
location as literally external. A greater pathology probably lies in misrecognizing these
voices as being one's own thoughts. This latter pathology is what we might call
'subjective integrity'.
I find it interesting in this context to contemplate the ideological position and
mechanism of Tourette's syndrome-specifically, those Touretteurs who issue utterances
as a type of tic (somewhere around 20% of those with the syndrome, but in this note,
allow the generic mention to refer to this subset). I have no doubt of the neurological basis
of the syndrome, and certainly have no desire to return to crude Freudian equation of
Tourette's with hysterias. But neurological generalities play out through human
particularities. It is not as if Touretteurs issue words of random languages, nor even words
of some Chomskian universal grammar; Touretteurs inevitably eject words and phrases of
their own native language (or at least of language familiar to them), and very often these
words and phrases are invectives or other taboo words. Clearly there is something more
than neurology going on in word choice.
A somewhat provocative characterization would be to read Tourette's as a type of
ideology critique. Touretteurs eject words as one might vomit after swallowing a poison. In
a sense, the externalities of Symbolic discursivity (Spectacle/ideology) which are
internalized by all subjects are re-externalized by Touretteurs without the intervention of
interpellation (at least for some few utterances). Everyone re-externalizes stuff they have
heard once they start believing it; and a lot of us say stuff we do not believe at various
times. These "normal" types of repetitions are perceived as subjective acts, even in those
cases where the words themselves might be dissimulative or insincere. In Touretteurs'
verbal tics, the content re-externalized is distinctly not perceived by the speaker (nor by
listeners "in the know") as a subjective act. There are not too many other situations where
verbal re-externalization occurs without a subjective presumption (acting, maybe;
recitation; imitative speech, such as a child playing word games; maybe a couple others).
A utopian appropriation might imagine Touretteurs to say "you need not be subjectivized
by your speech."
What would be interesting to know would be more about how Touretteurs
subjectively perceive the things they utter as tics. Clearly there is no direct doxastic
connection in the sense of a tic being an assertion. But there could be associational beliefs
involved, in the manner of Freudian dreamwork transference. Or there might be an actual
relation between eschewal and tic utterances. The commonness of invectives supports
this inasmuch as most people think there is something wrong with saying invectives (even
Let me rephrase the last paragraph. The reality of the Spectacle is that
"everyone's ideas are in our head!" The Spectacle operates by an inward
radiance of obscenely repeated externalities (TV, ads, art, jingles, logos, political
truisms) into the thereby permeated internality of subjectivity. Both objectively
and and subjectively the slogan "our ideas are in everyone's head" is exactly
wrong. The force, therefore, of the slogan operates at a level which is neither
objective nor subjective but which is instead material and terroristic. The
Situationist slogan
— and other Situationist actions
— is an example of the
materialist verbal efficacy which makes up the title and subject matter of this
dissertation. The mode of efficacy of Situationist words/actions is precisely in
their irreality and untruth. The enunciative physicality of an utterance persists
even apart, and in eschewal of, an interpellative integration of the utterance. Or
at least, so I hope. One gesture, in any event, of the Situationists, is to separate
enunciation from subjectivation, since the latter is inherently corrupted in
spectacular society
.
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those who say them at certain times). Under this hypothesis, it would be important to
understand the level of the eschewal— there is a difference between things that people
simply disagree with and those they feel guilty about believing. On the other hand, the
actual hearing of certain phrases frequently may have its own (re-)subjectivizing effects.
There are simply a lot of details I do not have in forming a judgement on the matter of this
footnote.
88The previous footnote 87 discusses a wholly different sort of non-interpellated
utterance. The comparison and contrast between Situationist utopianism and Tourette's
Syndrome is worth contemplating, methinks. The results of the comparison are not
obvious.
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Separation and Representation
At this point, it is probably worthwhile to connect the Situationists'
analyses with my own. The central terms of Situationist theory are 'separation'
and spectacle
. The former is, in meaning and use, a close proxy for the early-
Marx's term 'alienation'. Within Society of the Spectacle, 'alienation' and
'separation' are used somewhat interchangeably. There may be a significance to
the preference for the word 'separation' rather than the available Marxist
alternative 'alienation ' 89 in Situationist writing, but for my purposes I will treat
the two as equivalent synonyms. 'Spectacle', in turn, is a proxy for an older
theoretically-infused term, 'ideology'. Synonymy will here be assumed also. As
an informal, guess, I would speculate that the use of "ordinary" words from
outside of Marxist theoretical traditions was something of an effort to "start
afresh" for Situationist theory, despite the clear recapitulation of so much of
Marxian and Hegelian theory. Let us leave that matter for a different document
beyond this much.
The Spectacle creates subjects who are separated from their own desire.
Desire is actual only through mediation, and mediation becomes the actuality of
desire. In spectacular society, ideology does not simply represent desire, rather
desire becomes a representation of ideology. The consequence is that
representation at its core in spectacular society is a form of falsity, and no truth
remains in representation. For Debord
,
90
89The two words at issue seem to have basically the same meaning and connotation in
French as in English, as far as my very limited understanding of French goes.
90A citational note is in order here. In this and all other quotations from Debord's
Society of the Spectacle, page number will not be indicated, but rather aphorism number.
As well as matching the spirit of the book, this convention reflects the fact that the Black
& Red edition I utilize does not provide printed pagination.
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§29. The spectacle originates in the loss of the unity of the
world, and the gigantic expansion of the modern spectacle
expresses the totality of this loss: the abstraction of all specific
labor and the general abstraction of the entirety of production are
perfectly rendered in the spectacle, whose mode of being
concrete is precisely abstraction. In the spectacle, one part of the
world represents itself to the world and is superior to it. The
specatcle is nothing more than the common language of this
separation. What binds the spectators together in no more than
an irreversible relation at the very center which maintains their
isolation. The spectacle reunites the separate, but reunites it as
separate. [Debord, 1983]
As a consequence, the Situationist project must be much like my metaphysical
terrorism of this document. I might interject here, as if such a voice could
originate outside the text, the usual caveat about this document's modification.
Political representation is already tainted by the totalizing reach of
spectacularization.
For the situationists, the prospect of either revolutionary
organisation or theory representing the working class was quite
unthinkable. Since such representation is precisely the ground of
alienation against which the revolution is effected, 'the
revolutionary organization must learn that it can no longer combat
alienation by means of alienated forms of struggle'
. It cannot
'represent the revolutionary class', but must 'simply recognize
itself as radically separated from the world of separation'
.
[Plant,
1992, quoting Debord, 1 983] 91
91
Plant works, in part, from a somewhat different translation of Debord than
referenced in my bibliography. In the Black & Red edition I utilize, §122 is rendered as,
When constantly growing capitalist alienation at all levels makes it
increasingly difficult for workers to recognize and name their own misery,
forcing them to face the alternative of rejecting the totality of their misery
or nothing, the revolutionary organization has to learn that is can no longer
combat alienation with alienated forms.
§ 1 1 9 is translated as,
A revolutionary organization existing before the power of the Councils (it
will find its own form through stuggle), for all these historical resons,
already knows that it does not represent the working class. It must
recognize itself as no more than a radical separation from the world of
separation.
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If Situationism can act in revolutionary fashions, it must do so apart from the
mode of separation, and therefore quite apart from the mechanism of
representation.
Ideology as Base
I made a remark in my introduction (at page 21) which equated ideology
with the base of the base/superstructure pair. Such a remark must have seemed
topsy-turvy to familiar Marxist divisions. The same reversal motivates
Situationist conceptions. Debord writes, for example,
§4 The spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social
relation among people, mediated by images. [Debord, 1983]
Or in a somewhat less aphoristic tone,
§6 The spectacle, grasped in its totality, is both the result and the
project of the existing mode of production. It is not a supplement
to the real world, an additional decoration. It is the heart of the
unrealism of the real society. In all its specific forms, as
information or propoganda, as advertisement or direct
entertainment consumption, the spectacle is the present model of
socially dominant life. It is the omnipresent affirmation of the
choice already made in production and its corollary consumption.
The spectacle's form and content are identically the total
justification of the existing system's conditions and goals. The
spectacle is also the permanent presence of this justification,
since it occupies the main part of the time lived outside of modern
production. [Debord, 1983]
Within a Situationist analysis — and I generally endorse such a conclusion
myself— the material organization of society is, nowadays, organized around
consumption. The previously "natural" order of Capitalist society, in which
commodities were manufactured in order to meet an inevitable and natural — or
The translations are not dramatically different, but it is useful, in any event, to provide a
bit more context from Debord's aphorisms.
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at least extrinsic-set of needs, has been reversed to a spectacular order in
which needs and desires are manufactured to service the inevitable course of
production. The revolutionary overturning of previous productive methods which
was at the core of 19th century Capitalism has shaded into one in which it is
instead primarily desires which are perpetually overturned through revolutions of
subjectivation (i.e. advertising).
Baudrillard, for a certain period, made some profound observations along
these lines. Between 1972 and 1973 — that is, between For a Critique of the
Political Economy of the Sign and The Mirror of Production
-he seems to have
turned an insight into the economic function of consumption in modern society
into a parodic rejection of economic function. It is too bad, really; and his later
books generally continue this trend (although not without interesting
observations and analysis). In any event, the following is helpful.
One can generalize this conclusion by saying that needs— such as
they are-can no longer be defined adequately in terms of the
naturalist-idealist thesis— as innate, instinctive power,
spontaneous craving, anthropological potentiality. Rather, they are
better defined as a function induced (in the individual) by the
internal logic of the system: more precisely, not as a
consummative force liberated by the affluent society, but as a
productive force required by the functioning of the system itself,
by its process of reproduction and survival. In other words, there
are only needs because the system needs them.
And the needs invested by the individual consumer today are just
as essential to the order of production as the capital invested by
the capitalist entrepeneur and the labor power invested by the
wage laborer. It is all capital. [Baudrillard, 1981, p.82]
The point I would make would not be some crude dialectic gesture in
which the old production is suddenly cast as superstructural, with spectacular
ideology now playing the role of base. That has a formulaic neatness, but too
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much so. Both the shop-floor and the TV sitcom remain as techniques in the
function of capital, and as the material quiddity of the relations among people.
Rather, I believe in the distinction between base and superstructure precisely
insofar as the base of an all-encompassing Capitalism has swallowed everything
into its obscene physicality. There is a base and a superstructure, but
everything existing is base. In this light, my metaphysical terrorism, Bey's later
discussed Poetic Terrorism and Temporary Autonomous Zones, and
Situationism s gestures of artistic refusal, are all utopian calls for the return of
the superstructure. They make this call by operating, not at the phantasm of
superstructure which the Capitalist totality casts as a simulacrum of itself, but
at the base itself, counter to production and (productive) ideology.
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CHAPTER VII
THE POVERTY OF CAUSALITY
Time, as Hegel showed, is the necessary alienation, the
environment where the subject realizes himself by losing
himself, where he becomes other in order to become truly
himself. Precisely the opposite is true in the dominant
alienation, which is undergone by the producer of an alien
present. In this spatial alienation, the society that radically
separates the subject from the activity it takes from him,
separates him first of all from his own time. It is this
surmountable social alienation that has prohibited and
petrified the possibility and risks of the living alienation of time.
[Debord, 1983, §161]
The Ideology of Causation
What I would like to accomplish in this chapter is to show some manners
in which some very deep ideologies can become, almost accidentally, tied very
closely to some much shallower ideologies. As I have discussed in greater detail
in the previous chapter, almost everything is an "ideology" in the sense I use it.
Everything which can serve as a locus for social formations, and everything
which can be described as a relative coherent collection of beliefs (both logically
and pragmatically), is a sort of ideology. But such ideologies— or perhaps more
neutrally, ideas— have a lot of different levels of significance. Some have
structured our most basic conceptions of the world for hundreds, or maybe
thousands, of years, while others are tabloid sensations for a few months. At
an entirely different and orthogonal level to longstandingness of ideologies,
ideologies differ quite a lot in relation to the tendency towards and success at
becoming hegemonic, i.e. encompassing and coopting their outsides.
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Ideologies sometimes become pinned down with other ideologies. And
sometimes, the fate of one ideology comes to ride with that of one either much
more transient, or one much more archaic. Ordinary ideologies sometimes get
pinned to hegemonies, or the reverse. Several examples of such pinnings down,
or pinnings together, have been discussed in my case studies. One fascinating
and utopian— or at least sometimes counter-hegemonic-possibility contained in
certain conjunctions is that we can often "get" much more out of an ideology
critique, or out of a forgetfulness, than one might expect. Perhaps in an act
bringing an end to a minor ideology, a deep and hegemonic ideology is carried to
the same end-despite the all encompassing nature of the latter which would
otherwise resist both critique and forgetting. On the other hand, it may happen
a minor target gains a surprising lease on life by riding the wake of a larger
ideology.
Our Kantian/Cartesian notions of causality, and its temporality— pre-
dating those figures I use to name it by some hundreds of years— is certainly
one of our deepest, most longstanding, and most hegemonic ideologies. In some
ways I will attempt to name, I believe that causality's fate might follow those of
some more recent and less hegemonic phenomenological gestalts. To interject a
reminder: it is worth remembering the grad school's sadistic impositions on this
literal text. Some ideologies of love, of gender, and of personal attachment,
while hardly fleetingly transient themselves, seem rather less deep than our
apparently unconnected belief in causality. But it just might happen — and at the
least it can be discerned as a present Utopian moment— that these shallower
ideologies are being forgotten or critiqued, and that with them causality is being
forgotten.
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Phenomenological Saturation
Certain moments, it seems, are filled with a rich significance exceeding
the penury of the ideologically reconstructed causal interconnectedness of this
phenomenal world. Kant, for example, thought that there was one such moment
(call it “the present," if you like) when the noumenal self constructs the entire
causal sequence of all events in time. Most of us-followers of Walter Benjamin
that we are— believe that there are more than one such moments. Certain
moments in our lives, overcoded by collections of photographs, documents, and
such paraphernalia, which mark onto-symbolic changes in the course of our
birth, marriage, graduation, certification, death, etc. — claim such a rich
significance, though generally they do so fraudulently. The saturation of
significance at these events is fraudulent because their possibility, if not their
inevitability, is already explicable in advance. However, it is these conventional,
explicable “saturated" moments which point the way to an uneasy
comprehension of the "authentic" saturated moments from within the
ideological realm of explicability in which we live.
The distinction between "authentic" and "inauthentic" saturation
uneasily drawn above will be illustrated herein by gesture to several recent films
in which several scenarios of feminine transgression/deviance are played
through. This new distinction between transgression and mere deviance recodes
that between authenticity and inauthenticity at a "higher" level; though the dis-
ease we must feel at all of these is little assuaged by the variation in
nomenclature. Words simply fail us. Nonetheless, let me try to sketch what I
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bel.eve to be signified, however ephemerally, by this quadrangle of words:
authentic, inauthentic, transgressive, deviant: arrangeable in a grid“ as,
92 -
This grid could also be arranged according to the Greimasian "semiotic sauare"
terms as
|uxtaposes ,0 the He9elia" triad IZizek, 1991a], That is, we could arrange the
Inauthentic
Deviant
Authentic
Transgressive
Zizek presents us with the following two other such semiotic squares, which I will presenthere for comparison and explication:
and.
Necessary •« * Impossible
Possible Contingent
Prescribed * Prohibited
Permitted X
These squares may be read as charting a series of dialectical reversals, starting from the
top left, moving rightward, then returning to the bottom left along the diagonal. Each of
these moves may be read as a process of negation, giving us the famous Hegelian logic of
the negation of the negation according to which we do not arrive where we started.
What is absent within the restricted Hegelian triad is a moment of pure negativity,
represented in the bottom right of the square, which conditions the first two moments
through its negative relation to them, but which is simply incommensurable with the
synthetic moment represented at bottom left. But it is this "fourth moment" which is
nonetheless always necessary for the dialectic to proceed.
Zizek illustrates this point well vis-a-vis the second two graphs presented, so I will
comment herein only on the first graph — containing the terms of discussion within this
essay. A brief reflection upon this will show that the remaining graphs follow the same
structure.
Within the use of the terms as sketched throughout this essay, an inauthentic
moment of saturated subjectivity is a moment in the imaginary construction of the subject
whose phenomenological character is ineffable, but whose occurrence is nonetheless
predictable. With the move to those spontaneous authentic moments, the ineffability of
the phenomenological experience is accompanied by non-predictability. Such authentic
moments might not have happened. In the transition from authenticity to deviance, two
things happen. In the first place, effability is constituted, and predictability remains absent.
A deviant act is by definition one which breaks with regulative normativity, and hence
might not have happened. But within the category of deviance, a subject is nonetheless
constituted by categories of explanatory normativity, even at the very moment she
violates regulative norms. Deviance is always effable within the terms of explanation of a
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Rational
"
Real
Imaginary
Symbolic
Inauthentic Authentic
Deviant Transgressive
Table of Discontinuities
The Imaginary
At the first level, that of the Lacanian Imaginary, certain moments are
marked as more-than-temporal in their functional construction of an ideal ego
[Zizek, 1989, p. 1 05]. That is, a few particular instants play a pivotal
significance in our image of self. They function precisely as the condensed
terms in which all other actions of self become meaningful: as Lacanian quilting
points. To cite just one example, our auto-ontological status as a married person
is pinned to that moment of Austinian illocution when we uttered the
otherwise plain words, "I do" [Austin, 1962]. Following this pivotal moment,
many later moments days, years, or even a lifetime worth of moments: an
infinite number, in any event— are "grounded" by this singular moment so
saturated in ontological significance. 93
pathological subjectivity
,
though it's occurrence is always contingent. The second facet of
this negation of a negation” is a transfer of “levels." With deviance we move from a
phenomenological constitution of subjectivity to a sociological one.
The triadic motion through Inauthenticity - Authenticity - Deviance seems to
complete a dialectics of subjectivity, even one in which predictability functions as a
vanishing mediator on the path from ineffability to effability. However, there remains a
fourth term unaccounted for in this dialectics. That term, transgression
,
marks the point in
the dialectics of subjectivity held by the very impossibility of subjectivity. It represents,
hence, the dissolution of the dialectic movement; the underlying purpose of the whole
dialectic is to mask this position in order that a fantasy of subjectivity may be dialectically
played through. But it is only in relation to the actual unreality of subjectivity that the
fantastic play of the dialectic of subjectivity functions; and therefore it is this fourth
moment— entirely outside of the dialectic of subjectivity — which forms the very basis of
the dialectic and of subjectivity.
93Consider, as an example of saturation, the moment when we "fall in love", discussed
in some greater detail in the below section, Whither Romantic Love?
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The inauthenticity of the saturated moments already mentioned lies
precisely in the fact that they are illocutionary. Their significance is repeatable,
predictable, and, moreover, generally quite banal. Such is precisely the fact of
the conventional character of illocutions. To be precise, inauthentic saturated
moments are not necessarily themselves speech-acts; but even when their
character is otherwise, they are almost always immediately cotemporal with an
illocutionary speech-act. A birth, for example, is not a speech-act, but it is
generally marked by a particular illocution (i.e. "It's a girl!").
A moment which is authentically saturated must be purely perlocution-
ary, rather than merely illocutionary [Austin, 1962], Authentically saturated
moments must be, in some way, individual, particular and non-categorizable. In
their non-categorizability, such moments represent a break with any sociological
or phenomenological rationality. These moments are pure, non-assimilatable
exceptions to rationality within the imaginary act of identification. As
exceptions, these authentic saturated moments occupy the impossible place of
the Lacanian Real. Return to the example given of an inauthentic saturated
moment: that of a marriage vow. Whatever the subjective centrality and
saturation of this moment, in relation to which we live an infinite number of
homogeneous moments as a "married person," we nonetheless always already
knew prior to the illocution that a "married person" was a possible thing to
be— and that our vow was a possible one. The character of an authentic
moment is just the opposite: it must never in advance have been known
possible, nor after must it constitute a possible way-of-being. Examples fail,
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since such moments are, by definition, unnameable; but one may point to the
status of mystical experiences whose entire significance is to leave one exactly
what one was without the experience, but fundamentally to change the
meaning of this entire way-of-being. I shall also point to filmic "representations"
of such moments below.
The imaginary distinction of saturation, as was hinted at above, is just
Walter Benjamin's distinction between "homogeneous linear" from "messianic"
time, writ small [Benjamin, 1968], Within the distinction of saturation,
messianic moments are reflected into a subjective perspective, rather than
projected into the reality itself as they are with those cultural/religious
moments understood to mark epochal changes. Whereas Benjamin made his
distinction to refer to differing, more-or-less univocal, cultural conceptions of
the structure of time, I find these two structures to be themselves structurally
related within the imaginary construction of subjectivity.
To understand this system of imaginary structuration of subjectivity we
may observe the following: When we point to authentic and fraudulent
saturated moments, we point only to a distinction in the ease with which
messianic moments are retroactively reincorporated into the homogeneous linear
time— into the causal sequence— of the Symbolic Order. 94 A marriage, to
94To use a somewhat Deleuze/Guattarian figure [Deleuze, 1987b], we may say that
striated time becomes smooth with its incorporation into the Symbolic Order of
speech/thought. In pursuing the Deleuze/Guattarian trope we will notice that this same
incorporation produces the opposite effect upon bodies/spaces. With its stratification into
the Symbolic order a smooth body becomes striated. The crucial essay within Deleuze and
Guattari's book, in regard to this, is "How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs,"
though this manner of thinking permeates Thousand Plateaus. So paradoxically, we have a
total situation wherein striated bodies within striated spaces move through smooth
(homogeneous linear) time, while only smooth (unstriated or striated to saturation) bodies
exist in striated (messianic) time. Of course, if we observe any of this, we talk about it
only from the side of the Symbolic. Insofar as we must discuss it in language, the below
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continue with my example, however saturated/messianic it appears subjectively
represents no break from the point-of-view of a collective Symbolic Order. That
is, whatever evaluation my marital status is assigned by representatives of a
Symbolic Order (other persons), it represents no discontinuity in the system of
valuation. It is here we move to the second row of my grid.
The Symbolic
Discontinuities within the Symbolic Order have a different character than
the phenomenological saturation by which I characterized discontinuities in the
Imaginary Order. Interject. Wrong text. Document by intervention. ODR, they
suck. These "higher" discontinuities mark breaks, not in temporo-causal order,
but rather in valuation
;
and breaks exist not relative to an ideal ego, but rather
to an ego-ideal [Zizek, 1989, p.105]. That is to say, what is in question within
the Symbolic Order is not the construction of an image of self, relative to which
we are subjectivated, but rather the construction of the position from which our
image of self is seen: the position of the Other. We enter the Symbolic Order
"by assuming a certain 'mandate', by occupying a certain place in the
intersubjective symbolic network" [Zizek, 1989, p.1 10].
To return once again to my standard example, we exist as a "married
person" within the Symbolic Order, not insofar as this status is ontologically
grounded by a saturated illocutionary moment, but rather insofar as this status
is embedded in a system of deontological valuations. A married person must
have certain sorts of relations to each person within the system of social
discussed Thelma and Louise provides a fertile ground from which to elaborate these
effects.
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relations simply by virtue of this de/ontological status. This is not a description,
but a command. The illocutionary "I do" subject(ivate)s to a whole series of
imperatives which are both necessary and impossible to obey; just as does the
proclaimitive "It's a girl!" One must be nothing but a purely formal position
within an homogeneous system of signs, and yet one must occupy this position
as a subject who recognizes one's moment of entry into this vacant position as
ontologically saturated. Put yet another way, one must function as a Saussurian
sign, standing only in negative relation to other signs; and yet, to function in
such a manner is only imaginarily possible in relation to saturated moments of
pure positivity.
We can see how those moments of saturation which are discontinuities
within the imaginary construction of temporality are mere homogeneous
continuities within the Symbolic Order. I have commented already about
inauthenticity being a result of possibility— any event which was always already
possible represents no real break with temporality. On the other hand, however,
for this moment to become so saturated, it must have also possibly not
occurred. No such question of possibility arises in the Symbolic Order. The
structural position of "marriage," for example, is simply necessary. It makes no
difference which position we actually occupy (married/unmarried, male/female,
etc.), the imperative is simply that we occupy a position. Our possible change in
category between sides of these binaries no more affects the structure of the
oppositions than does a phoneme run through a synthesizer to become a
different phoneme affect the structure of phonemic oppositions. Categorization
in some position or another is the inevitability.
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The Symbolic, however, has it's own discontinuities, grounding its own
homogeneity. Some actions of categorized beings cannot be valuated within the
normative constraints of the category. It may happen that we encounter a
trompe / oeil in normativity; in which we misrecognize the system of valuation
applicable to a person s position. Retroactively, after recognition, we may de-
valuate the meanings of previous acts and fit them cleanly into a structure of
valuation; but during the very moment of recognition there exist an equivocal
ungroundedness to the whole symbolic edifice. However, despite the implicit
threat to normativity within such re-valuations, re-valuation is a necessary prop
of the Symbolic Order. It is the means by which the infinity of accidents of
empirical beings can be confined within the rigid binarisms of symbolic
normativity: "If this person was not what we thought she was, nonetheless,
she is something."
My standard examples apply here. We see someone wearing "a wedding
band," and thus immediately overlay every one of her actions with a system of
valuation in accordance with the de/ontological categories of marriage. Upon
recognition that she was not actually married, after discounting by
condemnation her "subterfuge," we are able to re-valuate her past actions and
reinsert her into a hermetic Symbolic Order. Such a description applies still more
to such a "deception" as wearing the clothes not matching our "actual"
gender/sex — and to many other forms of "passing." For a subject not to match
in her empirical being her symbolic category— but rather to match a different
category— is what I name "deviance." Deviance is, however, still listed under
the column of the "Rational," however, since whatever discontinuities in
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insertion arise with deviant behavior, a deviant's insertion is ambiguous only
between possible categorical positions.
With transgression, it is possibility which is violated. Transgression is a
play of ambiguity between impossible, unoccupiable positions. Just as
impossibility marked the place of the Real within imaginary saturations, so it
does amongst symbolic discontinuities. Transgression is the contingency of pure
exception within the Symbolic Order; it is the absolute excess of symbolization
which exceeds even the deviant success of signification manifested in the
hysterical symptom . 95 Let us turn now to deviance and transgression in some
films, as promised.
B: Is that a female impersonator?
A: Of what? [Warhol, 1975, p.41]
Hysterical Movies
One frequently used tool in the institution and maintenance of the
compulsively heterosexual form of the bourgeois nuclear family has been the
95What is at issue here, under a different name, is the distinction between an ordinary
symptom and its Lacanian near-homonym, sinthome [Zizek, 1989, p . 7 1 ] . An ordinary
hysterical symptom — say a bodily paralysis of a particular organ — is precisely a device of
symbolic coding. It is a kind of deviance, and as such is quite easily interpretable, in
principle. Moreover, retroactively, a symptom becomes recoded as an almost trivial
consequence of one's particular insertion into the Symbolic Order. On the face of it we
believe that there is no reason why "a woman" should experience this peculiar paralysis,
for example, but the end result of analysis is to show how such a symptom was a mere
reflection of her position of insertion. Such is the classical Freudian course of treatment.
The Lacanian sinthome is quite different; and is quite outside relation to "the
talking cure." The sinthome is what persists after every fantasy has been worked through,
after every dream and joke fully decoded. It is a pure excess of the Real which grounds
subjectivity outside the participation of either the Symbolic or the Imaginary. Such is also
the place of feminine jouissance, quite unencodeable into a phallic Symbolic Order.
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hystericization of women. Hysteria has been cast as the result of a failure of
"normal" womanly sexuality; and its threat used ideologically as a bogey to
women straying from a normative marital heterosexuality. This much is well
known by now, if not already banal.
Several cases of this bogey appear in recent films
— though with
traditional hysteria being replaced by more aggressively violent forms of
derangement. Examples of such films include Fatal Attraction, The Fland That
Rocks the Cradle, and Single White Female
; the list is probably extensible. In
each of these films, a main female character is in some way deprived of the
bliss of bourgeois nuclear heterosexual monogamy. Such deprivation, however,
represents an interesting departure from older devices for the maintenance of
family values in which the threat was of more-or-less subjectively decided
refusal of these values by women (and the result, hysteria ). 96 In these recent
films we see characters who have fully attempted to internalize normative
heterosexuality, but whose attempt has been blocked by external events such
as the death of a husband. The consequence, as I have mentioned, of such an
external deprivation, is the lapse into a homicidal violence. Such violence is
presented as the more-or-less expected result of an unfulfilled heterosexuality,
and simultaneously of an excess of sexuality in general. The moral seems to be
that with a loss of the possibility of marital heterosexual normality comes a loss
of all constraining values whatsoever.
96The classic examples here are the femme fatales of Film Noir. Women who choose
an independence uncharacteristic especially of that typical of 1940's gender roles — or
really more atypical of roles in the 1930's which these 1940's movies implicitly
venerated— bring about their own downfalls through their own morbid obsessions (sex,
drugs, music, and so on).
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Another recent and popular film, however, presents the same "objective"
narrative but with a meaning, perhaps, exactly reversed. In Thelma and Louise
we are shown just the same external deprivation of normative heterosexuality,
followed both by a "deviant" expression of an excess of sexuality, and by an
abandonment of constraining values. The expression of such an abandonment is
again in violence. Obviously, however, the moral of Thelma and Louise is
different than that of the others: their deprivation of "normality" and resultant
abandonment of value constraints is transgressive rather than merely deviant.
And insofar as a film can represent the phenomenological interiority of its
characters, the saturations in Thelma and Louise are authentic; while they
remain inauthentic in the other films.
Thelma and Louise was a more-or-less conscious response to the
deviance films discussed herein; it has in turn been consciously imitated by
other rather interesting later films. Both Boys on the Side and Leaving Normal
are pretty explicitly imitations of Thelma and Louise . 21 However, while these
two films each offer important feminist gestures, they fail to capture the
trangressive moment of Thelma and Louise precisely insofar as they, instead,
offer utopian possibilities. The section which examines these latter films
explores briefly the the non-reduceability of transgression to utopian vision. In a
sense, nonetheless, these utopian films are only possible in the wake of Thelma
97To be accurate, given production schedules, Edward Zwick's 1992 Leaving Normal
was probably written, and possibly filmed, prior to the release of Thelma and Louise.
Regardless of the actual empirical answer to the biographical relation of Zwick, or writer
Ed Solomon, to Thelma and Louise, Leaving Normal was generally received as a response
to Thelma and Louise-, and I will find it illustrative to consider it as part of a developmental
series following Thelma and Louise. Herbert Ross' 1994 Boys on the Side makes quite a
few explicit references to Thelma and Louise, so I think little question exists that it was
created, at least partially, as a reaction to the latter.
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and Louise. While a feminist mainstream film still had to respond to the
construction of unsuccessful (or non-) heterosexuality as a kind of deviance or
madness, after Thelma and Louise made that response, it created a break in
filmic traditions which allowed the creation of new positive valuations in films
such as the two mentioned.
I do not mean to overplay the analogies amongst these several films, nor
to reduce them to the univocal narrative I sketch above. Each of these films is,
of course, the play of many themes beyond the single one I mention. However,
the similarities in the narratives of the above films, combined with their sharply
different valuations of these narratives, allow us to attempt to distinguish
between transgressive acts and simply deviant acts, although both types must
be seen as identical from within the perspective of a fully coded Symbolic
Order. That is, from the perspective of normativity, either transgression or
deviance are indifferently on the outside of the Law. It is only from within a
not-yet-fully-coded subjective position that such a difference is "intelligible;"
and even this intelligibility becomes retroactively erased with its symbolic
apprehension.
We also should not make the error of assuming that Thelma and Louise
succeeds in transgressiveness and authenticity simply because it is a better film
than the others I mention. While it would be difficult for films as wooden (and,
indeed, just as plain bad) as The Hand That Rocks the Cradle or Single White
Female to present authentic saturation or transgressive discontinuities, the
same dismissal cannot be made of Fatal Attraction. This latter is certainly a
finely crafted film which is quite conscious in its selective play and violation of
normative categories of heterosexuality. I should interject here, in a Cagean
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disruption of this text, that what you hold is not my actual document, but a
mutilation produced largely by the Office of Degree Requirements. If deviance,
rather than transgression, is presented in Fatal Attraction that is because
director Adrian Lynne intended to make a film about such a matter (though I do
not imagine, in any event, that he conceived his film even remotely in the terms
I use in discussing it). Even if the same can not be said of The Hand That Rocks
the Cradle or Single White Female, their presentation is nonetheless important in
understanding cultural scripts of symbolic deviance.
The common script played in each of the "deviant" films I mention all
concern single women who are initially misrecognized as being resigned to their
failure of heterosexual monogamy. But eventually, each of these women is
recognized as displaying an hysterical inability to situate herself within this
status, and as having a pathological jealousy of another woman achieving such
a normative status. The "symptoms" of such hysteria are, in each woman's
case, attempts to murder both the man with whom they are sexually obsessed
and the other woman whose heterosexuality is properly fulfilled by relation to
this man. The misrecognition which occurs with each hysteric woman concerns
her successful internalization of her sexual status; each is misrecognized as
sane. The more-or-less constant equation made by these films is, therefore, of
non-heterosexuality/monogamy with insanity.
In each of the three deviant films there are several crucial moments of
recognition at which the pathological character of the hysterical woman’s
sexuality is revealed through a failure to "pass." These slips are of the
classically Freudian sort: slips of the tongue, and loss of composure at
apparently insignificant moments. As is generally the convention in "thriller"
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type films, the audience is always given a clue to the true nature of the events
in the film prior to realization by the protagonists, but never immediately or all at
once. Let us briefly trace this pattern in each of the films; we'll go in chronologi-
cal order, following the direction of influence.
In Fatal Attraction, Glen Close plays Alex Forest, an apparently
successful, sexually-attractive and well-balanced single woman in her thirties,
who shortly into the film has a "casual" affair with a married associate Dan
Gallagher (Mike Douglas). The audience first sees a fissure in the face of her
normalization of her sexual status when she rather insistently asks Dan to
spend a second day with her after their initial night together; but this is a very
minor matter, showing Alex only ever-so-slightly less sexually confident than
we had initially believed. Step by step following this, however, Alex more and
more desperately pursues a continuation of this sexual relation with Dan (later
partially because of her pregnancy, which resulted from their affair), clearly
expressing a fantasy of becoming re-normalized in a heterosexually
monogamous relationship (to him). As this status is blocked by the existence of
Dan's wife, Beth, Alex makes increasingly violent and pathological attacks
against Dan and Beth.
The crucial thing to observe about Fatal Attraction, for the purposes of
this essay, is that both Alex's "true" categorization and her "apparent"
one— i.e. both an hysterical/compulsive relation to an ego-ideal, and a fully
normalized such relation — fall easily within the categories of a post-Freudian
Symbolic Order. Although Alex's "true" identity as a deranged killer, and failed
woman, are certainly negatively valuated, they are nonetheless well within the
system of valuation. Something valued negatively— even negatively in the
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extreme— is still valued
;
and hence Alex's pathology in itself is not even
deviant. Normativity values normality and its opposites with equal facility.
Where Alex s deviance arises is with her ruse to normality, her effort to "pass,"
and with the misrecognition such a ruse creates in the audience and characters.
The several moments of saturated transition in Fatal Attraction, insofar
as they can be considered relative to Alex's imaginary construction of an ideal
ego, are perfectly inauthentic. We can safely identify two or three moments
satured in Alex's subjectivity. These include the first sexual contacts with Dan;
the moment when she discovers she is pregnant; and possibly when Dan firmly
refuses acknowledgement of responsibility for her pregnancy. These three
moments give the meaning to those infinity of moments in between each, and
mark ontological transitions in Alex's way of being: first from non-intimacy to
intimacy with Dan; second from sterility to natality; third from presuming a
relation with Dan to being a scorned woman. None of these categories, of
course, are ones which I would apply personally, but such are roughly the
ideological terms within which the film is set.
What we must notice about the several moments of ontological
transformation in Fatal Attraction is that all are possible— all are, in fact, broadly
stereotypical, and rather banal. The three moments are all illocutionary insofar
as their outcomes are quite conventional. In other words, although these
moments are unquestionably saturated according to the meaning I have tried to
give that term, they are also inauthentic. We shall see, however, when I discuss
Thelma and Louise, the possibility of the presentation of a non-conventional
saturation.
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It should be possible here to mention the two other hysterical films only
very briefly, since they follow the pattern-from the point of view of my
analysis
— of Fatal Attraction. Differences exist in the details, naturally, but if
anything, both The Hand That Rocks the Cradle and Single White Female play
through conventionality and deviance still more clearly than does Fatal
Attraction.
In The Hand That Rocks the Cradle, Rebecca DeMorney plays Payton
Flanders. Near the beginning of the film, the compulsively heterosexual “good"
protagonist, Claire Bartel, makes allegations of sexual impropriety against her
doctor, whom we learn retroactively to be Payton’s former husband
.
98 This Dr.
Mont then commits suicide under the burden of a likely criminal prosecution
against him for sexual abuse . 99 Payton, when she first appears on-screen,
applies for a nannie position with the Bartels; which she is offered since she
appears the very epitome of normalized subjectivity. In every way she appears
haute middle-class and heterosexual; and appears to have fully integrated the
death of her husband. Naturally, this proves not to be so; and soon enough she
is busy preparing various efforts to murder family members, steal the children,
98
Actually, this is not quite right. Although the fact that Payton was married to the Dr.
Mont against whom Claire made allegations is not overtly spoken until near the end of the
film, it would be extremely difficult for any intelligent viewer to miss this obvious "plot
twist" for more than the first five minutes after Payton first appears on screen. But
perhaps the retroactivity applies, nonetheless, to the knowledge of Claire or her husband
Michael. To the viewer, the "twist" is given away by Payton's very early line, "My
husband was the only one who understood me. He took care of me. He was murdered." In
addition to revealing the remaining course of the film, this line also makes almost
indisputable my hysteric reading of the film.
99The nature of Dr. Mont's crime is itself rather indicative of the compulsive and
pathological nature of the normalized heterosexuality represented in the film. Dr. Mont is a
gynecologist, and his crime is not committed through any act outside of his professional
duties, but simply in enjoying the gynecological exams he performs.
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and seduce the husband, Michael. Such is the price of the single life. Almost
needless to say, the discontinuities in Payton's symbolic role are merely deviant;
and her moments of saturation (chiefly her husband's suicide) are narrowly
conventional.
Sing'e White Female again repeats the pattern I have described twice. A
single woman, seemingly almost excessively well integrated into her sexual
status, turns out to have an hysterical inability to occupy this status. Jennifer
Jason Leigh s character is slowly revealed to have a pathological jealousy of her
roommate s heterosexual grounding, which is eventually expressed in various
attempts to murder the various figures in the drama. In a slight variation on the
previous themes, Single White Female is somewhat ambiguous as to what
status Leigh s character holds as an ideal ego: whether lesbian or heterosexual.
But the non-fulfillment of either one is shown more-or-less inevitably to result in
a symptomatic violence. The play of misrecognition/recognition of insane
murderous intent follows the same pattern of deviance I have discussed; and
the moments saturated from the hysteric's perspective fall under the same
conventionality.
Transgression and Utopia
Why is Ridley Scott's film, Thelma and Louise, different? It is the story
of two "women" who, during several saturated moments invisible to the (male)
Symbolic Order, flee ontologically from the overcoding of "womanhood." Such,
anyway, is my utopian reading which is rejected by every character able to
"live" until the end of the film; and rejected perhaps even more strongly by the
audience, who anxiously try retroactively to make sense of the events in the
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film. According to this retroactive, anti-utopian Symbolic reading by the
audience, whatever Thelma and Louise did, they did having already been, at the
beginning of the film, women for whom these actions were possible-given only
the correct antecedent events. Thelma (Gina Davis) and Louise (Susan
Sarandon) are two normatively heterosexual (in monogamous relationships)
women who leave for a brief vacation without “their men." In the course of
driving to their destination, there is an attempted rape of Thelma, which is
prevented by Louise, who shoots to death the attempted-rapist. Fugitives from
the law— juridical and Symbolic — for the remainder of the film, Thelma and
Louise commit several more criminal" acts, ranging from armed robbery, to
arson, to assault on a police officer. Eventually, they decide to drive over a cliff
rather than submit to apprehension by the police. The entire film is permeated
by the homo-affective relationship between Thelma and Louise, though it never
quite becomes openly sexual. In its overall form, the narrative closely matches
the pattern of a large number of “criminal" narratives, dating at least from the
many biographical portrayals of the famous “Bonnie and Clyde."
Outside of the familiar narrative of Thelma and Louise are several
moments less easily integrated into symbolic categorization. Clearly, categories
such as criminal, fugitive, or even — dare we say— lesbian fall easily within the
systems of valuation fully available before the film begins. These terms are
terms of condemnation, but are also symbolic categories which are quite
possible to occupy. But while the change between "normal" heterosexuality and
the "outlaw" status Thelma and Louise assume is deviant, it most certainly is
not transgressive.
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The several saturated moments during which they move into the new
status of criminality are, similarly, inauthentic. For example, at one wonderful
point in the film, Thelma threatens a police officer with a gun, in order to assure
their escape; and the moment when she takes the decision to do so clearly
represent a saturated moment in her definition of an ideal ego, relative to which
the valuation of obedience to the juridical State is reversed, or at least modified.
It is unquestionable that this saturated moment is a moment of liberation; and a
real change in de/ontological valuation and being occurs here. Nonetheless, the
position from which Thelma is valuated, her ego-ideal, does not change at this
moment. Simply to decide to disobey, rather than obey, the imperatives of the
State does not modify the construction of the State as the subject relative to
which obedience is defined. These interjections form, perhaps, a sort of
Burroughs cut-up of the text; a text already subjected to capricious
interventions by the Office of Degree Requirements. Moreover, the saturation of
the moment when obedience changes to disobedience is pretty well
conventional, given its frequent repetition in the mentioned "criminal"
narratives, to whose genre this film belongs.
Authenticity and transgression occur only at the non-stereotypical
moments of the film. A scene showing an a-conventional discontinuity in the
subjectivity of Louise's character concerns, not the various transitions to
criminality, but rather a kind of lapse of femininity. This lapse, however, is not a
lapse which simply transforms Louise from femininity to some other identifiable
category. It rather exists as a pure exception to symbolic coding. About midway
through the film, after Thelma and Louise's fugitive status has already been
established, Louise starts to use a car mirror to put on lipstick; looks over at a
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group of people in a diner window who are halfway looking back at her; then
casually throws her lipstick away. What occurs at this moment is that Louise,
seeing the position from which she is seen-her ego-ideal- simply abandons her
relation to this position. In Lacanian analysis, such an abnegation is known as
psychosis.
From the point of view of the Symbolic Order, during Louise's
"psychotic" break nothing whatsoever has happened. This moment is not even
deviant; it does not represent, for example, feminist critiques which have been
made of the use of makeup— which might be deviant insofar as they attempt to
reverse the valuation given to makeup. But Louise does not attempt to reverse
valuation, she simply abandons it! She does not critique a positive valuation of
wearing lipstick, she refuses valuation itself. It is only such an abandonment of
valuation that I describe as transgression. 100 Misrecognition and recognition do
not make sense relative to an act of transgression, since one neither starts as,
nor becomes, any possible thing to be correctly recognized or not. Louise is not
first misrecognized under the label "feminine," then later correctly recognized
under some other label ("non-feminine"). The category with which Louise breaks
is simply meaningless as a result of the break. Though if insistently coded, she
remains exactly what she was previous to it, since nothing has happened.
Consider, finally, the moment I have described from the imaginary side of
saturation. Louise's sudden non-valuation of femininity provides an
homogeneous grounding for the rest of the film. It is saturated in the sense I
100Of relevance also in this regard, is the notion I try to develop of revolutionary ennui
in my discussions of Butler's hetero-normativity. See page 250.
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have defined the term. But there is nothing illocutionary about Louise's act: it
was not possible in advance.
After Utopia
The films which follow Thelma and Louise- those two I want to discuss,
anyway-start with an interesting reversal of the deviance "genre", and thereby
the same reversal of our transgression film. Where the four films described
already each had unexpected and unchosen events which served to push the
characters out of a normalized bourgeois heterosexuality, all the main
characters in both Leaving Normal and Boys on the Side succeed in normalizing
their own (utopian) subjectivities precisely where they eschew voluntary
decision. Even more than the many cinematographic, plot, musical and citational
references to Thelma and Louise in both films
,
101 the theme of liberation
resulting from a forclosure of choice seems borrowed from Scott's film. Of
course, this is perhaps the wrong message to draw from Thelma and Louise,
whose title characters, after all, drove off a cliff at the end. More important for
the analysis in this chapter, is that Leaving Normal and Boys on the Side tell
stories whose conclusions are the subjectivation of their characters into
successful, possible and achieved feminist subjectivities, outside the bourgeois
101 Thelma and Louise, Leaving Normal, and Boys on the Side are all "road movies"
about women driving away from somewhere they can't stay. The last has a strikingly
similar genre of music accompanying the road scenes to the first, and the Southwest
geography assumes a plot and metaphorical significance in both. Christine Lahti, in Leaving
Normal even looks strikingly like Susan Sarandon in Thelma and Louise. While one probably
cannot attribute the entirety of the physical similarity of the actors to any intentional
reference, the hair-style and clothing of the characters accentuate the connection, as does
a rather similar relationship to cigarettes in the characters (both attitudinal and in the
physiognomic acts of smoking). A number of other similarities could surely be cataloged,
but need not here.
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heterosexual matrix taken seriously by the deviance films or ruptured by the
transgression film.
Where both Leaving Normal and Boys on the Side start is where Thelma
and Louise started: with a preliminary setup which puts the main characters on
the road, driving to somewhere they think they want to go. In all three, the sets
of women never quite make it where they started out toward (in Leaving
Normal, the geographic location which is reached turns out to have been based
on a misrecognition, which amounts to the same thing). The failure to reach a
destination in each case results from external events which stand in the way of
volition. Such an abandonment of choice is an explicit intention in Leaving
Normal, and a moral explicitly drawn at the end. However, unlike in Thelma and
Louise, the protagonists of Leaving Normal and Boys on the Side wind up
somewhere-, and that somewhere turns out to be where they belonged- where
they could accomplish a stable valuation of self-all along. The utopian and
feminist message of these movies rests on the fact that these valuations are
not defined in relation to marital heterosexuality (some of the characters are
heterosexual, but in no case is dependence/relation to a man a main catergory
of valuation by herself, or her millieu). Rather, the two sets of protagonists in
Leaving Normal and Boys on the Side find primary affective bonds between
themselves, as women, and form alternative familial and social structures
around themselves.
In another sense, where Leaving Normal and Boys on the Side start is
precisely where Thelma and Louise ended. None of the main characters in these
two movies start in a state of heterosexual normality, as do those in the other
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four films herein discussed
.
102
Rather, where they all start is with an
abandonment of this normality, precisely the abondonment within which Thelma
and Louise died. The jokes, musings, and fantasies I have often heard
suggesting a sequel to Thelma and Louise are answered in this way by Leaving
Normal and Boys on the Side. These are the characters of Thelma and Louise,
had they lived to make sequels (at least in their relationship to normative
heterosexuality as discussed in this essay). Where the characters start is with
an uncertain, not-quite-normalized subjectivity-they are not quite sure how
they fit into a Symbolic Order, but they know it is not in the fantastic position
postulated by the deviance films. Where the characters end is with a full
normalization, but with a normalization into a primarily female-identified, and not
mostly sexually defined, utopian subjective position. The moral of these films,
read in the context I give, seems to be that once transgressed, there is no same
heterosexual normality to go back to; and hence the (filmic) possibility of
transgression is forclosed once again (at least vis. one particular normativity).
102An objection could be made here relative to the character Holly (Drew Barrymore) in
Boys on the Side. Holly is perfectly heterosexual, and never really fails to fit into this
position. However, although Barrymore's performance is quite wonderful, I think it makes
sense to think of Holly not so much as a character in herself, but as a precipitating
event— a force of nature. The drama of the film is between Jane (Whoopi Goldberg) and
Robin (Mary Louise Parker), and in each's development.
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Every revolution appears impossible before it occurs; and
inevitable afterwards. [Unknown attribution]
Whither Romantic I n\,*?
Richard White, in an APA conference paper I had the opportunity to
comment on, d.scusses, "The Future of Romantic Love" [White, 1995], White's
point in this paper is that romantic love presents a false alternative to the
normatively autonomous subject of our post-Kantian societies. Romantic love,
White believes, quite contrary to its pretense of erasing the boundaries of
subjects is actually one of the puzzle-pieces in the construction of this same
post-Kantian subjectivity. This much seems true enough.
When one thinks a bit about just what romantic love does in support of
an overtly contrary autonomous subject, I think one reaches a few points where
White does not really specify an answer; at least not in the mentioned paper. In
particular, at least two rather different paradigms for understanding the joint
social function of overt contraries come to my mind. Readers will, not doubt,
think of some more beyond these two.
One sort of support for autonomous subjectivity which romantic love
might provide is as a sort of release valve" for the excessive pressure in the
demands of subjectivity. White makes several remarks which come close to this
kind of metaphor for the relation of subjectivity and romantic love. Under this
metaphor, and keeping in mind White's insistence on an historical conditioning,
one might then place romantic love as another element within a parallel series of
"disciplinary techniques" such as prisons and hospitals, which Foucault, for
example, examines. One might here imagine that each twist and turn of
historically and politically determined normative subjectivity produces both its
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inherent resistances and a set of techniques for controlling those resistances.
Romantic love might then be one technique for the diffusion of anti-autonomous
rebellion against bourgeois subjectivity.
The thing to notice in the above account is that it places both a temporal
and causal priority on subjectivity over romantic love. Subjectivity is the hot
political topic and the contested terrain, while romantic love is merely one
ideological weapon used in the campaign. Interject (dear reader...): the text
actually written, and that approved by the signing committee, can only be found
at the web site indicated in the acknowledgment, not in the pages in your
hands. Another story one might tell, which seems equally hinted at by White, is
a more structuralist tale in which romantic abandon becomes the very symbolic
flip-side of subjective autonomy. In this story, subjectivity and romantic love are
both coeval and co-causal. In one variation of the story, romantic love belongs
to a Saussurian chain of oppositions for autonomous subjectivity, so that the
meaning itself of subjectivity depends on its opposite marker, romantic love.
This variation demands neither that there are not also other important defining
opposites for romantic love, nor that either subjectivity or romantic love do not
participate in social mechanisms beyond semantics. But the Saussurian version
of the structuralist tale of romance and subjects certainly demands a rather
closer linking of the two than one could allow in the Foucauldian description of
romantic love as a disciplinary technique. In the Saussurian narrative, one
cannot wrest either the monological centrality of subjectivity nor the loose
teleology which the Foucauldian mechanism might allow.
There is, it seems to me, another possible variation on our structuralist
tale. Rather than as an indifferent opposition, romantic love might function as a
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sort of "dark side" or "necessary repression" for the emergence of a particular
type of bourgeois subjectivity. Whether one finds convenient a metaphor of
Jekyll and Hyde, or one of a Freudian Ego emergent from the conflict of Id with
Superego, one could tell a certain structuralist story in which what made up
bourgeois subjectivity was neither pure autonomy nor romantic abandon, but
rather the overtly unworkable conjoining of the two.
I am not much committed to any of these stories in particular. No doubt
it should be possible to give additional accounts of the way romantic love and
autonomous subjectivity relate. I think my concern is that I cannot really
become convinced of the necessary sublation, or forgetting, or overthrow, of
romantic love until I have a bit more specific theory of how romantic love
relates to bourgeois subjectivity in the first place than White has really given us.
I quite heartily endorse his observation that the two really support each other. I
agree that romantic notions of "abandonment of self in a beloved" are facile at
best, and more likely a socially significant ruse. But more needs to be said here.
Several things raise my suspicion about White's account, and prompt me
to ask for a more specific theorization. First, and perhaps foremost of these is
the seemingly panglossian sentiment White espouses regarding romantic love's
successor(s). Let us grant some not uncommon wisdom that modernist
subjectivity is on the outs; and grant further that whither goes subjectivity
thither romantic love. We are assured at several points that "the decline of
romantic love must inevitably open up the space for new and more authentic
forms of relationship" and the like. But why on earth should this be the case?
Why not assume, quite the contrary, that with the dissolution of bourgeois
ideologies of autonomy, yet more inauthentic forms of human relationship will
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replace or succeed romantic love? Perhaps White and I are merely
temperamentally differently inclined, but I have no trouble envisioning a world in
which the primary basis for adult affective relations becomes an economic
necessity for pooled-wages. As much of the infrastructural reality of
(heterosexual) romantic love has rested on economic battles over a male family-
wage earner (and female domesticity), much of it might rest, in the future, on
the inadequacy of falling wages to support this model. Such (not sol
hypothetical relations might certainly involve focussed affection and concern as
White requires of love. I would certainly maintain that this new type of "love"
would be different from a past romantic love, but it is not clear what might
make it thereby "more authentic".
To be clear: I do not wish to suggest that a wage-driven model of
"postmodern" love is the only possible one. There might well be others to
replace romantic love which are genuinely more authentic, rewarding and
liberatory. But even given the correctness of critiques of romantic love, a
diagnosis of the downfall of one form of oppression hardly in itself clears the
path to a liberated future. Bad sometimes goes to worse, and only sometimes to
better.
Another suspicion: White seems at points really not to take his historicist
and structuralist admonitions seriously. If romantic love's "conceptual analysis"
really is "inseparable from [its] historical genealogy" then we really cannot hope
to define romantic love in either phenomenological or psychological terms.
Certainly, a strict historicism hardly prohibits phenomenological or psychological
conjoins with romantic love as a social process. But it seems a bit off the mark
to go on a definitional search for romantic love in epiphenomenal mental realms.
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At a sort of micro level, a passing remark by White seems well to illustrate this
difference. He says, [W]hen I say that I love my country or that I love my new
car, it s not clear that my state of mind is directly analogous to the passion that
I might feel for another person." Perhaps not. But if not, this is a question just
of psychological statistics. What if I do happen to feel identically towards my
car as toward my lover? The pathological nature of such a feeling cannot, I
think, be a question of its phenomenological quality. Rather, this is not "true"
romantic love because of its failure of conformity with a normative socio-
historical construction of romantic love. That's what an historicist perspective
would tell us; and common-sense would happen to concur on this. The point
here is that if a social normativity can disqualify a phenomenologically genuine
romantic love, than perhaps what makes romantic love is not mental, but social.
White mostly agrees about this, but then does not quite pin down what
romantic love really is in socio-historical terms.
I think White's early mention of Roland Barthes points in a helpful
direction. For whatever critiques can and should be made of romantic love, my
own feeling is that one is better off analyzing it more in terms of its internal
semiotic system than by way of its function in covertly supporting bourgeois
subjectivity. Lots of things support bourgeois subjectivity at various levels.
Somehow that doesn't seem quite sufficient to really get at the quiddity of
romantic love. What I would find preferable— no doubt after an
acknowledgement of the ideological apparatus of romantic love— would be
something more about the particular internal organization of romantic love.
Certainly we all fall-in-love, and organize this experience, in remarkably similar
ways, as White observes following Barthes. But just what is the logic and
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structure of these ways of falling-in-love? What does this semiotic resemble?
For example, are the various oppositions and structures which stereotype
romantic love more like a language, like etiquette conventions, or like traffic
signals, to name but a few other semiotic systems?
One consequence, I think, of asking about romantic love as a semiotic
system is a possible separation of its synchronic and diachronic dimensions,
although White eschews this. A semiotic has a history, but it also has a distinct
momentary structure. I must confess here, that I have a guilty reason for trying
to bring in a separation of synchronic dimension of romantic love: I have my
own take, partial though it is, on a phenomenological centrality of certain
"special" moments in the constitution of subjectivity. Falling-in-love can be one
such moment.
I have tried elsewhere to take a certain inspiration from Walter
Benjamin's division of homogeneous linear from messianic time, but to
miniaturize this distinction onto a phenomenological level. What I have in mind
is the notion that certain "saturated" moments of experience present
themselves as outside of the normal temporal course of our lives by marking
ontological changes in our being. At certain moments we go from being one
type of person to another type, and the experience of those moments is not
groundable with a causal continuity of experience. Mind you, most such
moments are perfectly predictable, banal, and in most cases probably openly
reactionary. But they have these qualities only from the social framework
outside the transformed subject.
Consider, as an example of saturation, the moment when we "fall-in-
love"— with all those grand particular nothings which have adhered to that
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moment since the Renaissance. We remember the every appearance of our
beloved at that moment, the exact hue of the lighting, the song playing, the
very second of the time at which it happened; the love adheres to our beloved
in his every idiosyncracy, his every particular feature becomes the very reason
we love him. I should interject here, although Derrida might accuse me of
logocentnsm, that what you hold is not my actual document, but a mutilation
produced largely by the Office of Degree Requirements. From the perspective of
the symbolic/causal order, nothing in this moment is inexplicable or special: if
the light was of just such a hue that is only because the sun was in that
particular position behind the clouds, and anyway, had it been different that
difference would have had the same personal significance; our true love has just
these particular features, but most of these could have been predicted perhaps
years previously from our own class, family, language, appearance, etc. — and
those few not so predictable are ones for which we would have substituted
others had they not been present. Still, none of its causal/symbolic predictability
makes our moment of love any less personally saturated. Perhaps the light could
have been different, but it wasn t! Perhaps our beloved could have been
another, but he isn't! The saturation of that moment is visible only from within a
perspective which includes the experience of that moment; the moment is
invisible, or at least vacuous, from without.
My narrative, of course, sounds like a perfectly ordinary romantic eulogy
to the splendors of love of the sort which concludes with love's liberatory
grace. That's not at all the point I would like to make. These saturated moments
so eulogized are reactionary at best, and trite at worst. But the very
phenomenological specialness of these trite moments seems to have an
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importantly inevitable position in a bourgeois/Kantian subjectivity. My feeling is
that rather than as the rather accidental "escape valve" of subfectivity,
exceptional moments like those of falling-in-love are the rather necessary
abscesses in the transcendental unity of aperception.
I am all with White in hoping for an end of romantic love, and in
agreement that this end has something to do with an end of modernity. But I
think that the change in subjectivity intertwined with these ends is greater than
that White probably thinks. It is not just a matter of postmodern lovers valuating
autonomy differently. It is likely a matter of the next subjects constituting the
world in other than a Kantian causal order!
The Hegemony of Heterosexuality
For Judith Butler,
What in Lacan would be called 'sexed positions,' and what some
of us might more easily call 'gender,' appears to be secured
through the depositing of non-heterosexual identifications in the
domain of the culturally impossible. [Butler, 1990, p.1 1 1],
According to this logic, homosexuality is not fully repudiated, but is rather
abjectly maintained in its necessity for maintaining the psychic structure of
sexuation. Specifically, Butler utilizes the Lacanian distinction between the
Imaginary and the Symbolic to maintain that homosexual desire is inherently an
Imaginary possibility, but is a possibility which must be performatively
repudiated with assumption of a subjective position in the Symbolic register.
This repudiation of homosexual desire is by no means a mere developmental
step which is done once, then over with. Rather, this repudiation is repeatedly
invoked with every act of speech from within a sexed position — since
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homosexual desire is, according to the dictates of the Symbolic Order truly
"that love which cannot speak its name."
Contained in Butler's analysis of "sexuation through abjection of
homosexuality" is a critique of feminist/queer theorists who have maintained
that homosexuality is a way out of the trap of gender (they are not named, but
implicitly Wittig and Irigaray are the targets). By allowing that the condition of
homosexual desire is a retreat to a purely Imaginary register, exclusive of
speech within the Symbolic, such theorists fail to challenge-and perhaps even
strengthen
— the dictates of a compulsorily heterosexual Symbolic Order. It is
less than clear what the positive content of Butler's critique is, however. While
she points to the "tacit cruelties that sustain coherent identity (p.1 1 5)," she
nonetheless does not suggest that identity is to be denied, overcome, erased
(p.1 17)." What, then, are we to do with these cruel identities ? Butler hints that
if not merely suffered, options might be to parody or destabilize identities. The
option not occurring, I think, to Butler in her systematizing binarism of totalizing
identity or unachievable anti-identitarianism, is simply to ignore identity— what I
would like to call a "strategic indifference" or "revolutionary ennui." Perhaps the
dictates of cruel identities can simply be suspended (in the sense of a
suspended musical chord as much as in that of a postponed event) without
mounting an impossible challenge to a totalizing compulsory
heterosexuality/sexuation.
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In an airplane hijacking, the threat of a hijacker brandishing a
revolver is obviously an action; so is the execution of the
hostages, if it occurs. But the transformation of the passengers
into hostages, and of the plane-body into a prison-body, is an
instantaneous incorporeal transformation, a "mass media act”
in the sense in which the English speak of "speech acts."
[Deleuze and Guattari, 1987
, p.81 ]
The Immediate Imam
Many of the ideas that I have presented in this document— particularly
those of an ontological, or onto-political, sort are also presented by the
pseudonymous anarchist theorist Hakim Bey. I think it worthwhile to provide a
few pages of discussion of Bey's work. A number of themes I have developed
are argued by Bey, but from a somewhat different perspective. In terms of
organization, I will simply discuss a few elements from each of his books, in the
order of their publication.
The Temporary Autonomous Zone
The Temporary Autonomous Zone (TAZ) is a tactic of disappearance, a
strategy of invisibility, within a totalized ideology of visibility and of the faux-
presence of the Spectacle. Bey, in all his writings, uses highly spatial
metaphors/metonyms of society, control, resistance and transgression (where
my own imagery more often focuses on different types of times, and sometimes
of DeleuzeGuattarian flows). Within Bey's imagic framework, a TAZ is an
interstice of the possible. Totalization is spatially described as filling out to all
possible boundaries— quite literally in certain aspects, as with the expansion of
State territorial claim to every point of the globe by the start of the 20th
Century— but totality, or the Spectacle, is not thereby necessarily dense (in a
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mathematical or solid-state physics sense). There is no region unaccounted for
by totalization, but there are spaces.’ 03
Within the essays of TAZ. Bey casts TAZ as the only strategy of free
activity currently possible (this changes, however, somewhat, in Bey's later
writing),
Absolutely nothing but a futile martyrdom could possibly result
now from a head-on collision with the terminal State. ..we're not
touting the TAZ as an exclusive end in itself, replacing all other
forms of organization, tactics, and goals. We recommend it
because it can provide the quality of enhancement associated
with the uprising without necessarily leading to violence and
martyrdom. The TAZ is like an uprising which does not engage
directly with the State, a guerilla operation which liberates an area
(or land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-
form elsewhere/elsewhen, before the State can crush it. Because
the State is concerned primarily with Simulation rather than
substance, the TAZ can "occupy" these areas clandestinely and
carry on its festal purposes for quite a while in relative
peace— Babylon takes its abstractions for realities; precisely
within this margin of error the TAZ can come into existence. ...As
soon as the TAZ is named (represeneted, mediated), it must
vanish, it will vanish, leaving behind it an empty husk, only to
spring up again somewhere else, once again invisible because
undefinable in terms of the Spectacle. [Bey, 1991, p. 1 00- 101]
As I characterized, TAZ is concerned with a disappearance. This disappearance
is a bit different than those written about by Baudrillard, Lyotard, Foucault and
others. Rather than an idea disappearing as an ablation within an ideology
103One could easily model the spatial metaphor more precisely with fractal descriptions
(which Bey toys with at points). A variety of images based on shapes such as the Cantor
Set could bring in specifics of the relative density and measure of TAZ versus Spectacle
within the social space; different historical situations could resemble different such
distributions and densities. While this kind of imagery is in some ways rich, and the
concepts it provides are worthwhile, it would be counterproductive to try to mathematize
the spatial metaphor to the point of actually measuring properties of different historical
times and places in comparisons with each other, beyond the broadest comparisons in the
metaphor.
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(particularly one in which the idea is a founding principle in some way), the
disappearance of TAZ is tactical rather than global. The TAZ is concerned with
little ways of not-being within the ideological edifice of the is.
One TAZ might be Bob Black's Zerowork concept [Black, 1993 ] A
simple removal of oneself from "the economy" makes one invisible to this
totality. Certainly, the State has had its mechanisms to colonize and take over
this realm of non-work: vagrancy laws, anti-welfare laws, property tax, etc. But
there remain a variety of interstices within which many people have simply
refused to play that game (squatters, communes, drop-out artists). While not
opposing per se the resistances of strikes, organizing, sabotage, and other
workerist resistances, Zerowork does present a "third way" in which, as much
as it successfully diseppeers
,
the physical violence of State clampdown is
avoided or transgressed.
Although Bey does not seem to have contemplated it, I think another
TAZ might exist by "hiding in the light." The very success of totality at points
seems to undermine its own coopting and oppressive mechanisms. I hardly
want to claim some revolutionary insight or discursively transgressive radicalism
to my recent mode-of-being. But there is something interesting I have observed
of late. Over a variety of misgivings and rationalizations, and for all kinds of
obvious reasons, recently I worked in the belly of the beast. I was not quite
building bombs or smashing heads, but I did perform wage labor at a big and
bad corporation. I worked in a right-wing state, in a right-wing nation, mostly
with people who believe lunatic right-wing Christian ramblings. And yet, I am in
no way "closeted," nor even taciturn, about such matters as being a Marxist (or
athiest, vigorously anti-natalist, opposed to marriage and the family, pro-queer,
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and so on). Most remarkably, this non-hidden heterodoxy does not even result
in informal negative biases against me by the crazies who were my colleagues.
These facts are the results of several things. Obviously, all kinds of
privilege are at play here: race, gender, education, and also (most strongly,
I
think) the fact that I have techno-instrumental skills in great demand. At a
certain level, the fact that I speak frankly where most other folks otherwise
similarly situated remain politic, is a precondition of the facts mentioned. But
aside from the above preconditions, there is a curious phenomenon at play.
Capitalist triumphalism has rendered my Marxist beliefs wholly non-integratible
into the world-view of ordinary folks. Again, to interject, please find the
dissertation as actually written via the web site indicated in the
acknowledgments. Say what I like, my particular profession of opposition to the
mechanisms of totality no longer appears as a threat and a taint. In fact,
Marxism is capable of being correctly understood at an epistemic level by my
colleagues 104 while remaining simply a gap within the liminal economy of their
ideological schemes. I suspect that the "invisibility of the overt"-as a structural
possibility-which I have encountered has been at play in a variety of times and
places other than that I occupy.
Within a TAZ (to put it spatially), Bey's hope is for transgressions which
satisfy more genuine human desires. He invokes the concept Poetic Terrorism
(PT) to describe this,
104Obviously, their understanding is indicated in a fairly general sense. The folks I
worked with know that Marxism has concepts such as the workers revolution, the
opposition of labor to capital, base and superstructure, etc. The comparative arcana that I
might write or read in Marxist academic journals would be lost to them. But then, that
would be no less true of the not-specifically-Marxist articles I might read/write about, say,
comparison of the ontological thought of Duns Scotus and Spinoza.
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Weird dancing in all-night computer-banking lobbies. Unauthorized
pyrotechnic displays. Land-art, earth-works as bizarre alien
artifact strewn in State Parks. Burglarize houses but instead of
stealing, leave Poetic-Terrorist objects. Kidnap someone & make
them happy.
...Bolt up brass commemorative plaques in places
(public or private) where you have experienced a revelation or had
a particularly fulfilling sexual experience, etc.
...Organize a strike in
your school or workplace on the grounds that it does not satisfy
your need for indolence & spiritual beauty.
...The audience
reaction or aesthetic-shock produced by PT ought to be at least
as strong as the emotion of terror-powerful disgust, sexual
arousal, superstitious awe, sudden intuitive breakthrough, dada-
esque angst— no matter whether the PT is aimed at one person or
many, no matter whether it is "signed" or anonymous, if it does
not change someone's life (aside from the artist) it fails. [Bey,
1991, p.4-5]
There are two aspects, to my thinking, in Poetic Terrorism. On the one hand,
PT's are characterized by their non-commodification, and their non-subservience
to instrumental rationality. There is nothing useful about PT, not even from the
point-of-view of a libidinal economy of organs. That is, we might here borrow a
DeluezeGuatarrian notion of organs as the points which regulate and coagulate
flows. The Spectacle's libidinal economy, its Marcusian repressive
desublimation [Marcuse, 1992], formulates desires in terms of their stoppages,
not their flows. PT's are not about having i.e. art, but about performing it. PT
stands on the side of potentialities, not of realizations/alienations. It is not, of
course, that PT is simply ideal, simply in the conception, but that even the
concretion of PT realizes further potentialities, rather than aims at its own
completion.
The other aspect of PT I would draw attention to is its mode of effect.
PT aims to do something to transform someone, its recipient— or in the State's
language of terrorism, its victim. The mode in which PT does something is not
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epistemic, or even phroenetic, but mimetic. The effect does not represent, but
continues, the act. The critical force of PT is not to critique the Spectacle, but
to move someone to a place-a state of mind, if you will-where the Spectacle,
even if only for a moment, does not operate. The PT, as its name well indicates,
operates not at the level of ideology, but at the level of terrorism. In a pithy
characterization, Bey remarks, "Art tells gorgeous lies that come true. [Bey,
1991, p.40]"
Emphasizing the mode of effect of PT, Bey provides the symmetrical
concept of Art Sabotage,
Art Sabotage is the dark side of Poetic Terrorism
— creation-
through-destruction... A-S goes beyond paranoia, beyond
deconstruction
— the ultimate criticism — physical attack on
offensive art— aesthetic jihad.... A-S seeks to damage institutions
which use art to diminish consciousness & profit by delusion...
Muzak is designed to hypnotize & control — its machinery can be
smashed. ...Public book burnings— why should rednecks &
Customs officials monopolize this weapon? Novels about children
possessed by demons; the New York Times bestseller list;
feminist tracts against pornography; schoolbooks (especially
Social Studies, Civics, Health); piles of New York Post, Village
Voice & other supermarket papers; choice gleanings of Xtian
publishers; a few Harlequin Romances — a festive atmosphere,
wine-bottles & joints passed around on a clear autumn afternoon.
[Bey, 1991, p.12]
Within the overall scheme of TAZ's, an A-S is a bulldozer which clears a space
in the Spectacle for a TAZ. PT is the infiltration of TAZ into totality, a
rhizomatic shoot which might pop up again elsewhere when it has the
opportunity. Spaces will not stay cleared for long after A-S, but they will
momentarily. At least possibilities are opened before the Spectacle recuperates
control. Maybe enough space for a TAZ.
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An essay-or maybe a manifesto- within TAZ called "Resolution for the
1 990's: Boycott Cop Culture!!!" is a nice illustration of Bey's style of cultural
analysis. A number of TAZ themes are brought out.
If one fictional figure can be said to have dominated the popcult
of the eighties, it was the Cop....[T]he Cop Show has only three
characters
— victim, criminal, and policeperson
— but the first two
fail to be fully human-only the pig is real
.... Just as the murder-
mystery is always an exercise in sadism, so the cop-fiction
always involves the contemplation of control. The image of the
inspector or detective measures the image of "our" lack of
autonomous substance, our transparency before the gaze of
authority. Our perversity, our helplessness. Whether we imagine
them as "good" or "evil," our obsessive invocation of the eidolons
of the Cops reveals the extent to which we have accepted the
manicaean worldview they symbolize We propose an esoteric
hermeneutical exegesis of the Surrealist slogan "Mort aux
vaches!" We take it to refer not to the death of individual cops
("cows" in the argot of the period) — mere leftist revenge
fantasy— petty reverse sadism — but rather to the death of the
image of the flic, the inner Control. ..In this sense, then, we call
for a boycott of the image of the Cop, & a moratorium on its
production in art. [Bey, 1991, p.90-93]
As I read Bey's description — and also as I read the shows themselves— the Cop
Show acts as a colonization of independent thought. The Cop Show lures us
into an identificatory mechanism with the cops. What this does is transpose our
conception of the cops from the position of superego stand-in for the "reality"
of State violence 105
,
to that of ego-ideal. We are not just regulated by the
cops— even when regulation is an internalized psychic mechanism — our deepest
105Under a socialization of desire which is the regime of the Spectacle, our superego is
no longer an "internalization" of law. The immediacy of the internal is the realized social
order. And in the social, it is the monopoly use of legitimate force which enforces the
paternal law. It is not that we have passed into a Hobbesian absolutism of violence.
Obviously, force is not generally used in control; how could it be? But the flip side of
repressive desublimation is that a socially desublimated desire operates at exactly the
same level of external consciousness as does the cop. Our superego is no longer like a
little cop in our head, now it is a little cop in our head.
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identification and desire is to resemble the mechanism of regulation. We wish
we could be more like the mechanisms of our own psychic control.
Bey attacks particularly the fantasy fiction genre in which cops are
overall well-meaining, only a little racist, and hardly ever torture suspects. Hill
Street Blues is such a show from the recent past which Bey finds particularly
noxious. He is right, certainly. The very "street-realism" of shows of that sort,
which show the "dark underside" of police behavior, are a way of pretending
this dark underside is only as minimally brutal as what is shown in the TV
programs. Further, the "realism" clearly furthers the fantasy that the cops are
just folks like us which is surely the most noxious aspect. I might interject
here, in a pattern of almost extra-textual terrorism, that what you hold is not
my actual dissertation, but a mutilation produced largely by the Office of Degree
Requirements. But what I find still more frightening is the documentary style of
Cops or America's Most Wanted. In those, it is not just that a warm-and-fuzzy
cop fantasy is realized, but that the sick-and-brutal cop reality is fantasized.
These shows seem not even to hesitate in showing the most blatant abuses of
human rights and flagrant disregard for due process — all, presumably, to be met
by cheering fans watching the shows . 106 The live-footage documentary seems
106The television show which has probably had the greatest critical force, and at least
a limited subversive potential, in the last few years was MTV's Beavis and Butthead. This
is not to say that a lot of big caveats about the critical potential of any television should
not be attached here. But certainly a good number of moments on Beavis and Butthead
have provided analyses similar to those of Adorno or Debord. In particular, one episode
addressed just the kind of flattening of fantasy and violence in the documentary cop
shows which I discuss here. After committing some petty criminal vandalism, Beavis and
Butthead return to their home to watch a documentary-style cop show. The focus of the
cop-show episode is the search for Beavis and Butthead themselves. Beavis and Butthead,
of course, fail to recognize themselves as represented on the show, despite photographs
of them flashed on screen; and they voice sentiments about their hopes that the cops will
beat the hell out of the suspects. During the course of watching the cop-show, the cops
are pictured on the live-TV as breaking down Beavis and Butthead's door, which they then
do both within the TV-show and at the meta-level of Beavis and Butthead's actual
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to cause a perverse suspension-of-disbelief precisely where there should be no
disbelief to suspend.
Immediatism
Bey's book Immediatism (also sometimes titled, in part or whole, Radio
Sermonettes
)
further develops two themes beyond where TAZ left off: ways of
being in groups; and how mediation coopts. The concern of this book is a focus
on the possibilities for art and creativity, although insofar as there is a focus it
is not meant to separate "art" from something else, certainly not from
"politics." The second first...
The title essay is arranged as a series of numbered aphorism, much in
the style of Debord's book [Debord, 1983], The first proposition Bey presents
as background,
I. All experience is mediated-by the mechanisms of sense
perception, mentation, language, etc. — &certainly all art consists
of some futher mediation of experience. [Bey, 1994, p.7]
But there is more specificity here,
II. However, mediation takes place by degrees. Some experiences
(smell, taste, sexual pleasure, etc.) Are less mediated than others
(reading a book, looking through a telescope, listening to a
record). Some media, especially "live" arts such as dance,
theater, musical or bardic performances, are less mediated than
others such as TV, CDs, Virtual Reality. Even among the media
usually called "media," some are more & others are less
mediated, according to the intensity of imaginative participation
they demand. [Bey, 1994, p.7]
livingroom (yes, yes... they don't really have a livingroom, they're animated characters
which I in turn watched of my TV). The cops bust in, and start beating on Beavis and
Butthead with night-sticks. Beavis and Butthead, despite the beating, strain to continue
watching the cop-show on their TV, with great satisfaction that the TV suspects are now
being beaten on live TV, as per their hopes.
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The call of Immediatism is for the utilization of human creativity apart
from the coopting demands of mediation. Immediatist art-or simply activity,
since art is not a thing apart-is impermanent, direct, non-commodifiable, and,
significantly, hidden. In another aphorism Bey writes,
[W]e nevertheless declare without hesitation.
..the founding of a
"movement," IMMEDIATISM. We feel free to do so because we
intend to practice Immediatism in secret, in order to avoid any
contamination of mediation. Publicly we'll continue our work in
publishing, radio, printing, music, etc., but privately we will create
something else, something to be shared freely but never
consumed passively, something which can be discussed openly
but never understood by the agents of alienation, something with
no commercial potential yet valuable beyond price, something
occult yet woven completely into the fabric of our everyday lives.
[Bey, 1994, p.10]
These are utopian possibilities of a sort; possibilities which will have to be
changed somewhat with Millennium
,
as we will see below. But the utopian
moment here is the possibility of unmediated, or at least minimally mediated,
action which is possible exactly insofar as it does not enter the inauthenticity of
an ultimately-totalizing, and ultimately marked by commodification, mediation.
Bey's goal of invisibility is in some ways curiously easy,
Nowadays anything which evades the idiot gaze of publicity is
already virtually secret. Most modern people seem unable to
believe in the reality of something they never see on
television — therefore to escape being televisualized is already to
be quasi-invisible. Moreover, that which is seen through the
mediation of the media becomes somehow unreal, & loses its
power (I won't bother to defend this thesis but simply refers the
reader to a train of thought which leads from Nietzsche to
Benjamin to Bataille to Barthes to Foucault to Baudrillard). By
contrast, perhaps that which is unseen retains its reality, its
rootedness in everday life & therefore in the possibility of the
marvelous. [Bey, 1994, p . 1 5]
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One can create a kind of authenticity of one's expression simply by avoiding
mediation in transforming expression into representation. Those who do not
want their "15 minutes of fame" are almost below the threshhold where the
media bothers with cooptation. Then again, the temptation for recognition is a
nagging presence in our media circuit of false authenticities. All those pathetic
souls who perform rituals of stereotyped pettiness for daily talk-shows, for
example, presumably believe the con of expressive genuineness falling out of
the mediation by TV and "fame." Indeed, it seems that the content of their
performances are generally of the dissatisfaction they feel with the stereotyped
relations they then ape for the camera-in some kind of hope that the camera's
extra level of mediation will transform mediated falseness into emergent
expressiveness.
Even if we do not begin at the mediation of stereotype pantomimes in
our relations to others, the coopting force of "making a living" draws us in that
direction,
Suddenly it will appear to you (as if a demon had whispered it in
your ear) that the Immediatist art you've created is so good, so
fresh, so original, so strong compared to all the crap on the
"market" — so pure— that you could water it down & sell it, &
make a living at it, so you could all knock off WORK, buy a farm
in the country, & do art together for-ever after. And perhaps it's
true. [Bey, 1994, p. 22]
But eventually,
[T] he dream of each succeeding yesterday became the parlor
decor of every tomorrow — bought, chewed, reproduced, sold,
consigned to museums, libraries, universities, & other mausolea,
forgotten, lost, resurrected, turned into nostalgia-craze,
reproduced, sold, etc., etc., ad nauseam [Bey, 1994, p.42]
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Invisibility, and therefore a kind of resistive genuineness, seems easy at first
blush — and indeed it is. ..for a while-but overall movements, from Romanticism
to Surrealism to Situationism have historically succumbed to the cooptive
tendency of recognition, representation, and commodification.
Immediatism is a call to non-mediated expression, but also a call to
groups of certain sorts also buried under mediated Capitalism.
Immediatism means to enhance individuals by providing a matrix
of friendship, not to bellitle them by sacrificing their "ownness" to
group-think, leftist self-abnegation, or New Age clone-values.
What must be overcome is not individuality per se, but rather the
addiction to bitter loneliness which characterizes consciousness in
the 20th century. [Bey, 1994, p.19]
Capitalism, for Bey,
...only supports certain kinds of groups, the nuclear family for
example, or the people I know at my job," because such groups
are already self-alienated & hooked into the Work/Consume/Die
structure. ...We're not kidding or indulging in hyperbole when we
insist that meeting-face-to-face is already "the revolution." [Bey,
1994, p.20-21 ]
The groups called for by Immediatism must, by definition, serve an
illegitimate— anti often therefore illegal — purpose from the point of view of
Capitalist totality. They are not for work, not for consumption, and not even for
the mediation and representation of the flow of capital (such as are "official"
art). In their illegitimacy, such groups are in their nature hidden— both by
conscious deception toward authority, and by simple invisibility.
A model Bey looks favorably on is the Tongs, which were organized
around officially illegitimate purposes. Other historical secret societies, such as
the Masons, provide a similar inspiration. Bey characterizes these societies,
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A Tong can perhaps be defined as a mutual benefit society for
people with a common interest which is illegal or dangerously
marginal
— hence, the necessary secrecy.
In maintaining a self-conscious secrecy, an Immediatist group or affiliation does
not merely avoid outright prosecution if its activity is considered threatening to
the state, it avoids representation and cooptation where its activity is
threatening to the Spectacle. Invisibility and secrecy are interstices of totalizing
mediation.
Millennium
Five years ago it still remained possible to occupy a third position
in the world, a neither/nor of refusal or slyness, a realm outside
the dialectic even a space of withdrawal; — disappearance as
will to power [Bey, 1996, p.29]
What happened in the intervening years, was 1989 107— another ideology named
by a date, as those discussed in footnote 4. With the fall of a second world,
Capitalist triumphalism — its one-world — seeks to, and succeeds in, eliminating
the interstices of TAZ. Strategies must change; jihad of presence is the only
opposition to a Capitalism of sameness.
For the Bey of Millennium, the logic of triumphalist Capitalism is a logic
of sameness and separation. Everything in consciousness, in desires, falls under
the homogenous form of exchange of equivalence. Whether the question is
"What is to be done?" or merely "What do you want?" the answer is already
mediated by the equivalence of money to itself. The logic of sameness is the
107The publication dates referenced here do not precisely match the dates of
composition or original presentation of Bey's works. TAZ was, in major part, first written
around 1986; the essays of Immediatism around 1992; and those of Millennium around
1994.
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logic of this equivalence; this sameness is a removal, a separation, of desire
from itself. Desires are stamped out in the one-world except as they fall under
the insatiable mediation of monied exchange.
To Bey (though the analogy is mine, not his), triumphalist Capitalism
returns in its fundamental principle to Marx's set of transitions, or equivalences,
in Chapter 3, Volume I of Capital [Marx, 1967/1867], C-M-C' or M-C-M' can be
read as the equivalence posited by money, but 'C' in this case can be read not
merely as 'commodity', but as 'consciousness' or desires themselves (or
perhaps, 'consumption'). Money is identical to itself (except in quantity), but it
also stands in each mediating chain with desire. On the one hand, in the cycle
C-M-C', our desires are mediated by their possibility of "satisfaction" only
within the logic of capitalist exchange. But as with Marx, the more fundamental
equation is M-C-M'. It is not, at root, us that utilizes money to satisfy ends
(desires leading, with mediation, to desires), but money that utilizes us to
satisfy its ends. The one-world proclaims that we must desire, in order to
promote the ghoulish parthenogenesis of money.
In Bey's characterization,
Having long ago capitalized all material being, the power of
scarcity has had no choice but to commodify the image (and the
imagination) as well — on the presumption that this is an ever-
expanding market. Awareness must be privatized— thought must
be appropriated, adulterated, alienated, packaged, labelled,
advertized and sold back to consciousness. All creativity must be
priced, and even the very process of resistance against this
expropriation must be turned to profit ("Be a rebel — buy a
Toyota! — or "Image is nothing, taste is everything" as a slogan for
some crappy softdrink). [Bey, 1996, p. 62]
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Or also,
The old Dualism has imploded into a totalized topology defined by
the gnoseographic geosophy of money and its less-than-one
dimensionality. The "mirror of production" has been superceded
by a complete transparency, the vertigo of terror. Land, labor,
nature, self itself, life itself, and even death can be re-invented as
the basis of all exhange— everything is money. [Bey, 1996, p.39]
Bey follows with a clarification on the ideological nature of money's totalization.
I might interject here, in a now familiar fashion, that what you hold is but a
shadow of my actual dissertation; the actual document can be found at the web
site indicated in my acknowledgments. Perhaps in an effort to dodge certain
accusations levelled against somewhat similar remarks by Baudrillard, Bey is
clear that he is characterizing Capital's imperative self-characterization, not its
empirical reality per se.
If, for Bey, there is nothing of futurity left to the concept of utopia"
what is the jihad, where are the possibilities of resistance? One sort of remark
he makes is a call for a sacralization, a mystico-religious commitment, to
resistance— in other words, of presence and difference. For Bey, mystical
traditions, particularly in Islam, about which he has written extensively under
another name, clearly provide inspiration for strategies of resistence. Hassan-i-
Sabbah and his school, for example, if even only for purely historical reasons,
rather than religious ones, is a worthwhile exemplar of radicalism. Still... aside
from a fascinating example, what does religious mystical experience "get" an
athiest like myself?
I am quite happy to agree with Bey that epistemic standards (whether
scientistic or theological) hardly need be the appropriate ones by which to judge
the "truth" of mystical experience ("fuck science and religion — we should
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demand a rationalism of the marvellous-an end to the violence of explanation."
[Bey, 1996, p.60]). Truth is not such an interesting question as all that. Even
so... where precisely is the resistance in these states of consciousness?
Perhaps surprisingly,
I think I can agree with Bey here also. The moments of
saturation and the unnameable ways-of-being which I have discussed earlier in
this chapter. The "truth" behind Islamic mysticism is not Islam (which despite
its thread of resistance to the Capitalist one-world is still a pretty awful
ideological system in its orthodox-fundamentalist form), but mysticism. Similarly
positive descriptions might be given of the ultra-heterodox Gnostic Christian
sects, the proto-Narodnik mysticism of Thomas Muntzer, Cabbalistic Judaism,
the Hindu occultism of Ghandi, and other heterdoxies which have had (overtly)
religious forms. Bey remarks,
Every religion has called forth its own inner antithesis over & over
again; every religion has considered the implications of moral
opposition to power; every tradition contains a vocabulary of
resistance as well as capitulation to oppression. Speaking broadly
one might say that up until now this "counter-tradition"- which is
both inside & outside religion — has comprised a "suppressed
content." [Bey, 1996, p.73]
An interesting parallel to observe here is with the well-known mystic
tendency in Benjamin's writings. This tendency is usually characterized by
readers of Critical Theory as a sort of eccentricity, or even an outright
shortfalling, of Benjamin, who is in this context thought to be overly influenced
by Jewish theological traditions. I do not read it this way. I think Benjamin's
mysticism is quite secular and even the most radically Marxist element of his
project. Benjamin was the first thinker to thoroughly recognize the totalizing
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tendency of representation-as- commodity™ In recognizing this totalizing
tendency, Benjam.n recognized the instability of strategies of resistence, and
their inability to function within the confines of instrumental rationality. The
method of knowledge and understanding available at the limits, or in the
interstices, of instrumental reason must appear, from the point-of-view of
totalization, as mysticism or irrationalism.™ But those are the right strategies.
In fact, I have tried to show a certain efficacy of transgression within the
secularly mystic events of saturation, discontinuity, and messianic time, which I
discuss in the initial sections of this chapter
.
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There is more to Bey's strategy for opposing the one-world than its call
for sacralization. In resistance to sameness and separation, Bey calls for a way-
of-being lived through presence and difference. Bey's conception is not of a
simple call for solidarity (as a kind of identity), but one of an identification which
at its heart incorporates diversity and difference.
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ln this thorough recognition he is followed, most significantly, by Debord, by Bey;
and indeed, by Adorno. Whatever disagreements I may have insinuated regarding Adorno, I
hope the tone of reverence in these critiques shows through.
The irrationalism of Surrealism, and especially Dada, should also be understood in
this context. Dada poetry and art often involved methods of autonomism which tried to
break boundaries of the instrumentally rationalist creative process. The Dada concern with
such altered states— induced with drugs, sleep-deprivation, forced physical repetitions, or
meditation— parallels very closely mystical methods such as the Sufi "whirling dirvishes",
the Assassin's use of hashish (which is named after them, after all), Native American spirit
journeys (such as with peyote or yohimbe), Aboriginal "walkabout," or even the Oglala
Sioux "sun dance" to produce altered states through various bodily puncturings and the
like (and similarly, Indian swamis on beds of nails). Many of these ritual methods of
obtaining mystical knowledge, arose, like Dada, as self-consciously resistive strategies.
1 10
Or, as Bey writes,
[T]he Revolution threw out the baby ("non-ordinary consciousness") along
with the bathwater of the Inquisition or of puritan repression. Despite
Sorel's insistence that the Revolution needed a "myth", it preferred to
bank everthing on "pure reason" instead. [Bey, 1996, p. 83]
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Proudhonian federalism based on non-hegemonic particularities in
a "nomadological" or rhizomatic mutuality of synergistic
solidarities
— this is our revolutionary structure.... Post-
Enlightenment ideology will experience queasiness at the notion
of the revolutionary implications of a religion or a way of life
always already opposed to the monoculture of sameness &
separation. Contemporary reaction will blanch at the idea of inter-
permeability, the porosity of solidarity, conviviality & presence as
the complementarity & harmonious resonance of "revolutionary
difference." [Bey, 1996, p.43]
One striking feature in Bey's analysis of sameness and difference is the clear
echos of Situationism's homogenizing Spectacle. But the scope of difference
envisioned by Bey is more intellectually satisfying. The Situationist hope was
certainly for a gesture of independence in thought and aesthetic from the
monotony of commodified desire. Situationists seem largely to have
comprehend resistance in terms of the student rebellion in the Capitalist world
of the 1 960's. That moment undoubtably had its radical elements, but Bey's
conception seems both more global and more historical.
A heterogeneous assortment of transgressive inspirations for a collection
of lost moments of history. These are the temporary autonomous zones of
other places and times, which can still be pulled from the interstices of official
history. A very similar assortment of transgressive histories is recognized by a
variety post-Situationist writers, including a number of theoretical-leaning fiction
writers. For examples, books by Burrough [Burroughs, 1981; 1983; 1987],
Acker [Acker, 1996] and Matiasz [Matiasz, 1996] engage much the same
gestalt of resistance. Some such frequently utilitized interstices are the radical-
democratic pirate collectives of the 1 5th- 1 8th Century, tri-racial isolates in
colonized North America ("gone to Croatan..."), Moorish Sufism (including
possible buried connections with Celtic cultural artifacts), the EZLN Mayan
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globalist particularism, squatter/anarchist communities of the 1980s, and
American gay counter-culture of the Cold War. Such a list cannot be intended
as definitive of anything. None of the mentioned writers are attempting a
catalog of resistences as such. And yet some particular cultural moments stand
out to Bey and other recent theorists, as well as to some contemporaneous
novelists, as moments which are liberating precisely in unifying heterogeniety.
For the fiction writers I mention (and others), the elements in these series can
be unified even further in imagined utopias of plurality. Such an ideal is of a
coalescence, even a kind of identity of resistance, in some particular times and
places where groups of people with starkly divergent histories, races, religions,
cultures, and languages have come, or been thrown, together, and have formed
unities not despite but out of differences.
The jihad Bey envisions as the only possible resistance to the one-world
is a struggle for unity in necessarily particularist identities-or better, presences
The identities of a resistence such as the Zapatistas is quite opposed to the
identitarian logic of money. On one level, the Mayan-identity of the Zapatistas
does not submit to the mediating equivalence of exchange. Mayan-identity is
not the alienated self-identity of money just plainly insofar as it does not pose
the separation from itself which defines alienation. But even more importantly,
Zapatistism is not a totalizing ideology; it defines it own bounds and limits of
identificatory force. The EZLN does not want to make anyone else Mayan, it is
not colonizing. And yet, Zapatistism is not an isolationist or boosterist ideology
(and not merely because of the comparative disempowerment of its
members — painfully many "liberation" movements readily rely on the crudest
racial/nationalist dogma). The alliances and unities the EZLN has created have
270
been alliances of difference of precisely the sort Bey hopes for. The Zapatistas
are savvy on a global level without falling for the homogenization of globalism.
And appropriately, the EZLN has fired, at least, a revolutionary identification for
many quite different particularities throughout the world.
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CHAPTER VIII
WORDS TO THE END
From conundrum to penumbra... and back again.
[with thanks to W.V.O.Quine]
In a dissertation that is-like this one-devoted either to questions of
what is wrong in philosophy or to questions of what is wrong with reality, I
assume it is customary to conclude with an answer to Lenin's famous question
title, What is to be done?" Before this question I remain helplessly mute. The
most hopeful answer one can give, I suppose, is to answer, "Write a book like
this one!" It is a nice answer. Nietzsche's answer; or Adorno's answer; probably
Lenin s answer, in still other ways, Kant's answer, Hegel's answer, or even
Plato s answer. Some years ago I hoped it would be my answer, but not really
as I write this.
I would like to give Deleuze and Guattari's advice from the introduction
to A Thousand Plateaus [Deleuze and Guattari, 1987b] as a summary of the
preceding document, "Read this book as you would listen to a record album." I
still like that advice, and still believe that honesty requires such advice— not just
for this particular dissertation which pulls threads from many places, but for any
attempt at theory that simultaneously denies its own hopes for totalization and
formal consistency. Much of my project has been to identify a large number of
failures that I think are related: the failure of immanence and immanent critique;
the failure of philosophical truth and representation; many failures at the core of
subjectivity and subjectivation; the failures of systematicity; even, in a
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paradoxical way, the failures of totalizing ideologies whose totalizing force lies
at the root of many other failures. I might interject here, as if such a yoice could
originate outside the text, the usual caveat about this document's modification.
Since this dissertation-like Deleuze and Guatarri's book in this regard-does
not believe in totality as the right mode of either conception or action, what else
could the chapters and sections be besides a series of "tracks" to listen to for
their individual themes and motifs?
Nonetheless, I realize that a mere easy dismissal of a unifying project is
hardly a satisfactory conclusion for either writer or readers. Although this
document must present as a series of vignettes, each analyzing a mechanism of
failure, or of the ideological cover totalization utilizes, there is an almost
dialectical unity of the various gestures. Not nearly so neat, and not nearly so
directional as in Hegel's Phenomenology (or Marx's Capital) . But there remain
lessons to be learned from each striation of this dissertation. A few central
concepts are brought to each layer, and play themselves out there, even if they
do not arrive at some grander unity of conclusion, purpose and recommendation
in this conclusion.
Three concepts operate behind the scenes — and occassionally in front of
them — of each chapter and section.
First Concept: The Necessary/Impossible Pair
Necessity and impossibility, it seems to me, are closely conjoined in
ideologies, and in the subjects interpellated by those ideologies. Obviously, a
traditional modal logic— or the common-sense that underlies it— would feel an
affront in putting the terms together as other than plain antonyms. Fair enough
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for the "normal" case, but ideology is special.'” Almost by definition, the
process of subjectivation, the sine qua non of ideology, creates beliefs,
attitudes, emotions, 'truths' even, that are both necessary and impossible.
These facets of self-our ideological and thereby subjective self-are necessary
inasmuch as having them is at the core of being what we are. We literally could
not be a self without believing as we do. It is chiefly through Lacan, who pops
up throughout the dissertation-only occassionally systematically-that
I talk
about this fact of subjective necessity.
At the same time, many of those things that we must believe cannot be
believed coherently. There remain internal contradictions at the core of
ideologies; and these contradictions remain not as accidents, but as essential,
functional necessities of ideologies. A positivistic thinker, insofar as one might
be willing to talk about ideologies at all (for example, analytic Marxists, like
Roemer or Elster), might hope for a reduction of an ideology to a coherent
collection of interested beliefs. I mention what I call the Engels/Gramsci
approach in the section Why Ideology is Not Ideational
.
This amounts to
precisely the positivism I indicate in this paragraph (but let us not jump to any
characterization of Engels or Gramsci generally from this naming).
If an ideology were just a system of beliefs that the ruling class foists on
an unwitting working class, coherency and consistency would be a high goal in
such a scheme or plot. We might, indeed, very soon design Al machines upon
whom we will impose ideologies as a way of normativizing their actions — similar
in Under the topic Ideology in Opaque Contexts, I made some remarks about what is
special about ideology in an epistemic sense. As well, the discussions of Mocnik try to
flesh out some related points. The special kind of antonymic relationship between
'necessary' and 'impossible' is also pointed to somewhat passingly in footnote 92
,
in
discussion of Greimasian squares.
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epistemic/semantic schemes are currently called 'ontologies' by actual computer
scientists. Again, coherency would be a desideratum here (one thinks of old
Star Trek episodes, or Clark's 2001). But actual lived ideologies have not, and I
believe cannot, have such consistency. Real ideologies function, subjectivate,
by means of their inconsistencies.
I think the best effort I have made in
discussing this was in the section The American in Me, in relation to some now-
superseded contradictory coeval tendencies of American racial ideology. But I
have had the notion of inconsistency in mind in all my ideological case-studies.
The conjunction of necessary and impossible that I assert poses special
problems in the context of early modern philosophy. I do not write much directly
about Descartes, Hume, Kant, or similar cannonical philosophers-of-mind. But
they are nonetheless my targets, much as they have been the targets of
perhaps the majority of philosophy since Nietzsche— not just the targets of
phenomenologists and postmodernists, but even that of the likes of
Wittgenstein, Quine or Goodman. There are many more dissertations pointed to
by the few sentences of this paragraph than I am able to write. But without
trying to write them, I can still safely observe that philosophy between
Descartes and Nietzsche took as axiomatic that it was possible to form a
deduction from some collection of inevitable ideas to a veracious picture of the
world. What was necessary was both actual and possible. I am not the first,
not the best, and will not be the last; but I am still trying to exorcize the ghost
of Descartes — and perhaps thereby to give Descartes' daemon its due.
Underneath obscure and technical digressions in evolutionary biology, Lacanian
analytics, literary rants on movies about sex, and most everthing else herein, lay
so many attempts to answer the audacious inference,
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Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive
me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing solong as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must,
in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully
considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum
) I am, I exist is
necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in
my mind. [Descartes, 1641,
http://philos.wright.edu/Descartes/Meditation2.html] 112
Second Concept: Totalization
Ideologies, sometimes, have a tendency toward totality. Sometimes they
forclose discussion of particular notions by becoming outsideless. One might
analogize outsidelessness to surfaces, spheres, Mob, us strips, Kline bottles, and
Hilbert spaces. Lacan's digressions into topology were, in part, efforts to
capture this notion; albeit, perhaps, too literalistically. Rather than push too
much for a specific geometric or mathematical metaphor, I think it most useful
to connect totalization with my "first concept" of necessity as a feature of
subjectivation. As much as I can find an outside from which to look in at
hegemonic (totalized) ideologies, I notice a "paradoxical" contrast between
superstructure and base; Symbolic Order and reality; phenomena and noumena;
Ideology and history. A number of pairs proposed by a number of thinkers point
to what I want to observe, which can actually be stated fairly simply: certain
beliefs, at certain times, are so inevitable to some subjectivities that they are
1120r more accurately (though my Latin is rusty),
Sed est deceptor nescio quis, summe potens, summe callidus, qui de
industria me semper fallit. Haud dubie igitur ego etiam sum, si me fallit; &
fallat quantum potest, nunquam tamen efficiet, ut nihil sim quamdiu me
aliquid esse cogitabo. Adeo ut, omnibus satis superque pensitatis, denique
statuendum sit hoc pronuntiatum, Ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me
profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum.
[http://philos.wright.edU/Descartes/Meditation2L.html#l3]
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difficult to notice, and impossible to refute; and yet these same beliefs are
historically transient, even fleeting.
Discursive rationality has its place, and its scope. But it also has its
distinct limitations; and these limits wall off everything really important. The
ideologies that truly control us, and that most profoundly shape human social
relations, are those that have forclosed outsides. While the content of certain
scientific theories, for example, remains open to disputation, argument and
evidence, many other beliefs exist purely in the background, assumed uniformly
by all parties to such thereby superficial disputes. Conception has a horizon.
And beyond this horizon, nothing is visible, and nothing can be described. And
yet, our a priori is-in a phrase of Foucault-an historical a priori. The limits of
our conception are not those that limited subjects of the past, interpellated by
different ideologies, nor those that will limit subjects of the future.
One of the basic problems that I have attempted to address by this
dissertation is understanding how ideas that cannot be doubted now, were
unimagined in the past, and will be dismissed as comical in the future. I have
attempted to address this in part out of the anti-Cartesianism discussed in the
prior topic of this conclusion; but I have also another motive. As a political
radical— or even just as someone with a political motive of any sort— I want to
change social reality; and as an academic and a philosopher, I suppose I want to
do it by the "talking cure." At the same time, I recognize that I am a subject
interpellated by ideologies. To interject a reminder: it is worth remembering the
grad school's sadistic impositions on this literal text. As such, whatever I speak
of may be only what I can speak of: detritus, epiphenomena, superficiality— but
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what I would need to speak of might be that which lies past my horizon of
conception, on the outside of the outsideless ideologies in which I live.
My attempt to speak from the outside of the outsidelessness
I must be
within, my horizon of conception, is peformed through what Jeremy Barris
wrote about as a 'dance' [Barris, 1990]. First I step outside of what I am
actually outside of— those fairly short-lived ideologies I write about in Chapter
V, or the narrow racial ideologies in the latter part of Chapter IV, for
example— then I step back into what, for me, has no outside— gender, causality,
perhaps race as an ontological conceit. It is almost as if the sufficiently rapid
juxtoposition of chapters and sections might carry with it a perceptual trace, as
staring at a repeating and contrastive pattern can leave a visual remnant on a
flat surface after the pattern's removal (although perhaps an inversion or
distortion of the original pattern). What I try to create by the exercise of this
dissertation is at least a nagging doubt, "What if those things we know to be
true are ideological falsities in some unspecifiable manner?"
My pessimism that opens this conclusion arises from the fact that I
cannot hope for better than a subjunctive mood to my strongest conclusions. To
paraphrase Nietzsche: supposing our deepest held beliefs to be limited,
compliant, and false, what then? There is no good positive advice to give here.
Critical theory's immanentist ideology critique does not crank out
verisimilitudinous revolutionary slogans. The perspective of the proletariat may
be truer in some regards, but we still are left with a matter of degrees. Or still
worse, what we need is not truth at all — we already have plenty of that, and it
has generally let us down. What we need is an enunciative position outside
speech, a subject outside ideology, an actor and knower who is outside our
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outsideless horizon of being. We ain't got that! The closest I come to being able
to point at the Revolutionary Subject this paragraph fantasizes is with Hakim
Bey s excursions into mysticism; with Situationism's drifts into... well, into
mysticism also, I suppose; a sort of feminine jouissance in my exegeses of
'hysterical movies' (Lacan's mysticism, and Benjamin's). As a footnote, one
could observe how much Bataille, or Sorel, or perhaps less flatteringly,
Baudrillard, wind up where I have wound up. This is not exactly where I wanted
to go when I started this dissertation, despite the good company I keep here.
Third Concept: Ideological Adhesion
My salvation — to carry on (no doubt too far) the analogy of the
unsatisfying mysticism of my "second concept," above-is in a realization that
crystalized for me while writing later portions of this dissertation. I introduce the
'adhesive theory of ideological change' in my section The Irrelevance of
Critique, use it quite extensively throughout Chapter VII, and use it somewhat
more lightly in Chapter V, in the section Biology and Her Sisters, and elsewhere.
Explicitly identifying the adhesive theory, and naming it such, came after I had
made implicit use of the idea in a large number of places. It both does and does
not do what the term 'terrorism' of my title was intended for.
I believe that change within totalized ideologies must have extrinsic
sources. Talking about terrorism is in many ways like talking about mysticism,
as I do in this conclusion and in the places referred to by this conclusion. It is to
pose an externality— an 'intrusion of the real' in Zizek-ese— as a cause behind
change within ideology. 1 still believe in this effectivity of extrinsic causes: the
cry of 'Fire!' I talk about, or the quieting-by-death of ideologically influential
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embodied discursive positions, really does quite often wind up shaping the
resultant range of discursive positions. But the terrorist effectivity remains at
the level of 'that about which we cannot speak' (to paraphrase the last remark
of the Tractatus ); about it I must still remain silent. At the same time, however,
Barris' dance reveals an extrinsic intrinsity-or maybe, an intrinsic extrinsity.
Ideology is its own outside! Or rather, ideologies are outsides for each other.
What occurs over and over, I have found, is that ideologies sometimes
attach themselves together. In doing this, the most global of totalizations
sometimes glom on to trivial and transient ideologies, or the reverse— but with
the effect that the tail wags the dog. Moreover, ideologies sometimes attach
without necessarily being directly of the same domain. It may well occur that a
Kuhnian thorn — some "small" bit of observation, or tangential theoretical
quandry— in the side of a grander theory winds up unraveling the whole of the
theory. But what really interests me is those times that conceptually and
historically dissimilar set of ideas undergo this same (pseudo-)Kuhnian process.
Why disease with liberation (Forgotten Aids Myths)? Why causality with film
representations of femininity (The Ideology of Causation and Hysterical
Movies )? Why evolutionary biology with Homo Economicus (Biology and Her
Sisters )? Why electrification with capital punishment (The Irrelevance of
Critique ) ?
For all of the ideological conjunctions I examine one can find analogies,
overlapping histories, and specific shared conceptual terms. In some pairs these
are closer than in others. But in none of the examples I analyze in this
dissertation do I think that anyone could determine the adhesed causal histories
save through the virtue of hindsight. Or in some cases, one can see them only
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through the lens of a hopeful Imagination. We can simply observe that
adhesions occur; and observe with a certain optimism that political histories can
sometimes thereby take unexpected turns. For totalizing
ideologies
— hegemonies
— critique lacks a ground, and direct confrontation can
hardly be even imagined. And yet these same totalities sometimes ride along
with ephemera, things that lie within our horizons of conception and are within
our power to influence consciously and directly. Our nagging problem remains in
identifying what ideologies are so fused in anything but retrospect.
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APPENDIX A
COPYRIGHT TERMS
Intellectual property is a sham. Increasingly, IP law serves as a means of social
control and regulation by the powerful of the less powerful, and as a means of
transferring wealth from the poor to the rich. A depressing downward spiral of
freedoms leads from the Berne Convention, to repeatedly extended barring of
intellectual works from the public domain by the U.S. Congress, to the truly
sickening World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in all its contrivances.
At the same time, over the last few years a virus— or several competing
viruses has infected a certain domain of expression, that surrounding computer
source code. Licenses like the GNU General Public License (GPL), Perl Artistic
License, Berkeley Software License, and others, have been means of creating
intellectual works under copyright terms specially crafted to make derived
works remain in the open, and remain beneficial to the public good.
Computer source code has been a special case. It falls into a different
economy of derived works than do other intellectual products, and is subject to
different technical contraints and possibilities. However, many people familiar
with the efforts of "Open Source" licenses, like the examples mentioned, have
wanted to create a similar framework for the protection of "content." The best
such framework to date is the OpenContent License (OPL). The OPL may not be
the last word in protecting the freedom of ideas. But it is a good start. I release
this document, the Dissertation in Philosophy titled "The Speculum and the
Scalpel" by David Mertz, under the terms of the OPL:
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OpenContent License (OPL)
Version 1.0, July 14, 1998.
This document outlines the principles underlying the OpenContent
(OC) movement and may be redistributed provided it remains
unaltered. For legal purposes, this document is the license under
which OpenContent is made available for use.
The original version of this document may be found at
http://www.opencontent.org/opl.shtml
LICENSE
Terms and Conditions for Copying, Distributing, and Modifying
Items other than copying, distributing, and modifying the Content
with which this license was distributed (such as using, etc.) are
outside the scope of this license.
1. You may copy and distribute exact replicas of the OpenContent
(OC) as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you
conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy an
appropriate copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty; keep
intact all the notices that refer to this License and to the absence
of any warranty; and give any other recipients of the OC a copy
of this License along with the OC. You may at your option charge
a fee for the media and/or handling involved in creating a unique
copy of the OC for use offline, you may at your option offer
instructional support for the OC in exchange for a fee, or you may
at your option offer warranty in exchange for a fee. You may not
charge a fee for the OC itself. You may not charge a fee for the
sole service of providing access to and/or use of the OC via a
network (e.g. the Internet), whether it be via the world wide web,
FTP, or any other method.
2. You may modify your copy or copies of the OpenContent or
any portion of it, thus forming works based on the Content, and
distribute such modifications or work under the terms of Section
1 above, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:
a) You must cause the modified content to carry prominent
notices stating that you changed it, the exact nature and
content of the changes, and the date of any change.
b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish,
that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the OC
or any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge
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to all third parties under the terms of this License, unless
otherwise permitted under applicable Fair Use law.
These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole. If
identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the OC,
and can be reasonably considered independent and separate
works in themselves, then this License, and its terms, do not
apply to those sections when you distribute them as separate
works. But when you distribute the same sections as part of a
whole which is a work based on the OC, the distribution of the
whole must be on the terms of this License, whose permissions
for other licensees extend to the entire whole, and thus to each
and every part regardless of who wrote it. Exceptions are made to
this requirement to release modified works free of charge under
this license only in compliance with Fair Use law where
applicable.
3. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not
signed it. However, nothing else grants you permission to copy,
distribute or modify the OC. These actions are prohibited by law if
you do not accept this License. Therefore, by distributing or
translating the OC, or by deriving works herefrom, you indicate
your acceptance of this License to do so, and all its terms and
conditions for copying, distributing or translating the OC.
NO WARRANTY
4. BECAUSE THE OPENCONTENT (OC) IS LICENSED FREE OF
CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE OC, TO THE
EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN
OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE OC "AS IS" WITHOUT
WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK OF USE OF THE OC IS WITH YOU.
SHOULD THE OC PROVE FAULTY, INACCURATE, OR
OTHERWISE UNACCEPTABLE YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL
NECESSARY REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
5. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR
AGREED TO IN WRITING WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR
ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MIRROR AND/OR REDISTRIBUTE
THE OC AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR
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DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL
OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR
INABILITY TO USE THE OC, EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER
PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGES.
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APPENDIX B
BILDUNGSROMANS
A long time ago-shortly before I started in this doctoral program-1 wrote an
extended review of a book by Jagdish Hattiangadi called How is 1 anmmgp
—SSlble? ' Hattiangadi's book is largely about a subject that I guess one would
do well to call 'evolutionary epistemology'. He thinks-or at least he thought 12
years ago-that since people have at least a bit of a tendency to believe true
things over false ones, we must have evolved biologically to act in this weakly
verisimilitudinous manner. I don't think that Hattiangadi's book is a particularly
pivotal one, although I still think it is interesting and worthwhile. But as a point
of biography, I entered Massachusetts, and graduate school, with a certain
nagging doubt.
In the conclusion to my dissertation, I talk a bit about trying to answer
Descartes cogito. But actually, there is something underneath the cogito, and
underneath most all of philosophy. We assume — as philosophers, but also just
as human beings— that we have a verisimilitudinous tendency. Truth is
something we arrive at, at least at times. What if this is not "true"? What if we
are not the sorts of beings that tend towards truths; or truths are not the sorts
of things that one can tend towards. This is the little nagging doubt that I wrote
a dissertation about.
Obviously, I have a problem here. I've said as much in my dissertation,
especially in its introduction, although saying it doesn't alleviate the problem at
all. Anything I might do to try to prove the contrary of our verisimilitudinous
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assumption is just a way of exemplifying it. Any critique or refutation I might
provide in relation to my nagging doubt firstly affirms and presupposes the very
verisimilitudinous assumption I want to upset. I am trapped
-and the rest of you
with me, I think-but my confinement still shouldn't imply my correctness. Or at
least that is still my little doubt.
I suppose I could have written a dissertation about radical skepticism.
Brains in vats. Evil demons. I suppose for an updated twist, I could write about
virtual realities of a computer generated sort. But I think it would have been a
forgone conclusion that I lose that game. Maybe such scenarios are right, and if
so, there is nothing much I can say one way or another. God doesn't rescue me;
as He did Descartes. But I think what I did write is much better than that other
dissertation. What I wanted to do-and what I think I did-was instead take as
given that everything I (or we) believe is pretty much accurate, at least in an
overall way. But I have wanted to ask whether even given all that, this nagging
verisimilitudinous assumption holds up. Obviously, I think it does not.
I think that if one thinks about my dissertation in terms of my nagging
doubt and the approach to it I mention, it might make a little more sense why I
include the many of the jarringly heterogenous elements in my dissertation that I
do. For example, I know it is difficult to read my biology chapter in continuity
with the later ones. But if only for the reasons of biography I have mentioned, I
thought it fair to give evolutionary epistemology its chance at grounding our
verisimilitudinous assumption. I find, of course, that a biological ground does
not ground truth. But it needed its chance.
I have already hinted at a reading strategy by now; but let me say it
explicitly. The dissertation I am defending today is really a Bildungsromans. It is
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the story of how I spent the last decade of my intellectual life. Many of the
things that have happened in this last decade did not just happen to me, but
also to the philosophical community around me. This decade, I find, has been
epitomized and exemplified foremost in the fact that Slavoj Zizek started writing
books in English
— those in Slovenian are not accessible to me, and are similarly
closed to much of the philosophical community. These books have been a joy to
read, but have also been something of a curse. With each successive book,
Zizek has snatched away those three-fourths thought and half written words
that I wished to use in my own essays and chapters. The challenge for me-in a
certain odd way rightly overly long in coming-has been to write what I wanted
to write without it winding up as mere plagiarism.
As important as Zizek's books have been, they are part of a philosophical
moment-maybe even a movement-that shares a number of constellations.
These constellations are identified by four specific names, each affixed with the
prefix 'post-'. The more commonplace 'post-'s— postmodern and post-
structuralist, among a few others— are approximations here. The better names
are— almost— the four names obliquely bandied in the introduction to Zizek's
first book: Althusser, Lacan, Foucault and Habermas. The last is a ruse,
however. I do not think Habermas quite warrants his own prefix, but rather he
is listed more for the chair he sits in than for the books he writes. The proper
name here would be, by my allusion, Horkheimer; but better still, simply Critical
Theory. To write social philosophy in the 1990's is to come to grips with
Althusser, Lacan, Foucault and Critical Theory. By and large, this is what Judith
Butler, Etienne Balibar, Jacques-Alain Miller, Frederic Jameson, Laclau and
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Mouffe, and a variety of other thinkers have been doing. I myself am included in
that list at least if it is made long enough.
If there is one neat question that I would try to place underneath this
whole list of thinkers
— including myself-it would be, "How does ideology work,
given the ultimate vacuity of subjectivation?" That is pretty much the topic of
all my dissertation. I tend to be more motivated by the epistemic impetus of my
mentioned nagging doubt than are most of those listed or hinted at. Actually,
my epistemic questions do not, in the end, fall all that far from the almost
wholly unmentioned Quine, and Kuhn, and Feyerabend, and Latour, who
picqued them in the first place, in my biography. But whatever the starting of
my journey to this moment of social philosophy in the 1990 s, the current
ground must be post-Lacanian, post-Althusserian, post-Foucauldian, and post-
Critical Theory. I hope to have said something while standing on this ground.
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